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force was 37；800 officers and men； he lost 10；306； or nearly 28 per
cent。
Though our victory was dearly bought； yet the importance of gaining
the day at any price was very great； particularly when we consider
what might have been the result had not the gallantry of the army and
the manoeuvring during the early disaster saved us from ultimate
defeat。 We had started out from Nashville on an offensive campaign；
probably with no intention of going beyond Murfreesboro'； in
midwinter； but still with the expectation of delivering a crushing
blow should the enemy accept our challenge to battle。 He met us with
a plan of attack almost the counterpart of our own。 In the execution
of his plan he had many advantages； not the least of which was his
intimate knowledge of the ground； and he came near destroying us。
Had he done so； Nashville would probably have fallen； at all events；
Kentucky would have been opened again to his incursions； and the
theatre of war very likely transferred once more to the Ohio River。
As the case now stood； however； Nashville was firmly established as a
base for future operations； Kentucky was safe from the possibility of
being again overrun； and Bragg； thrown on the defensive； was
compelled to give his thoughts to the protection of the interior of
the Confederacy and the security of Chattanooga； rather than indulge
in schemes of conquest north of the Cumberland River。 While he still
held on in Middle Tennessee his grasp was so much loosened that only
slight effort would be necessary to push him back into Georgia； and
thus give to the mountain region of East Tennessee an opportunity to
prove its loyalty to the； Union。
The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest； destroyed
the hopes of the secession element in Kentucky； renewed the drooping
spirits of the East Tennesseans； and demoralized the disunionists in
Middle Tennessee； yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned
the result on the battle…field。 Rosecrans seems to have planned the
battle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive； remain
entirely on the defensive； and that it was necessary only to push
forward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro'；
and notwithstanding the fact that on the afternoon of December 30
McCook received information that the right of Johnson's division。
resting near the Franklin pike； extended only to about the centre of
the Confederate army； it does not appear that attack from that
quarter was at all apprehended by the Union commanders。
The natural line of retreat of the Confederates was not threatened by
the design of Rosecrans； and Bragg； without risk to his
communications； anticipated it by a counter…attack of like character
from his own left； and demolished his adversary's plan the moment we
were thrown on the defensive。 Had Bragg followed up with the spirit
which characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee on
our right wingand there seems no reason why he should not have done
sothe army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville； but
it would have been depleted and demoralized to such a degree as to
unfit it for offensive operations for a long time afterward。 Bragg's
intrenchments in front of Stone River were very strong； and there
seems no reason why he should not have used his plain advantage as
explained； but instead he allowed us to gain time； intrench； and
recover a confidence that at first was badly shaken。 Finally； to cap
the climax of his errors； he directed Breckenridge to make the
assault from his right flank on January 2； with small chance for
anything but disaster； when the real purpose in view could have been
accomplished without the necessity of any offensive manoeuvre
whatever。
CHAPTER XIV。
APPOINTED A MAJOR…GENERALTHE SECRET EXPEDITION UNDER CARD THE
SCOUTHIS CAPTURE BY GUERRILLASESCAPEA REVENGE PARTYWOMEN
SOLDIERSA FIGHT WITH SABRESTULLAHOMA CAMPAIGNA FOOLISH
ADVENTURE。
On the 6th of January； 1863； my division settled quietly down in its
camp south of Murfreesboro'。 Its exhausted condition after the
terrible experiences of the preceding week required attention。 It
needed recuperation； reinforcement； and reorganization； and I set
about these matters without delay； in anticipation of active
operations early in the spring。 No forward movement was made for
nearly six months； however； and throughout this period drills；
parades； reconnoissances； and foraging expeditions filled in the time
profitably。 In addition to these exercises the construction of
permanent fortifications for the security of Murfreesboro' was
undertaken by General Rosecrans； and large details from my troops
were furnished daily for the work。 Much attention was also given to
creating a more perfect system of guard and picket duty…a matter that
had hitherto been somewhat neglected in the army； as its constant
activity had permitted scant opportunity for the development of such
a system。 It was at this time that I received my appointment as a
major…general of Volunteers。 My promotion had been recommended by
General Rosecrans immediately after the battle of Stone River； but
for some reason it was delayed until April； and though a long time
elapsed between the promise and the performance； my gratification was
extreme。
My scout； Card； was exceedingly useful while encamped near
Murfreesboro； making several trips to East Tennessee within the
enemy's lines to collect information as to the condition of the loyal
people there； and to encourage them with the hope of early
liberation。 He also brought back from each trip very accurate
statements as to the strength and doings of the Confederate army；
fixing almost with certainty its numbers and the locations of its
different divisions； and enabling my engineer…officerMajor
Morhardtto construct good maps of the country in our front。 On
these dangerous excursions Card was always accompanied by one of his
brothers； the other remaining with me to be ready for duty if any
accident occurred to those who had gone out； or in case I wanted to
communicate with them。 In this way we kept well posted； although the
intelligence these men brought was almost always secured at the risk
of their lives。
Early in the spring； before the Tullahoma campaign began； I thought
it would be practicable； by sending out a small secret expedition of
but three or four men； to break the Nashville and Chattanooga
railroad between Chattanooga and the enemy's position at Tullahoma by
burning the bridges in Crow Creek valley from its head to Stevenson；
Alabama； and then the great bridge across the Tennessee River at
Bridgeport。 Feeling confident that I could persuade Card to
undertake the perilous duty； I broached the contemplated project to
him； and he at once jumped at the opportunity of thus distinguishing
himself； saying that with one of his brothers and three other loyal
East Tennesseeans； who