按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
universality。 The understanding is in this way an intrinsically empty form which； on the one hand；
obtains a reality through the said given content and； on the other hand； abstracts from that
content； that is to say； lets it drop as something useless； but useless only for the Notion。 In both
these actions the Notion is not the independent factor； not the essential and true element of the
prior given material； on the contrary； it is the material that is regarded as the absolute reality； which
cannot be extracted from the Notion。
Now it must certainly be admitted that the Notion as such is not yet complete； but must rise to the
Idea which alone is the unity of the Notion and reality； and this must be shown in the sequel to be
the spontaneous outcome of the nature of the Notion itself。 For the reality which the Notion
gives itself must not be received by it as something external but must； in accordance with the
requirement of the science； be derived from the Notion itself。 But the truth is that it is not the
material given by intuition and representation that ought to be vindicated as the real in contrast to
the Notion。 People often say； 'It is only a notion；' contrasting the notion not only with the Idea but
with sensuous； spatial and temporal； palpable reality as something more excellent than the Notion；
and then the abstract is held to be of less account than the concrete because it lacks so much of
this kind of material。 In this view； to abstract means to select from the concrete object for our
subjective purposes this or that mark without thereby detracting from the worth and status of
the many other properties and features left out of account； on the contrary； these as real retain
their validity completely unimpaired； only they are left yonder； on the other side； thus it is only the
inability of the understanding to assimilate such wealth that compels it to content itself with the
impoverished abstraction。 Now to regard the given material of intuition and the manifold of
representation as the real in contrast to what is thought； to the Notion； is a view； the
abandonment of which is not only a condition of philosophising but is already presupposed by
religion； for how can there be any need for religion； how can religion have any meaning； if the
fleeting and superficial phenomena of the world of sensuous particulars are still regarded as the
truth？ But philosophy gives a reasoned insight into the true state of the case with regard to the
reality of sensuous being； it assumes the stages of feeling and intuition as precedent to the
understanding in so far as they are conditions of its genesis； but only in the sense that it is
conditioned by their reality。 Abstract thinking； therefore； is not to be regarded as a mere setting
aside of the sensuous material； the reality of which is not thereby impaired； rather is it the sublating
and reduction of that material as mere phenomenal appearance to the essential； which is
manifested only in the Notion。
Of course； if what is taken up into the Notion from the concrete phenomenon is to serve only as a
mark or sign； it certainly may be any mere random sensuous particular determination of the
object； selected from the others on the basis of any random external interest and of a similar kind
and nature as the rest。
A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the natural principle or the
beginning which forms the starting point in the natural evolution or in the history of the
developing individual； is regarded as the truth； and the first in the Notion。 Now in the order of
nature； intuition or being are undoubtedly first； or are the condition for the Notion； but they are not
on that account the absolutely unconditioned； on the contrary； their reality is sublated in the Notion
and with it； too； the illusory show they possessed of being the conditioning reality。 When it is a
question； not of truth but merely of history； as in pictorial and phenomenal thinking； we need not
of course go beyond merely narrating that we start with feelings and intuitions and that from the
manifold of these the understanding extracts a universality or an abstraction and naturally requires
for this purpose the said substrate of feelings and intuitions which； in this process of abstraction；
remains for representation in the same complete reality with which it first presented itself。 But
philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true in them；
and further； on the basis of this cognition； to comprehend that which； in the narrative； appears as a
mere happening。
If the superficial conception of what the Notion is； leaves all manifoldness outside the Notion and
attributes to the latter only the form of abstract universality or the empty identity of reflection； we
can at once appeal to the fact that quite apart from the view here propounded； the statement or
definition of a notion expressly includes not only the genus； which itself is； properly speaking； more
than a purely abstract universality； but also the specific determinateness。 If one would but reflect
attentively on the meaning of this fact； one would see that differentiation must be regarded as an
equally essential moment of the Notion。 Kant has introduced this consideration by the extremely
important thought that there are synthetic judgements a priori。 This original synthesis of
apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative development； it contains the
beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the Notion and is completely opposed to that
empty identity or abstract universality which is not within itself a synthesis。 The further
development； however； does not fulfil the promise of the beginning。 The very expression synthesis
easily recalls the conception of an external unity and a mere combination of entities that are
intrinsically separate。 Then； again； the Kantian philosophy has not got beyond the psychological
reflex of the Notion and has reverted once more to the assertion that the Notion is permanently
conditioned by a manifold of intuition。 It has declared intellectual cognition and experience to be a
phenomenal content； not because the categories themselves are only finite but； on the ground of a
psychological idealism； because they are merely determinations originating in self…consciousness。 It
is in keeping with this standpoint； too； that the Notion without the manifold of intuition is again
declared to be empty and devoid of content despite the fact that it is a synthesis a priori； as
such； it surely does contain determinateness and difference within itself。 Moreover； since the
determinateness is that of the Notion and therefore absolute determinateness； individuality； the
Notion is the ground and source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness。
The merely formal position that the Notion holds as understanding is fully confirmed in the Kantian
exposition of what reason is。 In reason； the highest stage of thought； one ought to have expected
the Notion to lose the conditionedness in which it still appears at the stage of understanding and to
attain to perfect truth。 But this exp