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g his right。 McCook was asked if he could hold his position for three hours； and replied that he thought he could。 The importance of doing so was again impressed upon him； and the officers then separated。
As will be seen； the plan of battle as formed by Rosecrans contemplated a feint attack by his right； which in the event of a repulse was to fall back slowly； contesting the ground stubbornly； while the main attack was to be made by the forces on the left； followed up the advance of the centre； the right to be temporarily sacrificed for the success of the general plan。 Rosecrans knew that Bragg had weakened his right to support his left； looking to offensive movements on his part； and that the vital point in his own plan was the ability of McCook to hold the enemy in check on his front。
During the 30th； Bragg formed his plan of battle； which； singular as it appears； was the exact counterpart of that of the Federal commander。 Hardee on the left； with McCown's and Cleburne's divisions； was to advance against the Federal right； which being forced back； Polk and Withers's and Cheatham's divisions were then to push the centre。 The movement made by a steady wheel to the right on the right of Polk's command as a pivot。 Bragg's plan was to drive our right and centre back against our left on Stone's River； seize our line of communication with Nashville； thus cutting us off from our base of operations and supplies； and ultimately securing the objective of his campaign； Nashville。 Bragg's plan was equally as bold as that of his opponentwhose command was slightly inferior in strength to the rebel forceand the success of either depended very largely on the degree of diligence in opening the engagement。 Rosecrans's orders were for the troops to breakfast before daylight and attack at seven o'clock。 Bragg issued orders to attack at daylight。
Chapter VIII。
The Battle of Stone's River。
With early light； on the morning of the 31st； the movement in each army began。 Rosecrans had established his headquarters in the rear of the left； in order to direct in person the forward movement of that portion of his army which was to cross Stone's River； sweep all resistance before it； and swing into Murfreesboro。 The command was given； and at once Van Cleve advanced two brigades； making the crossing of the river at the lower ford without opposition。 Wood's division had reached the river bank prepared to make the crossing and support Van Cleve。 Everything on the left appeared to be working satisfactorily； when the opening sounds of the enemy's attack on the right reached the left。 This was as intended； and went to show that if Bragg's left was fully occupied he then could give the less attention to his right； engaged by our army。 with high hopes the troops then pressing forward continued to cross the river。 Within an hour after the opening of the battle； one of McCook's staff officers reported to Rosecrans that the Right Wing was heavily pressed and needed assistance。 Rosecrans was not told of the rout of Johnson's division； nor of the rapid withdrawal of Davis； made necessary thereby。 Rosecrans； sending word to McCook to make a stubborn fight； continued his own offensive movement。 Everything was working well as far as he knew。 His strong force on the left was not yet engaged。 This he could hurl at the enemy's line of communications and strike on the flank of Bragg's army that was flanking him。 Soon after another staff officer from McCook arrived and reported that the entire Right Wing was being driven； a fact that manifested itself by the troops from the broken divisions pouring forth from the cedars in alarming numbers； and by the rapid movement of the noise of the battle to the north。 Then Rosecrans saw the necessity of abandoning his own movement； of recalling the left； and of proceeding at once to the right to save what was left of that corps as speedily as possible。 He ordered back his left from across the river； and calling on his staff to mount； rode full gallop over to the right to reform that command on a new line and save his army。 Now that he was on the defensive； after McCook's disaster； it was impossible to carry out his original plan of battle。
On the 30th； McCown in posting his division placed Ector's and Rains's brigades in the first line； and McNair's brigade in the second。 Hardee ordered McCown at once to change this so as to bring McNair on the front line。 This order was not obeyed until the morning of the 31st； when the movement was made； causing； however； some delay in the advance of Hardee's command on our right。 At half past six o'clock； McCown's division in the front line with Cleburne's division in the second swinging around by a continuous change of direction to the right； advanced on to the right of McCook。 McCown did not properly execute the movement as intended； and was carried so far west as to leave a gap in the rebel front between Withers's left and McCown's right。 Into this gap Cleburne immediately threw his division； and advanced； filling the interval in the front line between McCown and Polk。 This gave Hardee double the length of front originally contemplated； and made it a single line instead of a double with division front。 These two divisions thus formed then struck McCook's right flankJohnson's division。 McCook's line was very weak and poorly posted。 It was thin and light； without reserves； with neither the troops nor commanding officers in their places； as they should have been； under Rosecrans's orders of the evening before。
Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged in a struggle unto death； and the air was full of tokens that one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought。 In the face of all this； Johnson； the commander of the First Division on the right； was not on the line nor near enough to his troops to give orders to them； his headquarters being a mile and a half in the rear。 General Willich the commander of the Second Brigade； which had been posted for the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our army； was absent from his command at division headquarters。 His brigade was not even in line； as they had been ordered to get their breakfast。 The batteries of the division were not properly posted； and in some cases the horses were away from the guns to the rear for water。 All this was criminal negligencea failure in the performance of dutyfor which some one should have suffered。 To the faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming disaster that overtook our army on that day。 As the two divisions of the enemy advanced； Kirk threw forward the Forty…fourth Illinois to support the skirmish line； and called on Willich's brigade for help。 This brigade being without an immediate commander； no effort was made to support Kirk。 The contest was too unequal to be maintained for any great length of time； and Johnson's division； after a sharp and spirited but fruitless contest； crumbling to pieces； was driven back with a loss of eleven guns。 Kirk was mortally wounded and Willich was captured； retur