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the field of Chickamauga would have been relinquished to us； but it
was fated to be otherwise。
Rosecrans； McCook； and Crittenden passed out of the battle when they
went back to Chattanooga； and their absence was discouraging to all
aware of it。 Doubtless this had much to do with Thomas's final
withdrawal； thus leaving the field to the enemy； though at an immense
cost in killed and wounded。 The night of the 21st the army moved
back from Rossville； and my division； as the rearguard of the
Twentieth Corps； got within our lines at Chattanooga about 8 o'clock
the morning of the 22d。 Our unmolested retirement from Rossville
lent additional force to the belief that the enemy had been badly
injured； and further impressed me with the conviction that we might
have held on。 Indeed； the battle of Chickamauga was somewhat like
that of Stone River； victory resting with the side that had the grit
to defer longest its relinquishment of the field。
The manoeuvres by which Rosecrans had carried his army over the
Cumberland Mountains； crossed the Tennessee River； and possessed
himself of Chattanooga； merit the highest commendation up to the
abandonment of this town by Bragg on the 8th of September； but I have
always fancied that that evacuation made Rosecrans over…confident；
and led him to think that he could force Bragg south as far as Rome。
After the Union army passed the river and Chattanooga fell into our
hands； we still kept pressing the enemy's communications； and the
configuration of the country necessitated more or less isolation of
the different corps。 McCook's corps of three divisions had crossed
two difficult ridgesSand and Lookout mountainsto Alpine in
Broomtown Valley with intentions against Summerville。 Thomas's corps
had marched by the way of Stevens's Gap toward Lafayette； which he
expected to occupy。 Crittenden had passed through Chattanooga； at
first directing his march an Ringgold。 Thus the corps of the army
were not in conjunction； and between McCook and Thomas there
intervened a positive and aggressive obstacle in the shape of Bragg's
army concentrating and awaiting reinforcement at Lafayette。 Under
these circumstances Bragg could have taken the different corps in
detail； and it is strange that he did not； even before receiving his
reinforcements； turn on McCook in Broomtown Valley and destroy him。
Intelligence that Bragg would give battle began to come to us from
various sources as early as the l0th of September； and on the 11th
McCook found that he could not communicate with Thomas by the direct
road through Broomtown Valley； but we did not begin closing in toward
Chattanooga till the 13th； and even then the Twentieth Corps had
before it the certainty of many delays that must necessarily result
from the circuitous and difficult mountain roads which we would be
obliged to follow。 Had the different corps； beginning with McCook's；
been drawn in toward Chattanooga between the 8th and 12th of
September； the objective point of the campaign would have remained in
our hands without the battle of Chickamauga； but； as has been seen；
this was not done。 McCook was almost constantly on the march day and
night between the 13th and the 19th； ascending and descending
mountains； his men worried and wearied； so that when they appeared on
the battle…field； their fatigued condition operated greatly against
their efficiency。 This delay in concentration was also the original
cause of the continuous shifting toward our left to the support of
Thomas； by which manoeuvre Rosecrans endeavored to protect his
communications with Chattanooga； and out of which grew the intervals
that offered such tempting opportunities to Bragg。 In addition to
all this； much transpired on the field of battle tending to bring
about disaster。 There did not seem to be any well…defined plan of
action in the fighting； and this led to much independence of judgment
in construing orders among some of the subordinate generals。 It also
gave rise to much license in issuing orders： too many people were
giving important directions； affecting the whole army； without
authority from its head。 In view； therefore； of all the errors that
were committed from the time Chattanooga fell into our hands after
our first crossing the Tennessee； it was fortunate that the Union
defeat was not more complete； that it left in the enemy's possession
not much more than the barren results arising from the simple holding
of the ground on which the engagement was fought。
CHAPTER XVI。
AT CHATTANOOGATHE ENEMY FORTIFIES LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND MISSIONARY
RIDGEREORGANIZING THE ARMYREMOVAL OF GENERAL ROSECRANS
PUNISHMENT OF DESERTERSGRANT AT CHATTANOOGATHE FIGHT ON LOOKOUT
MOUNTAINA BRAVE COLOR…BEARERBATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE。
By 9 o'clock on the morning of September 22 my command took up a
position within the heavy line of intrenchments at Chattanooga； the
greater part of which defenses had been thrown up since the army
commenced arriving there the day before。 The enemy； having now
somewhat recovered from the shock of the recent battle； followed
carefully； and soon invested us close into our lines with a parallel
system of rifle…pits。 He also began at once to erect permanent lines
of earthworks on Missionary Ridge and to establish himself strongly
on Lookout Mountain。 He then sent Wheeler's cavalry north of the
Tennessee； and； aided greatly by the configuration of the ground；
held us in a state of partial siege； which serious rains might
convert into a complete investment。 The occupation of Lookout
Mountain broke our direct communication with Bridgeport…our sub…
depotand forced us to bring supplies by way of the Sequatchie
Valley and Waldron's Ridge of the Cumberland Mountains； over a road
most difficult even in the summer season； but now liable to be
rendered impassable by autumn rains。 The distance to Bridgeport by
this circuitous route was sixty miles； and the numerous passes；
coves； and small valleys through which the road ran offered tempting
opportunities； for the destruction of trains； and the enemy was not
slow to take advantage of them。 Indeed； the situation was not
promising； and General Rosecrans himself； in communicating with the
President the day succeeding the battle of Chickamauga； expressed
doubts of his ability to hold the gateway of the Cumberland
Mountains。
The position taken up by my troops inside the lines of Chattanooga
was near the old iron…works； under the shadow of Lookout Mountain。
Here we were exposed to a continual fire from the enemy's batteries
for many days； but as the men were well covered by secure though
simple intrenchments； but little damage was done。 My own
headquarters were established on the grounds of Mr。 William
Crutchfield； a resident of the place； whose devotion to the Union
cause knew no bounds； and who rendered meand； in fact； at one time
or another； nearly every general officer in the Army of the