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images in the soul of the things which he has described。
Pro。 But when and how does he do this？
Soc。 When a man； besides receiving from sight or some other sense
certain opinions or statements； sees in his mind the images of the
subjects of them；…is not this a very common mental phenomenom？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And the images answering to true opinions and words are true；
and to false opinions and words false； are they not？
Pro。 They are。
Soc。 If we are right so far； there arises a further question。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only
in relation to the present and the past； or in relation to the
future also？
Pro。 I should say in relation to all times alike。
Soc。 Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described
already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones； from
which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do
with the future？
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 And do all those writings and paintings which； as we were
saying a little while ago； are produced in us； relate to the past
and present only； and not to the future？
Pro。 To the future； very much。
Soc。 When you say； 〃Very much；〃 you mean to imply that all these
representations are hopes about the future； and that mankind are
filled with； hopes in every stage of existence？
Pro。 Exactly。
Soc。 Answer me another question。
Pro。 What question？
Soc。 A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods； is
he not？
Pro。 Certainly he is。
Soc。 And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And all men； as we were saying just now； are always filled with
hopes？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And these hopes； as they are termed； are propositions which
exist in the minds of each of us？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us； a man may
often have a vision of a heap of gold； and pleasures ensuing； and in
the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over
his good fortune。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And may we not say that the good； being friends of the gods；
have generally true pictures presented to them； and the bad false
pictures？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 The bad； too； have pleasures painted in their fancy as well
as the good； but I presume that they are false pleasures。
Pro。 They are。
Soc。 The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures； and the
good in true pleasures？
Pro。 Doubtless。
Soc。 Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of
men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true； and there are pains
of a similar character？
Pro。 There are。
Soc。 And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a
real opinion； but often about things which had no existence either
in the past； present； or future？
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And this was the source of false opinion and opining； am I
not right？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real
but illusory character？
Pro。 How do you mean？
Soc。 I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real
pleasure； who is pleased with anything or anyhow； and he may be
pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real
existence； and； more often than not； are never likely to exist。
Pro。 Yes； Socrates； that again is undeniable。
Soc。 And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like；
are they not often false？
Pro。 Quite so。
Soc。 And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are
true or false？
Pro。 In no other way。
Soc。 Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as
they are false。
Pro。 Nay； Socrates； that is the very opposite of truth； for no one
would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false； but by
reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable。
Soc。 Well； of pleasures which are and caused by corruption we will
hereafter speak； if we care to continue the enquiry； for the present I
would rather show by another argument that there are many false
pleasures existing or coming into existence in us； because this may
assist our final decision。
Pro。 Very true； that is to say； if there are such pleasures。
Soc。 I think that there are； Protarchus； but this is an opinion
which should be well assured； and not rest upon a mere assertion。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 Then now； like wrestlers； let us approach and grasp this new
argument。
Pro。 Proceed。
Soc。 We were maintaining a little while since； that when desires； as
they are termed； exist in us； then the body has separate feelings
apart from the soul…do you remember？
Pro。 Yes； I remember that you said so。
Soc。 And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the
bodily state； while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain
which was experienced。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 Then now you may infer what happens in such cases。
Pro。 What am I to infer？
Soc。 That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously；
and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which
correspond to them； as has been already shown。
Pro。 Clearly。
Soc。 And there is another point to which we have agreed。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less； and that
they are of the class of infinites。
Pro。 Certainly； we said so。
Soc。 But how can we rightly judge of them？
Pro。 How can we？
Soc。 It is our intention to judge of their comparative importance
and intensity； measuring pleasure against pain； and pain against pain；
and pleasure against pleasure？
Pro。 Yes； such is our intention； and we shall judge of them
accordingly。
Soc。 Well； take the case of sight。 Does not the nearness or distance
of magnitudes obscure their true proportions； and make us opine
falsely； and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of
pleasures and pains？
Pro。 Yes； Socrates； and in a degree far greater。
Soc。 Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were
saying before。
Pro。 What was that？
Soc。 Then the opinions were true and false； and infected the
pleasures and pains with their own falsity。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false
because they are seen at various distances； and subjected to
comparison； the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement
when placed side by side with the pains； and the pains when placed
side by side with the pleasures。
Pro。 Certainly； and for the reason which you mention。
Soc。 And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element
which