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ll on the goods that pass through their country。＇8＇ In Japan； it is true； to cheat the customs is a capital crime； but this is because they have particular reasons for prohibiting all communication with foreigners； hence the fraud＇9＇ is rather a contravention of the laws made for the security of the government than of those of commerce。
12。 Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty。 It is a general rule that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the subject； and that there is a necessity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of slavery。 This has always been and always will be the case。 It is a rule derived from nature that never varies。 We find it in all parts in England； in Holland； and in every state where liberty gradually declines； till we come to Turkey。 Switzerland seems to be an exception to this rule； because they pay no taxes； but the particular reason for that exemption is well known； and even confirms what I have advanced。 In those barren mountains provisions are so dear； and the country is so populous； that a Swiss pays four times more to nature than a Turk does to the sultan。
A conquering people； such as were formerly the Athenians and the Romans； may rid themselves of all taxes as they reign over vanquished nations。 Then indeed they do not pay in proportion to their liberty； because in this respect they are no longer a people； but a monarch。
But the general rule still holds good。 In moderate governments there is an indemnity for the weight of the taxes； which is liberty。 In despotic countries＇10＇ there is an equivalent for liberty； which is the lightness of the taxes。
In some monarchies in Europe there are particular provinces＇11＇ which from the very nature of their civil government are in a more flourishing condition than the rest。 It is pretended that these provinces are not sufficiently taxed； because through the goodness of their government they are able to be taxed higher； hence the ministers seem constantly to aim at depriving them of this very government； whence a diffusive blessing is derived； which redounds even to the prince's advantage。
13。 In what Government Taxes are capable of Increase。 Taxes may be increased in most republics； because the citizen； who thinks he is paying himself； cheerfully submits to them； and moreover is generally able to bear their weight； from the nature of the government。
In a monarchy taxes may be increased； because the moderation of the government is capable of procuring opulence： it is a recompense； as it were； granted to the prince for the respect he shows to the laws。 In despotic governments they cannot be increased； because there can be no increase of the extremity of slavery。
14。 That the Nature of the Taxes is in Relation to the Government。 A capitation is more natural to slavery； a duty on merchandise is more natural to liberty； by reason it has not so direct a relation to the person。
It is natural in a despotic government for the prince not to give money to his soldiers； or to those belonging to his court； but to distribute lands amongst them； and of course that there should be very few taxes。 But if the prince gives money； the most natural tax he can raise is a capitation； which can never be considerable。 For as it is impossible to make different classes of the contributors； because of the abuses that might arise thence； considering the injustice and violence of the government； they are under an absolute necessity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the poorest and most wretched are able to contribute。
The natural tax of moderate governments is the duty laid on merchandise。 As this is really paid by the consumer； though advanced by the merchant； it is a loan which the latter has already made to the former。 Hence the merchant must be considered on the one side as the general debtor of the state； and on the other as the creditor of every individual。 He advances to the state the duty which the consumer will sometime or other refund： and he has paid for the consumer the duty which he has advanced for the merchandise。 It is therefore obvious that in proportion to the moderation of the government； to the prevalence of the spirit of liberty； and to the security of private fortunes； a merchant has it in his power to advance money to the state； and to pay considerable duties for individuals。 In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or sixty pounds sterling for every tun of wine he imports。 Where is the merchant that would dare do any such thing in a country like Turkey？ And were he so presumptuous； how could he do it with a crazy or shattered fortune？
15。 Abuse of Liberty。 To these great advantages of liberty it is owing that liberty itself has been abused。 Because a moderate government has been productive of admirable effects； this moderation has been laid aside； because great taxes have been raised； they wanted to carry them to excess； and ungrateful to the hand of liberty； of whom they received this present； they addressed themselves to slavery； who never grants the least favour。
Liberty produces excessive taxes； the effect of excessive taxes is slavery； and slavery produces a diminution of tribute。
Most of the edicts of the eastern monarchs are to exempt every year some province of their empire from paying tribute。＇12＇ The manifestations of their wills are favours。 But in Europe the edicts of princes are disagreeable even before they are seen； because they always make mention of their own wants； but not a word of ours。
From an unpardonable indolence in the ministers of those countries； owing to the nature of the government； and frequently to the climate； the people derive this advantage； that they are not incessantly plagued with new demands。 The public expense does not increase； because the ministers do not form new projects： and if some by chance are formed； they are such as are soon executed。 The governors of the state do not perpetually torment the people； for they do not perpetually。 torment themselves。 But it is impossible there should be any fixed rule in our finances； since we always know that we shall have something or other to execute； without ever knowing what it is。
It is no longer customary with us to give the appellation of a great minister to a wise dispenser of the public revenues； but to a person of dexterity and cunning； who is clever at finding out what we call the ways and means。
16。 Of the Conquests of the Mahometans。 It was this excess of taxes＇13＇ that occasioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahometans carried on their conquests。 Instead of a continual series of extortions devised by the subtle avarice of the Greek emperors； the people were subjected to a simple tribute which was paid and collected with ease。 Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation than a corrupt government； in which they suffered every inconvenience of lost liberty； with all the horror of present slavery。
17。 Of the Augmentation of Troops。 A new distemper has spread itself over Europe； infecting our princes； and inducing them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops。 It has its redoublings； and of necessity becomes contagious。 For as soon as one