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offensive； he attacked Crook at Kernstown； and succeeded in
administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat
to Martinsburg； and finally to Harper's Ferry。 Crook's withdrawal
restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac； so； recrossing this
stream； he advanced again into Maryland； and sending McCausland on to
Chambersburg； Pennsylvania； laid that town in ashes； leaving three
thousand non…combatants without shelter or food。
When Early fell back from the vicinity of Washington toward
Strasburg； General Grant believed that he would rejoin Lee； but later
manoeuvres of the enemy indicated that Early had given up this idea；
if he ever； entertained it； and intended to remain in the valley；
since it would furnish Lee and himself with subsistence； and also
afford renewed opportunities for threatening Washington。 Indeed； the
possession of the Valley of the Shenandoah at this time was of vast
importance to Lee's army； and on every hand there were indications
that the Confederate Government wished to hold it at least until
after the crops could be gathered in to their depots at Lynchburg and
Richmond。 Its retention； besides being of great advantage in the
matter of supplies； would also be a menace to the North difficult for
General Grant to explain； and thereby add an element of considerable
benefit to the Confederate cause； so when Early's troops again
appeared at Martinsburg it was necessary for General Grant to
confront them with a force strong enough to put an end to incursions
north of the Potomac； which hitherto had always led to National
discomfiture at some critical juncture； by turning our army in
eastern Virginia from its chief purposethe destruction of Lee and
the capture of the Confederate capital。
This second irruption of Early； and his ruthless destruction of
Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant
looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among
the Union forces along the upper Potomac； but for a time the
authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions。
The President and Secretary Stanton seemed unwilling to adopt his
suggestions； and one measure which he deemed very importantthe
consolidation into a single command of the four geographical
districts into which； to relieve political pressure no doubt； the
territory had been dividedmet with serious opposition。 Despite
Grant's representations； he could not prevail on the Administration
to approve this measure； but finally the manoeuvres of Early and the
raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance； though Grant had
somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a
commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against
Early。
On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander； and
in obedience to his telegraphic summons I repaired to his
headquarters at City Point。 In the interview that followed； he
detailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac； telling
me that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operate
against Early； but that General Hunter； who was at the head of the
geographical department； would be continued in his position for the
reason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct or
consolidate the different districts。 After informing me that one
division of the Cavalry Corps would be sent to my new command； he
went on to say that he wanted me to push the enemy as soon as this
division arrived； and if Early retired up the Shenandoah Valley I was
to pursue； but if he crossed the Potomac I was to put myself south of
him and try to compass his destruction。 The interview having ended；
I returned to Hancock Station to prepare for my departure； and on the
evening of August 1 I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army
of the Potomac； but not from command of the cavalry as a corps
organization。
I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August； and the next day
received instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grant
at Monocacy Junction； whither he had gone direct from City Point； in
consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President
indicating his disgust with the confusion； disorder； and helplessness
prevailing along the upper Potomac； and intimating that Grant's
presence there was necessary。
In company with the Secretary of War I called on the President before
leaving Washington； and during a short conversation Mr。 Lincoln
candidly told me that Mr。 Stanton had objected to my assignment to
General Hunter's command； because he thought me too young； and that
he himself had concurred with the Secretary； but now； since General
Grant had 〃ploughed round〃 the difficulties of the situation by
picking me out to command the 〃boys in the field；〃 he felt satisfied
with what had been done； and 〃hoped for the best。〃 Mr。 Stanton
remained silent during these remarks； never once indicating whether
he； too； had become reconciled to my selection or not； and although；
after we left the White House； he conversed with me freely in regard
to the campaign I was expected to make； seeking to impress on me the
necessity for success from the political as well as from the military
point of view； yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken any
part in disapproving the recommendation of the general…in…chief。
August 6； I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy； and he there
turned over to me the following instructions； which he had previously
prepared for General Hunter in the expectation that general would
continue to command the department：
〃HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD；
〃Monocacy Bridge； Md。； Aug。 5； 1864。
〃GENERAL： Concentrate all your available force without delay in the
vicinity of Harper's Ferry； leaving only such railroad guards and
garrisons for public property as may be necessary。
〃Use in this concentration the railroad； if by so doing time can be
saved。 From Harper's Ferry； if it is found that the enemy has moved
north of the Potomac in large force； push north； following and
attacking him wherever found； following him； if driven south of the
Potomac； as long as it is safe to do so。 If it is ascertained that
the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac； then push south
the main force； detaching； under a competent commander； a sufficient
force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes。 In
detaching such a force； the brigade of cavalry now en route from
Washington via Rockville may be taken into account。
〃There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the
best of cavalry； numbering at least five thousand men and horses。
These will be instructed； in the absence of further orders； to join
you by the south side of the Potomac。 One brigade will probably
start to…morrow。
〃In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley； as it is expected you will have
to go first or last； it is desirable that nothing