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a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第6章

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king had obtained and preserved his dominion by God's design。 (114) On the



other hand; Eleazar; before his country had utterly fallen; wished to give a



proof of his constancy to his compatriots; in order that they might follow



in his footsteps; and go to any lengths; rather than allow their right and



power to be transferred to the Greeks; or brave any torture rather than



swear allegiance to the heathen。 (115) Instances are occurring every day in



confirmation of what I here advance。 (116) The rulers of Christian



kingdoms do not hesitate; with a view to strengthening their dominion; to



make treaties with Turks and heathen; and to give orders to their subjects



who settle among such peoples not to assume more freedom; either in



things secular or religious; than is set down in the treaty; or allowed by



the foreign government。 (117) We may see this exemplified in the Dutch



treaty with the Japanese; which I have already mentioned。



















'17:0' CHAPTER XVII … IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN; OR



NEED; TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER。



OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC; AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME



OF MOSES; AND AFTER HIS DEATH; TILL THE FOUNDATION



OF THE MONARCHY; AND   OF ITS EXCELLENCE。 LASTLY; OF



THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL; AND WHY



IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION。







'17:1' (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter; of the universal



rights of the sovereign power; and of the natural rights of the individual



transferred thereto; though it corresponds in many respects with actual



practice; and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more



and more; must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal。 (2)



No one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and; consequently;



his rights; as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so



sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish。 (3) It will always be



vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage; or to



love what brings him loss; or not to be offended at insults; or not to wish



to be free from fear; or a hundred other things of the sort; which



necessarily follow from the laws of human nature。 (4) So much; I think; is



abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power



as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power



and right; and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own



subjects as from external enemies。 (5) If it were really the case; that men



could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any



further influence on affairs 'Endnote 29'; except with the permission of the



holders of sovereign right; it would then be possible to maintain with



impunity the most violent tyranny; which; I suppose; no one would for an



instant admit。







(17:6) We must; therefore; grant that every man retains some part of his



right; in dependence on his own decision; and no one else's。







(7) However; in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's



right and power; we must take notice that it does not cover only those



actions to which it can compel men by fear; but absolutely every action



which it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience; not the



motive for obedience; which makes a man a subject。







(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the



sovereign; whether it be fear or hope; or love of his country; or any other



emotion … the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself; and



nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders。 (9) We must not; therefore;



assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are



done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign:



as a matter of fact; all actions spring from a man's deliberation with



himself; whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;



therefore; either dominion does not exist; and has no rights over its



subjects; or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on



men to decide to obey it。 (10) Consequently; every action which a subject



performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign; whether such



action springs from love; or fear; or (as is more frequently the case) from



hope and fear together; or from reverence。 compounded of fear and



admiration; or; indeed; any motive whatever; is performed in virtue of his



submission to the sovereign; and not in virtue of his own authority。







(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does



not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person



obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole



heart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest



dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of



his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion;



the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant; for they are



always greatly feared by their ruler。 (12) Furthermore; though it is



impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue; nevertheless



minds are; to a certain extent; under the control of the sovereign; for he



can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should



follow his wishes in their beliefs; their loves; and their hates。 (13)



Though such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign



they often result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power; and



from his direction ; in other words; in virtue of his right; we may;



therefore; without doing violence to our understanding; conceive men who



follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs; their loves;



their hates; their contempt; and all other emotions whatsoever。







(17:14) Though the powers of government; as thus conceived; are sufficiently



ample; they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of



their possessors。 (15) This; I think; I have already shown clearly enough。



(16) The method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not;



as I have said; intend to discuss; but in order to arrive at the object I



have in view; I will touch on the teaching of Divine revelation to Moses in



this respect; and we will consider the history and the success of the Jews;



gathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns



to their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their



dominion。







'17:2' (17) That the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the



subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive; is



most clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be



guided so as best to preserve their fidelity 
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