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determined as such； so much is Logic his natural element； indeed his own peculiar nature。 If
nature as such； as the physical world； is contrasted with the spiritual sphere； then logic must
certainly be said to be the supernatural element which permeates every relationship of man to
nature； his sensation； intuition； desire； need； instinct； and simply by so doing transforms it into
something human； even though only formally human； into ideas and purposes。 It is an advantage
when a language possesses an abundance of logical expressions； that is； specific and separate
expressions for the thought determinations themselves； many prepositions and articles denote
relationships based on thought； the Chinese language is supposed not to have developed to this
stage or only to an inadequate extent。 These particles； however； play quite a subordinate part
having only a slightly more independent form than the prefixes and suffixes； inflections and the like。
It is much more important that in a language the categories should appear in the form of
substantives and verbs and thus be stamped with the form of objectivity。 In this respect German
has many advantages over other modern languages； some of its words even possess the further
peculiarity of having not only different but opposite meanings so that one cannot fail to recognise a
speculative spirit of the language in them： it can delight a thinker to come across such words and to
find the union of opposites naively shown in the dictionary as one word with opposite meanings；
although this result of speculative thinking is nonsensical to the understanding。 Philosophy therefore
stands in no need of a special terminology； true； some words have to be taken from foreign
languages but these have already acquired through usage the right of citizenship in the philosophical
realm…and an affected purism would be most inappropriate where it was the distinctive meaning
which was of decisive importance。 The advance of culture generally； and of the sciences in
particular； gradually brings into use higher relationships of thought； or at least raises them to greater
universality and they have thus attracted increased attention。 This applies even to the empirical and
natural sciences which in general employ the commonest categories； for example； whole and parts；
a thing and its properties； and the like。
In physics； for example； the category of force has become predominant； but more recently the
category of polarity which is the determination of a difference in which the different terms are
inseparably conjoined； has played the leading part although it has been used inordinately in
connection with all phenomena； even with light。
It is a matter of infinite importance that in this way an advance has been made beyond the form of
abstraction； of identity； by which a specific concept； as； for example； force； acquires an
independent self…subsistence； and that prominence and currency have been given to the
determinate form； the difference； which is at…the same time an inseparable element in the identity。
Because of the fixed reality of natural objects the study of nature compels us to fix the categories
which can no longer be ignored in her； although with complete inconsistency towards other
categories which are also allowed to remain valid； and such study does not permit the further step
of abstracting from the opposition and indulging in generalities as so easily happens in the
intellectual sphere。
But while logical objects and their expressions may be thoroughly familiar to educated people it
does not follow； as I have said elsewhere； that they are intelligently apprehended； and to have to
occupy oneself with what is familiar can even arouse impatience — and what is more familiar than
just those determinations of thought which we employ on every occasion； which pass our lips in
every sentence we speak？
It is the purpose of this foreword to indicate the general features of the course followed by
knowing in its advance beyond a mere acquaintance with its objects； of the relation of
philosophical ＇wissenschaftlichen＇ thinking to this natural thinking。 This much； together with what
was contained in the earlier Introduction； will be sufficient to give a general idea of what is meant
by logical cognition； the kind of preliminary general idea which is demanded in the case of any
science prior to its exposition； that is； prior to the import of the science itself。
In the first place； we must regard it as an infinite step forward that the forms of thought have been
freed from the material in which they are submerged in self…conscious intuition； figurate conception；
and in our desiring and willing； or rather in ideational desiring and willing — and there is no human
desiring or willing without ideation — and that these universalities have been brought into
prominence for their own sake and made objects of contemplation as was done by Plato and after
him especially by Aristotle； this constitutes the beginning of the intelligent apprehension of them。
'It was only'； says Aristotle； 'after almost everything necessary and everything requisite for human
comfort and intercourse was available； that man began to concern himself with philosophical
knowledge' 'In Egypt'； he had previously remarked； 'there was an early development of the
mathematical sciences because there the priestly caste at an early stage were in a position to have
leisure'。
As a matter of fact； the need to occupy oneself with pure thought presupposes that the human
spirit must already have travelled a long road；
In the silent regions of thought which has come to itself and communes only with itself； the interests
which move the lives of races and individuals are hushed。？ it is； one may say； the need of the
already satisfied need for the necessities to which it must have attained； the need of a condition
free from needs； of abstraction from the material of intuition； imagination； and so on； of the
concrete interests of desire； instinct； will； in which material the determinations of thought are veiled
and hidden。 In the silent regions of thought which has come to itself and communes only with itself；
the interests which move the lives of races and individuals are hushed。
'In so many respects'； says Aristotle in the same context； 'the nature of man is in bondage； but this
science； which is not studied for its utility； is the only absolutely free science and seems therefore
to be a more than human possessions Philosophical thinking in general is still concerned with
concrete objects…God； nature； spirit； but logic is concerned only and solely with these thoughts as
thoughts； in their complete abstraction。 For this reason it is customary； to include logic in the
curriculum of youth； for youth is not yet involved in the practical affairs of life； living at leisure
so far as they are concerned； and it is only for its own subjective ends that it has to busy itself with
acquiring the means to enable it to become actively engaged with the objects of those practical
interests…and still theoretically even with these。 Contrary to Aristotle's view just mentioned； the
science of logic