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there is no use in disputing about the name。 But is virtue taught or
not？ or rather； does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught？
Men。 I agree。
Soc。 Then if virtue is knowledge； virtue will be taught？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then now we have made a quick end of this question： if virtue
is of such a nature； it will be taught； and if not； not？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 The next question is； whether virtue is knowledge or of another
species？
Men。 Yes； that appears to be the …question which comes next in
order。
Soc。 Do we not say that virtue is a good？…This is a hypothesis which
is not set aside。
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Now； if there be any sort…of good which is distinct from
knowledge； virtue may be that good； but if knowledge embraces all
good； then we shall be right in think in that virtue is knowledge？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And virtue makes us good？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And if we are good； then we are profitable； for all good things
are profitable？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then virtue is profitable？
Men。 That is the only inference。
Soc。 Then now let us see what are the things which severally
profit us。 Health and strength； and beauty and wealth…these； and the
like of these； we call profitable？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm： would you
not think so？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable
or the reverse？ Are they not profitable when they are rightly used；
and hurtful when they are not rightly used？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Next； let us consider the goods of the soul： they are
temperance； justice； courage； quickness of apprehension； memory；
magnanimity； and the like？
Men。 Surely。
Soc。 And such of these as are not knowledge； but of another sort；
are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful； as； for example；
courage wanting prudence； which is only a sort of confidence？ When a
man has no sense he is harmed by courage； but when he has sense he
is profited？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of
apprehension； whatever things are learned or done with sense are
profitable； but when done without sense they are hurtful？
Men。 Very true。
Soc。 And in general； all that the attempts or endures； when under
the guidance of wisdom； ends in happiness； but when she is under the
guidance of folly； in the opposite？
Men。 That appears to be true。
Soc。 If then virtue is a quality of the soul； and is admitted to
be profitable； it must be wisdom or prudence； since none of the things
of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves； but they
are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of
folly； and therefore and therefore if virtue is profitable； virtue
must be a sort of wisdom or prudence？
Men。 I quite agree。
Soc。 And the other goods； such as wealth and the like； of which we
were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes
evil； do not they also become profitable or hurtful； accordingly as
the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly； just as the things
of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom
and harmed by folly？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And the wise soul guides them rightly； and the foolish soul
wrongly。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And is not this universally true of human nature？ All other
things hang upon the soul； and the things of the soul herself hang
upon wisdom； if they are to be good； and so wisdom is inferred to be
that which profits…and virtue； as we say； is profitable？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either
wholly or partly wisdom？
Men。 I think that what you are saying； Socrates； is very true。
Soc。 But if this is true； then the good are not by nature good？
Men。 I think not。
Soc。 If they had been； there would assuredly have been discerners of
characters among us who would have known our future great men； and
on their showing we should have adopted them； and when we had got
them； we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of
harm； and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of
gold； in order that no one might tamper with them； and when they
grew up they would have been useful to the state？
Men。 Yes； Socrates； that would have been the right way。
Soc。 But if the good are not by nature good； are they made good by
instruction？
Men。 There appears to be no other alternative； Socrates。 On the
supposition that virtue is knowledge； there can be no doubt that
virtue is taught。
Soc。 Yes； indeed； but what if the supposition is erroneous？
Men。 I certainly thought just now that we were right。
Soc。 Yes； Meno； but a principle which has any soundness should stand
firm not only just now； but always。
Men。 Well； and why are you so slow of heart to believe that
knowledge is virtue？
Soc。 I will try and tell you why； Meno。 I do not retract the
assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught； but I fear
that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge： for
consider now。 and say whether virtue； and not only virtue but anything
that is taught； must not have teachers and disciples？
Men。 Surely。
Soc。 And conversely； may not the art of which neither teachers nor
disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught？
Men。 True； but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue？
Soc。 I have certainly often enquired whether there were any； and
taken great pains to find them； and have never succeeded； and many
have assisted me in the search； and they were the persons whom I
thought the most likely to know。 Here at the moment when he is
wanted we fortunately have sitting by us Anytus； the very person of
whom we should make enquiry； to him then let us repair。 In the first
Place； he is the son of a wealthy and wise father； Anthemion； who
acquired his wealth； not by accident or gift； like Ismenias the Theban
（who has recently made himself as rich as Polycrates）； but by his
own skill and industry； and who is a well…conditioned； modest man； not
insolent； or over…bearing； or annoying； moreover； this son of his
has received a good education； as the Athenian people certainly appear
to think； for they choose him to fill the highest offices。 And these
are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there
are any teachers of virtue； and who they are。 Please； Anytus； to
help me and your friend Meno in answering our question； Who are the
teachers？ Consider the matter thus： If we wanted Meno to be a good
physician； to whom should we send him？ Should we not send him to the
physicians？
Any。 Certainly。
So