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Remark 2： Defectiveness of the Expression 'Unity； Identity of Being and Nothing'
Remark 3： The Isolating of These Abstractions
Remark 4： Incomprehensibility of the Beginning
2。 Moments of Becoming： Coming…to…be and Ceasing…to…be
3。 The Sublation of Becoming
Remark： The Expression 'To Sublate'
To sublate； and the sublated （that which exists ideally as a moment）； constitute one of the most
important notions in philosophy。 It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs
throughout the whole of philosophy； the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially
distinguished from nothing。 What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing。 Nothing is
immediate； what is sublated； on the other hand； is the result of mediation； it is a non…being but as
a result which had its origin in a being。 It still has； therefore； in itself the determinateness from
which it originates。
To sublate； and the sublated （that which exists ideally as a moment） constitute one of the most
important notions in philosophy。 It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs
throughout the whole of philosophy； the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially
distinguished from nothing。 What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing。 Nothing is
immediate； what is sublated； on the other hand； is the result of mediation； it is a non…being but as
a result which had its origin in a being。 It still has； therefore； in itself the determinate from which
it originates。
'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language： on the one hand it means to preserve； to
maintain； and equally it also means to cause to cease； to put an end to。 Even 'to preserve' includes
a negative elements； namely； that something is removed from its influences； in order to preserve it。
Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved； it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that
account annihilated。
The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings
of this word。 But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the
same word for two opposite meanings。 It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language
words which have in themselves a speculative meaning； the German language has a number of
such。 The double meaning of the Latin tollere （which has become famous through the Ciceronian
pun： tollendum est Octavium） does not go so far； its affirmative determination signifies only a
lifting…up。 Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite； in this
more particular signification as something reflected； it may fittingly be called a moment。 In the case
of the lever； weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account of the
sameness of their effect； in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real； such as a
weight； and something ideal； such as a mere spatial determination； a line。' We shall often have
occasion to notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected
determinations； either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it has； as here；
because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate； whereas the foreign language
suggests more what is reflected。
The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive； now that they are
moments； is to be ascertained from the consideration of determinate being as the unity in which
they are preserved。 Being is being； and nothing is nothing； only in their contradistinction from each
other； but in their truth； in their unity； they have vanished as these determinations and are now
something else。 Being and nothing are the same； but just because they are the same they are no
longer being and nothing； but now have a different significance。 In becoming they were
coming…to…be and ceasing…to…be； in determinate being； a differently determined unity； they are
again differently determined moments。 This unity now remains their base from which they do not
again emerge in the abstract significance of being and nothing。
Chapter 2 Determinate Being
In considering determinate being the emphasis falls on its determinate character； the
determinateness is in the form of being； and as such it is quality。 Through its quality； something is
determined as opposed to an other； as alterable and finite； and as negatively determined not
only against an other but also in its own self。 This its negation as at first opposed to the finite
something is the infinite； the abstract opposition in which these determinations appear resolves
itself into the infinity which is free from the opposition； into being…for…self。
The treatment of determinate being falls therefore into three parts：
A。 Determinate being as such
B。 Something and other； finitude
C。 Qualitative infinity。
A Determinate Being as Such
（a） Determinate Being in General
（b） Quality
（c） Something
B Finitude
（a） Something and Other
（b） Determination； Constitution and Limit
（c） Finitude
＇a＇ The Immediacy of Finitude
＇b＇ Limitation and the Ought
Remark： The Ought
The ought has recently played a great part in philosophy； especially in connection with morality
and also in metaphysics generally； as the ultimate and absolute concept of the identity of the
in…itself or self…relation； and of the determinateness or limit。
'You can； because you ought' … this expression； which is supposed to mean a great deal； is implied
in the notion of ought。 For the ought implies that one is superior to the limitation； in it the limit is
sublated and the in…itself of the ought is thus an identical self…relation； and hence the abstraction of
'can'。 But conversely； it is equally correct that： 'you cannot； just because you ought。' For in the
ought； the limitation as limitation is equally implied； the said formalism of possibility has； in the
limitation； a reality； a qualitative otherness opposed to it and the relation of each to the other is a
contradiction； and thus a 'cannot'； or rather an impossibility。
In the Ought the transcendence of finitude； that is； infinity； begins。 The ought is that which； in the
further development； exhibits itself in accordance with the said impossibility as the infinity。
With respect to the form of the limitation and the ought； two prejudices can be criticised in more
detail。 First of all； great stress is laid on the limitations of thought； of reason； and so on； and it is
asserted that the limitation cannot be transcended。 To make such as assertion is to be unaware
that the very fact that something is determined as a limitation implies that the limitation is already
transcended。 For a determinateness； a limit； is determined as a limitation only in opposition to its
other in general； that is； in opposition to that which is free from the limitation； the other of a
limitation is precisely the being beyond it。 Stone and metal do not transcend their limitation
because this is not a limitation for them。 If； however； in the case of such general propositions
framed by the understanding； s