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Here it is proper to observe what share the senate had in the nomination of the qu？stor； that we may see how far the two powers were balanced。 Sometimes the senate caused a dictator to be chosen； in order to exercise the office of qu？stor；＇65＇ at other times they ordained that the people should be convened by a tribune； with the view of proceeding to the nomination of a qu？stor；＇66＇ and； in fine； the people frequently appointed a magistrate to make his report to the senate concerning a particular crime； and to desire them to name a qu？stor； as may be seen in the judgment upon Lucius Scipio＇67＇ in Livy。＇68＇
In the year of Rome 604； some of these commissions were rendered permanent。＇69＇ All criminal causes were gradually divided into different parts； to which they gave the name of perpetual questions。 Different pr？tors were created； to each of whom some of those questions were assigned。 They had a power conferred upon them for the term of a year； of trying such criminal causes as bore any relation to those questions； and then they were sent to govern their province。
At Carthage the senate of the hundred was composed of judges who enjoyed that dignity for life。＇70＇ But at Rome the pr？tors were annual； and the judges were not even for so long a term； but were nominated for each cause。 We have already shown in the sixth chapter of this book how favourable this regulation was to liberty in particular governments。
The judges were chosen from the order of senators； till the time of the Gracchi。 Tiberius Gracchus caused a law to pass that they should be taken from the equestrian order； a change so very considerable that the tribune boasted of having cut； by one rogation only； the sinews of the senatorial dignity。
It is necessary to observe that the three powers may be very well distributed in regard to the liberty of the constitution； though not so well in respect to the liberty of the subject。 At Rome the people had the greatest share of the legislative； a part of the executive； and part of the judiciary power； by which means they had so great a weight in the government as required some other power to balance it。 The senate indeed had part of the executive power； and some share of the legislative；＇71＇ but this was not sufficient to counterbalance the weight of the people。 It was necessary that they should partake of the judiciary power： and accordingly they had a share when the judges were chosen from among the senators。 But when the Gracchi deprived the senators of the judicial power；＇72＇ the senate were no longer able to withstand the people。 To favour； therefore； the liberty of the subject； they struck at that of the constitution； but the former perished with the latter。
Infinite were the mischiefs that thence arose。 The constitution was changed at a time when the fire of civil discord had scarcely left any such thing as a constitution。 The knights ceased to be that middle order which united the people to the senate； and the chain of the constitution was broken。
There were even particular reasons against transferring the judiciary power to the equestrian order。 The constitution of Rome was founded on this principle； that none should be enlisted as soldiers but such as were men of sufficient property to answer for their conduct to the republic。 The knights； as persons of the greatest property； formed the cavalry of the legions。 But when their dignity increased； they refused to serve any longer in that capacity； and another kind of cavalry was obliged to be raised： thus Marius enlisted all sorts of people into his army； and soon after the republic was lost。＇73＇
Besides； the knights were the farmers of the revenue； men whose great rapaciousness increased the public calamities。 Instead of giving to such as those the judicial power； they ought to have been constantly under the eye of the judges。 This we must say in commendation of the ancient French laws； that they have acted towards the officers of the revenue with as great a diffidence as would be observed between enemies。 When the judiciary power at Rome was transferred to the publicans； there was then an end of all virtue； polity； laws； and government。
Of this we find a very ingenious description in some fragments of Diodorus Siculus and Dio。 〃Mutius Sc？vola；〃 says Diodorus；＇74＇ 〃wanted to revive the ancient manners； and the laudable custom of sober and frugal living。 For his predecessors having entered into a contract with the farmers of the revenue； who at that time were possessed of the judiciary power at Rome； had infected the province with all manner of corruption。 But Sc？vola made an example of the publicans； and imprisoned those by whom others had been confined。〃
Dio informs us＇75＇ that Publius Rutilius； his lieutenant； was equally obnoxious to the equestrian order； and that upon his return they accused him of having received some presents； and condemned him to a fine； upon which he instantly made a cession of his goods。 His innocence appeared in this； that he was found to be worth a great deal less than what he was charged with having extorted； and he showed a just title to what he possessed： but he would not live any longer in the same city with such profligate wretches。
The Italians； says Diodorus again；＇76＇ bought up whole droves of slaves in Sicily； to till their lands and to take care of their cattle； but refused them a necessary subsistence。 These wretches were then forced to go and rob on the highways； armed with lances and clubs； covered with beasts' skins； and followed by large mastiffs。 Thus the whole province was laid waste； and the inhabitants could not call anything their own but what was secured by fortresses。 There was neither proconsul nor pr？tor that could or would oppose this disorder； or that presumed to punish these slaves； because they belonged to the knights； who at Rome were possessed of the judiciary power。＇77＇ And yet this was one of the causes of the war of the slaves。 But I shall add only one word more。 A profession deaf and inexorable； that can have no other view than lucre； that was always asking and never granting； that impoverished the rich and increased even the misery of the poor such a profession； I say； should never have been entrusted with the judiciary power at Rome。
19。 Of the Government of the Roman Provinces。 Such was the distribution of the three powers in Rome。 But they were far from being thus distributed in the provinces。 Liberty prevailed in the centre and tyranny in the extreme parts。
While Rome extended her dominions no farther than Italy； the people were governed as confederates； and the laws of each republic were preserved。 But when she enlarged her conquests； and the senate had no longer an immediate inspection over the provinces； nor the magistrates residing at Rome were any longer capable of governing the empire； they were obliged to send pr？tors and proconsuls。 Then it was that the harmony of the three powers was lost。 The persons appointed to that office were entrusted with a power which comprehended that of all the Roman magistracies； nay； even that of the people。＇78＇ They were despotic magistrates； extremely well adapted to the distance of the places to which they were destined。 They e