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whose finitude and untruth have been demonstrated in the logic。 On the contrary； logic exhibits the
elevation of the Idea to that level from which it becomes the creator of nature and passes over to
the form of a concrete immediacy whose Notion； however； breaks up this shape again in order to
realise itself as concrete spirit。 As contrasted with these concrete sciences （although these have
and retain as their inner formative principle that same logical element； or the Notion； which had
served is their archetype）； logic is of course a formal science； but it is the science of the absolute
form which is within itself a totality and contains the pure Idea of truth itself。 This absolute form
has in its own self its content or reality； the Notion； not being a trivial； empty identity； possesses in
its moment of negativity or of absolute determining； the differentiated determinations； the content is
simply and solely these determinations of the absolute form and nothing else a content posited by
the absolute form itself and consequently also adequate to it。 For this reason； this form is of quite
another nature than logical form is ordinarily taken to be。 It is already on its own account truth；
since this content is adequate to its form； or the reality to its Notion； and it is the pure truth
because the determinations of the content do not yet have the form of an absolute otherness or of
absolute immediacy。 When Kant； in connection with logic comes to discuss the old and famous
question： what is truth？ he first of all presents to the reader as a triviality the explanation of the
term as the agreement of cognition with its object a definition of great； indeed of supreme； value。 If
we remember this definition in connection with the fundamental assertion of transcendental
idealism； that reason as cognitive is incapable of apprehending things…in…themselves； that reality
lies absolutely outside the Notion； then it is at once evident that a reason such as this which is
unable to put itself in agreement with its object； the things…in…themselves； and things…in…themselves
that are not in agreement with the Notion of reason； the Notion that is not in agreement with
reality； and a reality that does not agree with the Notion； are untrue conceptions。 If Kant had
considered the Idea of an intuitive understanding in the light of the above definition of truth； he
would have treated that Idea which expresses the required agreement； not as a figment of thought
but rather as the truth。
'What we require to know' Kant goes on to say； 'is a universal and sure criterion of any cognition
whatever； it would be such a criterion as would be valid for all cognitions without distinction of
their objects； but since with such a criterion abstraction would be made from all content of the
cognition （relation to its object） and truth concerns precisely this content； it would be quite
impossible and absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognitions。' Here； the
usual conception of the formal function of logic is expressed very definitely and the argument
adduced has a very convincing air。 But first of all it is to be observed that it usually happens with
such formal ratiocination that it forgets in its discourse the very point on which it has based its
argument and of which it is speaking。 It is alleged that it would be absurd to ask for the criterion of
the truth of the content of cognition； but according to the definition it is not the content that
constitutes the truth； but the agreement of the content with the Notion。 A content such as is here
spoken of； without the Notion； is something notionless； and hence without essential being；
certainly we cannot ask for the criterion of the truth of such a content； but for the very opposite
reason； not； that is； because the content； as something notionless； is not the required agreement；
but simply because it cannot be anything more than a mere truthless opinion。 Let us leave on one
side the content which causes the confusion here the confusion into which formalism falls whenever
it sets out to explain something and which makes it say the opposite of what it intends and let us
stop at the abstract view that logic is only formal and； in fact； abstracts from all content； we then
have a one…sided cognition which is not to contain any object； an empty； blank form which
therefore is no more an agreement for an agreement essentially requires two terms then it is truth。
In the a priori synthesis of the Notion； Kant possessed a higher principle in which a duality in a
unity could be cognised； a cognition； therefore； of what is required for truth； but the material of
sense； the manifold of intuition； was too strong for him and he was unable to get away from it to a
consideration of the Notion and the categories in and for themselves and to a speculative method
of philosophising。
Logic being the science of the absolute form； this formal science； in order to be true； must possess
in its own self a content adequate to its form； and all the more； since the formal element of logic is
the pure form； and therefore the truth of logic must be the pure truth itself。 Consequently this
formal science must be regarded as possessing richer determinations and a richer content and as
being infinitely more potent in its influence on the concrete than is usually supposed。 The laws of
logic by themselves （not counting the heterogeneous accretions of applied logic and the rest of the
psychological and anthropological material） are commonly restricted； apart from the law of
contradiction； to some meagre propositions concerning the conversion of judgements and the
forms of syllogisms。 Even here the forms which come up for treatment as well as their further
modifications are only； as it were； historically taken up； they are not subjected to criticism to
determine whether they are in and for themselves true。 Thus； for example； the form of the positive
judgement is accepted as something perfectly correct in itself； the question whether such a
judgement is true depending solely on the content。 Whether this form is in its own self a form of
truth； whether the proposition it enunciates； the individual is a universal； is not inherently
dialectical； is a question that no one thinks of investigating。 It is straightway assumed that this
judgement is； on its own account； capable of containing truth and that the proposition enunciated
by any positive judgement is true； although it is directly evident that it lacks what is required by the
definition of truth； namely； the agreement of the Notion and its object； if the predicate； which here
is the universal； is taken as the Notion； and the subject； which is the individual； is taken as the
object； then the one does not agree with the other。 But if the abstract universal which is the
predicate falls short of constituting a Notion； for a Notion certainly implies something more； and if；
too； a subject of this kind is not yet much more than a grammatical one； how should the judgement
possibly contain truth seeing that either its Notion and object do not agree； or it lacks both Notion
and object？ On the contrary； then； what is impossib