按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
becomes ever more destitute of content； the individuality it despises is the profundity in which the
Notion seizes itself and is posited as Notion。
Universality and particularity appeared； on the one hand； as moments of the becoming of
individuality。 But it has already been shown that they are in themselves the total Notion； and
consequently in individuality do not pass over into an other； but that in individuality there is only
posited that they are in and for themselves。 The universal is in and for itself because it is in its
own self absolute mediation； self…reference only as absolute negativity。 It is an abstract universal
in so far as this absolute negativity。 It is an abstract universal in so far as this sublating is an
external act and so a dropping of the determinateness。
Life； Spirit； God — the pure Notion itself； are beyond the grasp of abstraction； because it deprives
its products of singularity； of the principle of individuality and personality； and so arrives at nothing
but universalities devoid of life and spirit； colour and content。
Yet the unity of the Notion is so indissoluble that even these products of abstraction； though they
are supposed to drop individuality are； on the contrary； individuals themselves。 Abstraction raises
the concrete into universality in which； however； the universal is grasped only as a determinate
universality； and this is precisely the individuality that has shown itself to be self…related
determinateness。 Abstraction； therefore； is a sundering of the concrete and an isolating of its
determinations； through it only single properties and moments are seized； for its product must
contain what it is itself。 But the difference between this individuality of its products and the
Notion's individuality is that； in the former； the individual as content and the universal as form are
distinct from one another … just because the former is not present as absolute form； as the Notion
itself； or the latter is not present as the totality of form。 However this more detailed consideration
shows that the abstract product itself is a unity of the individual content and abstract universality；
and is； therefore； a concrete … and the opposite of what it aims to be。
2。 But Individuality is not only the return of the Notion into itself； it immediately its loss。 Through
individuality； where the Notion is internal to itself； it becomes external to itself and enters into
actuality。 Abstraction which； as the soul of individuality is the relation of the negative to the
negative； and； as we have shown not external to the universal and the particular but immanent in
them； and through it they are concrete； content； an individual。 But as this negativity； individuality is
the determinate determinateness； is differentiation as such； through this reflection of the difference
into itself； the difference becomes fixed； it is only through individuality that the determining of the
particular takes place； for individuality is that abstraction which simply as individuality； is now
posited abstraction。
The individual； therefore； as self…related negativity； is immediate identity of the negative with itself；
it is a being…for…self。 Or it is the abstraction that determines the Notion； according to its ideal
moment of being； as an immediate。 In this way； the individual is a qualitative one or this。 With
this quality it is； first； repulsion of itself from itself； whereby the many other ones are presupposed；
secondly； it is now a negative relation towards these presupposed others； and； the individual is in
so far exclusive。
When one understands by the universal； that which is common to several individuals； one is
starting from the indifferent subsistence of these individuals and confounding the immediacy of
being with the determination of the Notion。 The lowest possible conception of the universal in its
connection with the individual is this external relation of it as merely a common element。
Chapter 2 The Judgment
The judgment is the determinateness of the Notion posited in the Notion itself。 The Notion's
determinations； or what we have seen to be the same thing； the determinate Notions； have already
been considered on their own； but this consideration was more a subjective reflection or
subjective abstraction。 But the Notion is itself this abstractive process； the opposing of its
determinations is its own determining activity。 The judgment is this positing of the determinate
Notions by the Notion itself。 Judging is thus another function than comprehension； or rather it is
the other function of the Notion as the determining of the Notion by itself； and the further
progress of the judgment into the diversity of judgments is the progressive determination of the
Notion。 What kinds of determinate Notions there are； and how these determinations of the
Notion are arrived at； has to reveal itself in the judgment。
The judgment can therefore be called the proximate realisation of the Notion； inasmuch as reality
denotes in general entry into existence as a determinate being。 More precisely； the nature of this
realisation has presented itself in such a manner that； on the one hand； the moments of the Notion
through its reflection…into…self or its individuality are self…subsistent totalities； while on the other
hand the unity of the Notion is their relation。 The determinations reflected into themselves are
determinate totalities； no less essentially in their indifferent and disconnected subsistence as
through their reciprocal mediation with one another。 The determining itself is only totality in that it
contains these totalities and their connection。 This totality is the judgment。 It contains； therefore；
first； the two self…subsistents which are called subject and predicate。 What each is cannot yet
really be said； they are still indeterminate； for it is only through the judgment that they are to be
determined。 The judgment； being the Notion as determinate； the only distinction present is the
general one that the judgment contains the determinate Notion over against the still
indeterminate Notion。 The subject can therefore； in the first instance； be taken in relation to the
predicate as the individual over against the universal； or even as the particular over against the
universal； or as the individual over against the particular； so far； they confront each other only in
general； as the more determinate and the more universal。
It is therefore appropriate and necessary to have these names； subject and predicate for the
determinations of the judgment； as names； they are something indeterminate that still awaits its
determination； and are； therefore； no more than names。 It is partly for this reason that the Notion
determinations themselves could not be used for the two sides of the judgment； but a stronger
reason is because the nature of the Notion determination is emphatically to be； not something
abstract and fixed； but to have and to posit its opposite within it； since the sides of the judgment
are themselves Notions and therefore the totality of its determinations； each side must run through
all these determinations and exhibit them within itse