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the Notion； the Idea； spirit be so named）； and then again we have described individual； sensuous
things as ideal in principle； or in their Notion； still more in spirit； that is； as sublated； here we must
note； in passing； this twofold aspect which showed itself in connection with the infinite； namely that
on the one hand the ideal is concrete； veritable being； and on the other hand the moments of this
concrete being are no less ideal … are sublated in it； but in fact what is； is only the one concrete
whole from which the moments are inseparable。
By the ideal ＇dem Ideellen＇ is meant chiefly the form of figurate conception and imagination； and
what is simply in my conception； or in the Notion； or in the idea； in imagination； and so on； is
called ideal； so that even fancies are counted as ideals … conceptions which are not only distinct
from the real world； but are supposed to be essentially not real。 In point of fact； the spirit is the
idealist proper； in spirit； even as feeling； imagination and still more as thinking and comprehending；
the content is not present as a so…called real existence； in the simplicity of the ego such external
being is present only as sublated； it is for me； it is ideally in me。 This subjective idealism； either in
the form of the unconscious idealism of consciousness generally； or consciously enunciated and set
up as a principle； concerns only the form of conception according to which a content is mine； in
the systematic idealism of subjectivity this form is declared to be the only true exclusive form in
opposition to the form of objectivity or reality； of the external existence of that content。 Such
idealism is ＇merely＇ formal because it disregards the content of imagination or thought； which
content in being imagined or thought can remain wholly in its finitude。 In such an idealism nothing is
lost； just as much because the reality of such a finite content； the existence filled with finitude； is
preserved； as because； in so far as abstraction is made from such finite reality； the content is
supposed to be of no consequence in itself； and in it nothing is gained for the same reason that
nothing is lost； because the ego； conception； spirit； remains filled with the same content of finitude。
The opposition of the form of subjectivity and objectivity is of course one of the finitudes； but the
content； as taken up in sensation； intuition or even in the more abstract element of conception； of
thought； contains finitudes in abundance and with the exclusion of only one of the modes of
finitude； namely； of the said form of subjective and objective； these finitudes are certainly not
eliminated； still less have they spontaneously fallen away。
Chapter 3 Being…for…self
In being…for…self； qualitative being finds its consummation； it is infinite being。 The being of the
beginning lacks all determination。 Determinate being is sublated but only immediately sublated
being。 It thus contains； to begin with； only the first negation； which is itself immediate； it is true that
being； too； is preserved in it and both are united in determinate being in a simple unity； but for that
very reason they are in themselves still unequal to each other and their unity is not yet posited。
Determinate being is therefore the sphere of difference； of dualism； the field of finitude。
Determinateness is determinateness as such； in which being is only relatively； not absolutely
determined。 In being…for…self； the difference between being and determinateness or negation is
posited and equalised； quality； otherness； limit … like reality； being…in…itself； the ought； and so
on…are the imperfect embodiments of the negation in being in which the difference of both still lies
at the base。 Since； however； in finitude the negation has passed into infinity； into the posited
negation of negation； it is simple self…relation and consequently in its own self the equalisation with
being； absolutely determined being。
Being…for…self is first； immediately a being…for…self — the One。
Secondly； the One passes into a plurality of ones … repulsion — and this otherness of the ones is
sublated in their ideality — attraction。
Thirdly； we have the alternating determination of repulsion and attraction in which they collapse
into equilibrium； and quality； which in being…for…self reached its climax； passes over into quantity。
A Being…for…self as Such
（a） Determinate Being and Being…for…self
（b） Being…for…one
Remark： The German Expression； 'What For a Thing' （Meaning 'What Kind of a Thing'）
（c） The One
B The One and the Many
（a） The One in its own self
（b） The One and the Void
Remark： Atomism
（c） Many Ones — Repulsion
Remark： The Monad of Leibniz
C Repulsion and Attraction
（a） Exclusion of the One
Remark： The unity of the One and the Many
（b） The one One of Attraction
（c） The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction
Remark： The Kantian Construction of Matter from the Forces of Attraction
and Repulsion
Attraction and repulsion； as we know； are usually retarded as forces。 This determination of them
and — the relationships connected with it have to be compared with the Notions which have
resulted from our consideration of them。 Conceived as forces； they are regarded as self…subsistent
and therefore as not connected with each other through their own nature； that is； they are
considered not as moments； each of which is supposed to pass into the other； but rather as fixed in
their opposition to each other。 Further； they are imagined as meeting in a third； in matter； but in
such a manner； that this unification is； counted； as their truth。； on the contrary； each is regarded
also as a first； as being in and for itself； and matter； or its determinations； are supposed to be
realised and produced by them。 When it is said that matter has the forces within itself； they are
understood to be so conjoined in this unity that they are at the same time presupposed as
intrinsically free and independent of each other。
Kant； as we know； constructed matter from the forces of attraction and repulsion； or at least he
has； to use his own words； set up the metaphysical elements of this construction。 It will not be
without interest to examine this construction more closely。 This metaphysical exposition of a
subject matter which not only itself but also in its determinations seemed to belong only to
experience is noteworthy； partly because as an experiment with the Notion it at least gave the
impulse to the more recent philosophy of nature； to a philosophy which does not make nature as
given in sense…perception the basis of science； but which goes to the absolute Notion for its
determinations； and partly because in many cases no advance is made beyond the Kantian
construction which is held to be a philosophical beginning and foundation for physics。
Now it is true that matter as it exists for sense perception is no more a subject matter of logic than
are space and its determinations。 But the forces of attraction and repulsion； in so far as they are
regarded as forces of empirical matter； are also based on the pure determinati