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is by the Eretrians called skleroter。
CRATYLUS： Very true。
SOCRATES： But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents； and is there the
same significance to them in the termination rho； which there is to us in
sigma； or is there no significance to one of us？
CRATYLUS： Nay； surely there is a significance to both of us。
SOCRATES： In as far as they are like； or in as far as they are unlike？
CRATYLUS： In as far as they are like。
SOCRATES： Are they altogether alike？
CRATYLUS： Yes； for the purpose of expressing motion。
SOCRATES： And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda？ for that is
expressive not of hardness but of softness。
CRATYLUS： Why； perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted； Socrates； and
should be altered into rho； as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my
opinion rightly； when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon
occasion。
SOCRATES： Good。 But still the word is intelligible to both of us； when I
say skleros （hard）； you know what I mean。
CRATYLUS： Yes； my dear friend； and the explanation of that is custom。
SOCRATES： And what is custom but convention？ I utter a sound which I
understand； and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound： this
is what you are saying？
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： And if when I speak you know my meaning； there is an indication
given by me to you？
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as
from like； for example in the lamda of sklerotes。 But if this is true；
then you have made a convention with yourself； and the correctness of a
name turns out to be convention； since letters which are unlike are
indicative equally with those which are like； if they are sanctioned by
custom and convention。 And even supposing that you distinguish custom from
convention ever so much； still you must say that the signification of words
is given by custom and not by likeness； for custom may indicate by the
unlike as well as by the like。 But as we are agreed thus far； Cratylus
（for I shall assume that your silence gives consent）； then custom and
convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our
thoughts； for suppose we take the instance of number； how can you ever
imagine； my good friend； that you will find names resembling every
individual number； unless you allow that which you term convention and
agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names？ I
quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things；
but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance； as Hermogenes says； is a
shabby thing； which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of
convention with a view to correctness； for I believe that if we could
always； or almost always； use likenesses； which are perfectly appropriate；
this would be the most perfect state of language； as the opposite is the
most imperfect。 But let me ask you； what is the force of names； and what
is the use of them？
CRATYLUS： The use of names； Socrates； as I should imagine； is to inform：
the simple truth is； that he who knows names knows also the things which
are expressed by them。
SOCRATES： I suppose you mean to say； Cratylus； that as the name is； so
also is the thing； and that he who knows the one will also know the other；
because they are similars； and all similars fall under the same art or
science； and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know
things。
CRATYLUS： That is precisely what I mean。
SOCRATES： But let us consider what is the nature of this information about
things which； according to you； is given us by names。 Is it the best sort
of information？ or is there any other？ What do you say？
CRATYLUS： I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of
information about them； there can be no other。
SOCRATES： But do you believe that in the discovery of them； he who
discovers the names discovers also the things； or is this only the method
of instruction； and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery。
CRATYLUS： I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery
are of the same nature as instruction。
SOCRATES： Well； but do you not see； Cratylus； that he who follows names in
the search after things； and analyses their meaning； is in great danger of
being deceived？
CRATYLUS： How so？
SOCRATES： Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his
conception of the things which they signifieddid he not？
CRATYLUS： True。
SOCRATES： And if his conception was erroneous； and he gave names according
to his conception； in what position shall we who are his followers find
ourselves？ Shall we not be deceived by him？
CRATYLUS： But； Socrates； am I not right in thinking that he must surely
have known； or else； as I was saying； his names would not be names at all？
And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth； and the proof
isthat he is perfectly consistent。 Did you ever observe in speaking that
all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose？
SOCRATES： But that； friend Cratylus； is no answer。 For if he did begin in
error； he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original
error and with himself； there would be nothing strange in this； any more
than in geometrical diagrams； which have often a slight and invisible flaw
in the first part of the process； and are consistently mistaken in the long
deductions which follow。 And this is the reason why every man should
expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first
principles：are they or are they not rightly laid down？ and when he has
duly sifted them； all the rest will follow。 Now I should be astonished to
find that names are really consistent。 And here let us revert to our
former discussion： Were we not saying that all things are in motion and
progress and flux； and that this idea of motion is expressed by names？ Do
you not conceive that to be the meaning of them？
CRATYLUS： Yes； that is assuredly their meaning； and the true meaning。
SOCRATES： Let us revert to episteme （knowledge） and observe how ambiguous
this word is； seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than
going round with them； and therefore we should leave the beginning as at
present； and not reject the epsilon； but make an insertion of an iota
instead of an epsilon （not pioteme； but epiisteme）。 Take another example：
bebaion （sure） is clearly the expression of station and position； and not
of motion。 Again； the word istoria （enquiry） bears upon the face of it the
stopping （istanai） of the stream； and the word piston （faithful） certainly
indicates cessation of motion； then； again； mneme （memory）； as any one may
see； expresses rest in the soul； and not motion。 Moreover； words such as
amartia and sumphora； which have a bad sense； viewed in the ligh