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78。 See Francis Pirard。
79。 As at present in Persia； according to Sir John Chardin； this custom is very ancient。 〃They put Cavades；〃 says Procopius； 〃into the castle of oblivion； there is a law which forbids any one to speak of those who are shut up； or even to mention their name。〃
80。 The fifth law in the Cod。 ad leg。 Jul。 Majest。
81。 In the 8th chapter of this book。
82。 Frederick copied this law in the Constitutions of Naples； i。
83。 In monarchies there is generally a law which forbids those who are invested with public employments to go out of the kingdom without the prince's leave。 This law ought to be established also in republics。 But in those that have particular institutions the prohibition ought to be general； in order to prevent the introduction of foreign manners。
Book XIII。 Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the Greatness of the Public Revenues Bear to Liberty
1。 Of the Public Revenues。 The public revenues are a portion that each subject gives of his property； in order to secure or enjoy the remainder。
To fix these revenues in a proper manner； regard should be had both to the necessities of the state and to those of the subject。 The real wants of the people ought never to give way to the imaginary wants of the state。
Imaginary wants are those which flow from the passions and the weakness of the governors； from the vain conceit of some extraordinary project； from the inordinate desire of glory； and from a certain impotence of mind incapable of withstanding the impulse of fancy。 Often have ministers of a restless disposition imagined that the wants of their own mean and ignoble souls were those of the state。
Nothing requires more wisdom and prudence than the regulation of that portion of which the subject is deprived； and that which he is suffered to retain。
The public revenues should not be measured by the people's abilities to give； but by what they ought to give； and if they are measured by their abilities to give； it should be considered what they are able to give for a constancy。
2。 That it is bad Reasoning to say that the Greatness of Taxes is good in its own Nature。 There have been instances in particular monarchies of petty states exempt from taxes that have been as miserable as the circumjacent places which groaned under the weight of exactions。 The chief reason of this is； that the petty state can hardly have any such thing as industry； arts； or manufactures； because of its being subject to a thousand restraints from the great state by which it is environed。 The great state is blessed with industry； manufactures； and arts； and establishes laws by which those several advantages are procured。 The petty state becomes； therefore； necessarily poor； let it pay never so few taxes。
And yet some have concluded from the poverty of those petty states that in order to render the people industrious they should be loaded with taxes。 But it would be a juster inference； that they ought to pay no taxes at all。 None live here but wretches who retire from the neighbouring parts to avoid working wretches who； disheartened by labour； make their whole felicity consist in idleness。
The effect of wealth in a country is to inspire every heart with ambition： that of poverty is to give birth to despair。 The former is excited by labour； the latter is soothed by indolence。
Nature is just to all mankind； and repays them for their industry： she renders them industrious by annexing rewards in proportion to their labour。 But if an arbitrary prince should attempt to deprive the people of nature's bounty； they would fall into a disrelish of industry； and then indolence and inaction must be their only happiness。
3。 Of Taxes in Countries where Part of the People are Villains or Bondmen。 The state of villainage is sometimes established after a conquest。 In that case； the bondman or villain that tills the land ought to have a kind of partnership with his master。 Nothing but a communication of loss or profit can reconcile those who are doomed to labour to such as are blessed with a state of affluence。
4。 Of a Republic in the like Case。 When a republic has reduced a nation to the drudgery of cultivating her lands； she ought never to suffer the free subject to have the power of increasing the tribute of the bondman。 This was not permitted at Sparta。 Those brave people thought the Helotes＇1＇ would be more industrious in cultivating their lands； and knowing that their servitude was not to increase； they imagined； likewise； that the masters would be better citizens； when they desired no more than what they were accustomed to enjoy。
5。 Of a Monarchy in the like Case。 When the nobles of a monarchical state cause the lands to be cultivated for their own use by a conquered people； they ought never to have the power of increasing the service or tribute。＇2＇ Besides； it is right the prince should be satisfied with his own demesne and the military service。 But if he wants to raise taxes on the vassals of his nobility； the lords of the several districts ought to be answerable for the tax；＇3＇ and be obliged to pay it for the vassals； by whom they may be afterwards reimbursed。 If this rule be not followed； the lord and the collectors of the public taxes will harass the poor vassal by turns till he perishes with misery or flies into the woods。
6。 Of a despotic Government in the like Case。 The foregoing rule is still more indispensably necessary in a despotic government。 The lord who is every moment liable to be stripped of his lands and his vassals is not so eager to preserve them。
When Peter I thought proper to follow the custom of Germany； and to demand his taxes in money； he made a very prudent regulation； which is still followed in Russia。 The gentleman levies the tax on the peasant； and pays it to the Czar。 If the number of peasants diminishes； he pays all the same； if it increases； he pays no more； so that it is his interest not to worry or oppress his vassals。
7。 Of Taxes in Countries where Villainage is not established。 When the inhabitants of a state are all free subjects； and each man enjoys his property with as much right as the prince his sovereignty； taxes may then be laid either on persons； on lands； on merchandise； on two of these； or on all three together。
In the taxing of persons； it would be an unjust proportion to conform exactly to that of property。 At Athens the people were divided into four classes。＇4＇ Those who drew five hundred measures of liquid or dried fruit from their estates paid a talent＇5＇ to the public； those who drew three hundred measures paid half a talent； those who had two hundred measures paid ten min？； those of the fourth class paid nothing at all。 The tax was fair； though it was not proportionable： if it did not follow the measure of people's property； it followed that of their wants。 It was judged that every man had an equal share of what was necessary for nature； that whatsoever was necessary for nature ought not to be taxed； that to this succeeded the useful； which ought to be taxed； but less than the superfluous； and that the largeness of the taxes on what was superfluous prevented superfluity。
In the taxing of lands it is customary to