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king had obtained and preserved his dominion by God's design。 (114) On the
other hand; Eleazar; before his country had utterly fallen; wished to give a
proof of his constancy to his compatriots; in order that they might follow
in his footsteps; and go to any lengths; rather than allow their right and
power to be transferred to the Greeks; or brave any torture rather than
swear allegiance to the heathen。 (115) Instances are occurring every day in
confirmation of what I here advance。 (116) The rulers of Christian
kingdoms do not hesitate; with a view to strengthening their dominion; to
make treaties with Turks and heathen; and to give orders to their subjects
who settle among such peoples not to assume more freedom; either in
things secular or religious; than is set down in the treaty; or allowed by
the foreign government。 (117) We may see this exemplified in the Dutch
treaty with the Japanese; which I have already mentioned。
'17:0' CHAPTER XVII … IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN; OR
NEED; TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER。
OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC; AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME
OF MOSES; AND AFTER HIS DEATH; TILL THE FOUNDATION
OF THE MONARCHY; AND OF ITS EXCELLENCE。 LASTLY; OF
THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL; AND WHY
IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION。
'17:1' (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter; of the universal
rights of the sovereign power; and of the natural rights of the individual
transferred thereto; though it corresponds in many respects with actual
practice; and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more
and more; must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal。 (2)
No one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and; consequently;
his rights; as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so
sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish。 (3) It will always be
vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage; or to
love what brings him loss; or not to be offended at insults; or not to wish
to be free from fear; or a hundred other things of the sort; which
necessarily follow from the laws of human nature。 (4) So much; I think; is
abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power
as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power
and right; and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own
subjects as from external enemies。 (5) If it were really the case; that men
could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any
further influence on affairs 'Endnote 29'; except with the permission of the
holders of sovereign right; it would then be possible to maintain with
impunity the most violent tyranny; which; I suppose; no one would for an
instant admit。
(17:6) We must; therefore; grant that every man retains some part of his
right; in dependence on his own decision; and no one else's。
(7) However; in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's
right and power; we must take notice that it does not cover only those
actions to which it can compel men by fear; but absolutely every action
which it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience; not the
motive for obedience; which makes a man a subject。
(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the
sovereign; whether it be fear or hope; or love of his country; or any other
emotion … the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself; and
nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders。 (9) We must not; therefore;
assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are
done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign:
as a matter of fact; all actions spring from a man's deliberation with
himself; whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;
therefore; either dominion does not exist; and has no rights over its
subjects; or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on
men to decide to obey it。 (10) Consequently; every action which a subject
performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign; whether such
action springs from love; or fear; or (as is more frequently the case) from
hope and fear together; or from reverence。 compounded of fear and
admiration; or; indeed; any motive whatever; is performed in virtue of his
submission to the sovereign; and not in virtue of his own authority。
(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does
not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person
obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole
heart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest
dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of
his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion;
the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant; for they are
always greatly feared by their ruler。 (12) Furthermore; though it is
impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue; nevertheless
minds are; to a certain extent; under the control of the sovereign; for he
can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should
follow his wishes in their beliefs; their loves; and their hates。 (13)
Though such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign
they often result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power; and
from his direction ; in other words; in virtue of his right; we may;
therefore; without doing violence to our understanding; conceive men who
follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs; their loves;
their hates; their contempt; and all other emotions whatsoever。
(17:14) Though the powers of government; as thus conceived; are sufficiently
ample; they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of
their possessors。 (15) This; I think; I have already shown clearly enough。
(16) The method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not;
as I have said; intend to discuss; but in order to arrive at the object I
have in view; I will touch on the teaching of Divine revelation to Moses in
this respect; and we will consider the history and the success of the Jews;
gathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns
to their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their
dominion。
'17:2' (17) That the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the
subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive; is
most clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be
guided so as best to preserve their fidelity