按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
already run through the whole of the exposition and consequently knows and indicates in advance
the sequence of its moments before these are brought forward by the subject matter itself。
Similarly in the other sciences； such preliminary definitions and divisions are in themselves nothing
else but such external indications； but even within the particular science they are not raised above
this status。 Even in logic； for example； we may be told perhaps that 'logic has two main parts； the
theory of elements and methodology'； then under the former there straightway follows perhaps the
superscription； Laws of Thought； and then； Chapter I： Concepts。 First Section： Of the
Clearness of Concepts； and so on。 These definitions and divisions； made without any deduction
or justification； constitute the systematic framework and the entire connectedness of such sciences。
Such a logic regards it as its vocation to talk about the necessity of deducing concepts and truths
from principles； but as regards what it calls method； the thought of a deduction of it simply does
not occur to it。 The procedure consists； perhaps； in grouping together what is similar and making
what is simple precede what is complex； and other external considerations。
But as regards any inner； necessary connectedness； there is nothing more than the list of headings
of the various parts and the transition is effected simply by saying Chapter II； or We come now to
the judgements； and the like。
The superscriptions and divisions； too； which appear in this system are not themselves intended to
have any other significance than that of a list of contents。 Besides； the immanent coming…to…be of
the distinctions and the necessity of their connection with each other must present themselves in
the exposition of the subject matter itself for it falls within the spontaneous progressive
determination of the Notion。？
That which enables the Notion to advance itself is the already mentioned negative which it
possesses within itself； it is this which constitutes the genuine dialectical moment。 Dialectic in this
way acquires an entirely different significance from what it had when it was considered as a
separate part of Logic and when its aim and standpoint were； one may say； completely
misunderstood。 Even the Platonic dialectic； in the Parmenides itself and elsewhere even more
directly； on the one hand； aims only at abolishing and refuting assertions through themselves and on
the other hand； has for its result simply nothingness。
Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external； negative activity which does not pertain to the
subject matter itself； having its ground in mere conceit as a subjective itch for unsettling and
destroying what is fixed and substantial； or at least having for its result nothing but the
worthlessness of the object dialectically considered。
Kant rated dialectic higher — and this is among his greatest merits — for he freed it from the
seeming arbitrariness which it possesses from the standpoint of ordinary thought and exhibited it as
a necessary function of reason。 Because dialectic was held to be merely the art of practising
deceptions and producing illusions； the assumption was made forthwith that it is only a spurious
game； the whole of its power resting solely on concealment of the deceit and that its results are
obtained only surreptitiously and are a subjective illusion。 True； Kant's expositions in the
antinomies of pure reason； when closely examined as they will be at length in the course of this
work； do not indeed deserve any great praise； but the general idea on which he based his
expositions and which he vindicated； is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the
contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations： primarily； it is true； with the
significance that these determinations are applied by reason to things in themselves； but their
nature is precisely what they are in reason and with reference to what is intrinsic or in itself。
This result； grasped in its positive aspect； is nothing else but the inner negativity of the
determinations as their self…moving soul； the principle of all natural and spiritual life。？
But if no advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of dialectic； the result is only the
familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite； a strange result for — since the infinite
is the Reasonable — it asserts that reason is incapable of knowing the Reasonable。
It is in this dialectic as it is here understood； that is； in the grasping of opposites in their unity or of
the positive in the negative； that speculative thought consists。
It is the most important aspect of dialectic； but for thinking which is as yet unpractised and unfree it
is the most difficult。 Such thinking； if it is still engaged in breaking itself of the habit of employing
sensuously concrete terms and of ratiocination； must first practise abstract thinking； hold fast
Notions in their determinateness and learn to cognise by means of them。 An exposition of logic to
this end would； in its method； have to keep to the division of the subject above…mentioned and
with regard to the more detailed contents； to the definitions given for the particular Notions without
touching on the dialectical aspect。 As regards its external 'structure； such an exposition would
resemble the usual presentation of this science； but it would also be distinguished from it with
respect to the content and still would serve for practice in abstract thinking； though not in
speculative thinking； a purpose which can never be realised by the logic which has become
popular through the addition of psychological and anthropological material。 It would give to mind
the picture of a methodically ordered whole； although the soul of the structure； the method （which
dwells in the dialectical aspect） would not itself appear in it。
Finally； with respect to education and the relation of the individual to logic； I would further remark
that this science； like grammar； appears in two different aspects or values。 It is one thing for him
who comes to it and the sciences generally for the first time； but it is another thing for him who
comes back to it from these sciences。 He who begins the study of grammar finds in its forms and
laws dry abstractions； arbitrary rules； in general an isolated collection of definitions and terms
which exhibit only the value and significance of what is implied in their immediate meaning； there is
nothing to be known in them other than themselves。 On the other hand； he who has mastered a
language and at the same time has a comparative knowledge of other languages； he alone can
make contact with the spirit and culture of a people through the grammar of its language； the same
rules and forms now have a substantial； living value。 Similarly； he who approaches this science at
first finds in logic an isolated system of abstractions which； confined within itself； does not embrace
within its scope the other knowledges and sciences。 。。。
On the contrary； when contrasted with the wealth of the world as pictorially conceived； with the
apparently real content of the o