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the smallest use in any enquiry。
Pro。 That seems to be very near the truth； Socrates。 Happy would the
wise man be if he knew all things； and the next best thing for him
is that he should know himself。 Why do I say so at this moment？ I will
tell you。 You； Socrates； have granted us this opportunity of
conversing with you； and are ready to assist us in determining what is
the best of human goods。 For when Philebus said that pleasure and
delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good； you
answered…No； not those； but another class of goods； and we are
constantly reminding ourselves of what you said； and very properly； in
order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two。 And these
goods； which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to
pleasure； and are the true objects of pursuit； are mind and
knowledge and understanding and art and the like。 There was a
dispute about which were the best； and we playfully threatened that
you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled；
and you agreed； and placed yourself at our disposal。 And now； as
children say； what has been fairly given cannot be taken back； cease
then to fight against us in this way。
Soc。 In what way？
Phi。 Do not perplex us； and keep asking questions of us to which
we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give； let us not imagine
that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our
discussion； but if we are unable to answer； do you answer； as you have
promised。 Consider； then； whether you will divide pleasure and
knowledge according to their kinds； or you may let the matter drop； if
you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our
controversy。
Soc。 If you say that； I have nothing to apprehend； for the words 〃if
you are willing〃 dispel all my fear； and； moreover； a god seems to
have recalled something to my mind。
Phi。 What is that？
Soc。 I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about
pleasure and wisdom； whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell； they
were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was
the good； but some third thing； which was different from them； and
better than either。 If this be clearly established； then pleasure will
lose the victory； for the good will cease to be identified with
her：…Am I not right？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds
of pleasures； as I am inclined to think； but this will appear more
clearly as we proceed。
Pro。 Capital； Socrates； pray go on as you propose。
Soc。 But； let us first agree on some little points。
Pro。 What are they？
Soc。 Is the good perfect or imperfect？
Pro。 The most perfect； Socrates； of all things。
Soc。 And is the good sufficient？
Pro。 Yes； certainly； and in a degree surpassing all other things。
Soc。 And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and
hunt after good； and are eager to catch and have the good about
them； and care not for the attainment of anything which its not
accompanied by good。
Pro。 That is undeniable。
Soc。 Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of
wisdom； and pass them in review。
Pro。 How do you mean？
Soc。 Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure； nor any
pleasure in the life of wisdom； for if either of them is the chief
good； it cannot be supposed to want anything； but if either is shown
to want anything； then it cannot really be the chief good。
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 And will you help us to test these two lives？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then answer。
Pro。 Ask。
Soc。 Would you choose； Protarchus； to live all your life long in the
enjoyment of the greatest pleasures？
Pro。 Certainly I should。
Soc。 Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you
if you had perfect pleasure？
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Reflect； would you not want wisdom and intelligence and
forethought； and similar qualities？ would you not at any rate want
sight？
Pro。 Why should I？ Having pleasure I should have all things。
Soc。 Living thus； you would always throughout your life enjoy the
greatest pleasures？
Pro。 I should。
Soc。 But if you had neither mind； nor memory； nor knowledge； nor
true opinion； you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of
whether you were pleased or not； because you would be entirely
devoid of intelligence。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And similarly； if you had no memory you would not recollect
that you had ever been pleased； nor would the slightest recollection
of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you； and if
you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when
you were； and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able
to calculate on future pleasure； and your life would be the life；
not of a man； but of an oyster or pulmo marinus。 Could this be
otherwise？
Pro。 No。
Soc。 But is such a life eligible？
Pro。 I cannot answer you； Socrates； the argument has taken away from
me the power of speech。
Soc。 We must keep up our spirits；…let us now take the life of mind
and examine it in turn。
Pro。 And what is this life of mind？
Soc。 I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live；
having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things； but
having no sense of pleasure or pain； and wholly unaffected by these
and the like feelings？
Pro。 Neither life； Socrates； appears eligible to me； or is likely；
as I should imagine； to be chosen by any one else。
Soc。 What would you say； Protarchus； to both of these in one； or
to one that was made out of the union of the two？
Pro。 Out of the union； that is； of pleasure with mind and wisdom？
Soc。 Yes； that is the life which I mean。
Pro。 There can be no difference of opinion； not some but all would
surely choose this third rather than either of the other two； and in
addition to them。
Soc。 But do you see the consequence？
Pro。 To be sure I do。 The consequence is； that two out of the
three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor
eligible for man or for animal。
Soc。 Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the
good； for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and
perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was
able to live such a life； and if any of us had chosen any other； he
would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible； and
not of his own free will； but either through ignorance or from some
unhappy necessity。
Pro。 Certainly that seems to be true。
Soc。 And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus； goddess is
not to be regarded as identical with the good？