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urged； in forcible terms； the foolishness and even impropriety of this delay； but Halleck； who knew much of the theory of war as learned from books； and in a general way wished to apply these principles to the practical movements of troops； overruled Buell。 The latter knew that the enemy in his front always resolutely refused to be bound in his operations by such rules in conducting campaigns。 The result of Halleck's wisdom soon became manifest when Bragg started for Kentucky； after the waste of Buell's time in repairing this railroad； which； when completed； was at once turned over to the enemy in good condition for immediate use against our own forces。 On Buell fell the force of the blow that some one had to bear for this failure to take advantage of a patent opportunity。 Buell's obedience to Halleck's orders rendered Bragg's advance into Kentucky possible； while Buell's failure to bring Bragg to a decisive action in Kentucky； and his refusal to follow Bragg into the mountains of Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee； was deemed sufficient cause by Halleck to issue the order removing him from his command。 If Halleck's order to Buell to repair this railroad had never been issued； Bragg's campaign in Kentucky would never have been made。 Halleck's removal of Buell was the direct result of the latter's obedience to orders received from the former。 On Rosecrans assuming command； almost the first order he received from Halleck was one directing him to advance into East Tennessee after Bragg。 With a full knowledge of the military situation obtained from Buell； Rosecrans proceeded at once to protect the line established by Buell； and await the advance of Bragg in the vicinity of Nashville。 The battle of Stone's River was for the time sufficient to prove； even to Halleck； that Buell and Rosecrans were correct； and Rosecrans was allowed for the time to attend to his command without being interfered with。 During the encampment at Murfreesboro； the first object of Rosecrans was to properly mount and equip his cavalry。 In this he received at first faint encouragement； which soon ceased altogether。
On March 1st Halleck； as Commander…in…Chief of the Armies of the United States； wrote a letter； sending a copy to Rosecrans and Grant； offering the position of the then vacant major…generalship in the regular army； to the general in the field who should first achieve an important and decisive victory。 Grant very quietly folded up the letter； put it by for future reference； and proceeded with the plans of his campaign； saying nothing。 To Rosecrans's open； impulsive； and honorable nature； engaged with all his powers in furthering the interests of the Government and the general welfare of his command； this letter was an insult； and he treated it accordingly。 On March 6th he prepared his reply； and forwarded it to Washington。 In this letter he informs the General…in…Chief that； 〃as an officer and as a citizen；〃 he felt 〃degraded at such an auctioneering of honors；〃 and then adds： 〃Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and for his country？ He would come by his commission basely in that case； and deserve to be despised by men of honor。 But are all the brave and honorable generals on an equality as to chances？ If not； it is unjust to those who probably deserve most。〃
The effect of this letter was to widen the breach between the authorities at Washington and Rosecrans。 Halleck's letter and Rosecrans's reply were both characteristic of the men。 Halleck； fresh from the results of a large law practice in Californiaprincipally devoted to the establishment of the validity of land grants in favor of his clients； in the success of which large contingent fees were gainedsaw nothing improper in such an offer to an officer of sufficient ability and standing to be in command of one of the armies of the United States。 With Rosecrans； all the honest； generous impulses of a high…principled； honorable gentleman； who had imperiled his life on many a battlefield； fighting solely from a sense of duty to his country； led to the expression of his contempt for the author of such an offer。 The mistake that Halleck made was in thinking that what would prove a tempting offer to a man like himself； would be so to Rosecrans。 No one will attempt to maintain the wisdom of Rosecrans's course as a matter of policy； however much they may sympathize with and admire the spirit of his letter。 It was an impolitic letter； and one that aided in drawing the ill…will and resentment of Halleck and Stanton upon him in full force later。
From this time forward； all the requests of Rosecrans for the improvement of the efficiency of his army were treated with great coolness； and in many instances it was only after the greatest importunity that he was able to secure the least attention to his recommendations for the increased usefulness of his command。 His repeated applications for more cavalry； and that they be armed with revolving rifles； were treated with little attention。 In the meantime nearly every communication from Washington intimated that he was unnecessarily delaying his advance upon Bragg in his works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma。 Grant； on his Vicksburg campaign； became very anxious for the advance of the Army of the Cumberland； to engage Bragg and prevent reinforcements being sent from him to Pemberton or Johnston； operating on his front and rear； and urged Rosecrans to move； and wrote to Halleck； requesting him to direct an advance of the Army of the Cumberland on Bragg's position。 Rosecrans regarded it for the best interest of the country for his army to remain constantly threatening Bragg； in order to hold the entire army of the latter in his immediate front； and also in the event of the defeat of Grant； and a concentration of the enemy on Rosecrans's position； that he should be close to his base； his army being then the reserve。 If an advance succeeded in driving Bragg from Tullahoma； a greater danger than his remaining inactive on our front might ensue。 To Bragg； the occupancy of Middle Tennessee was of sufficient importance to justify him in remaining inactive with his entire command； waiting for the advance of Rosecrans some six months。 If driven from Tennessee； his troops were ready to unite with the command in Mississippi and defeat Grant's movements。 If Bragg could be held in Tennessee after until after Grant's success was assured； then； by waiting at Murfreesboro with his army quiet； Rosecrans could render better service than by moving on the enemy。 This was a matter of military judgment； on one side espoused by Rosecrans and all his corps and division commanders； who were on the ground； and on the other by Halleck； Stanton； and Grant； and this question served to increase the feeling against Rosecrans in those quarters。 Bragg also considered that his presence on the front of the Federal army would prevent any troops from it being sent to aid Grant。 And thus the year wore away until early summer。 Still another consideration with Rosecrans； was the character of the soil in Tennessee from a short distance south of Murfreesboro to the foot of the Cumberland Mountains。 This was a light sandy loam；