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？ No： in order to preserve the dignity of the people； and the security of the subject； the legislative part which represents the people must bring in its charge before the legislative part which represents the nobility； who have neither the same interests nor the same passions。
Here is an advantage which this government has over most of the ancient republics； where this abuse prevailed； that the people were at the same time both judge and accuser。
The executive power； pursuant of what has been already said； ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting； otherwise it would soon be stripped of its prerogative。 But should the legislative power usurp a share of the executive； the latter would be equally undone。
If the prince were to have a part in the legislature by the power of resolving； liberty would be lost。 But as it is necessary he should have a share in the legislature for the support of his own prerogative； this share must consist in the power of rejecting。
The change of government at Rome was owing to this； that neither the senate； who had one part of the executive power； nor the magistrates； who were entrusted with the other； had the right of rejecting； which was entirely lodged in the people。
Here then is the fundamental constitution of the government we are treating of。 The legislative body being composed of two parts； they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting。 They are both restrained by the executive power； as the executive is by the legislative。
These three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction。 But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs； they are forced to move； but still in concert。
As the executive power has no other part in the legislative than the privilege of rejecting； it can have no share in the public debates。 It is not even necessary that it should propose； because as it may always disapprove of the resolutions that shall be taken； it may likewise reject the decisions on those proposals which were made against its will。
In some ancient commonwealths； where public debates were carried on by the people in a body； it was natural for the executive power to propose and debate in conjunction with the people； otherwise their resolutions must have been attended with a strange confusion。
Were the executive power to determine the raising of public money； otherwise than by giving its consent； liberty would be at an end； because it would become legislative in the most important point of legislation。
If the legislative power was to settle the subsidies； not from year to year； but for ever； it would run the risk of losing its liberty； because the executive power would be no longer dependent； and when once it was possessed of such a perpetual right； it would be a matter of indifference whether it held it of itself or of another。 The same may be said if it should come to a resolution of entrusting； not an annual； but a perpetual command of the fleets and armies to the executive power。
To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress； it is requisite that the armies with which it is entrusted should consist of the people； and have the same spirit as the people； as was the case at Rome till the time of Marius。 To obtain this end； there are only two ways； either that the persons employed in the army should have sufficient property to answer for their conduct to their fellow…subjects； and be enlisted only for a year； as was customary at Rome： or if there should be a standing army； composed chiefly of the most despicable part of the nation； the legislative power should have a right to disband them as soon as it pleased； the soldiers should live in common with the rest of the people； and no separate camp； barracks； or fortress should be suffered。
When once an army is established； it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative； but on the executive； power； and this from the very nature of the thing； its business consisting more in action than in deliberation。
It is natural for mankind to set a higher value upon courage than timidity； on activity than prudence； on strength than counsel。 Hence the army will ever despise a senate； and respect their own officers。 They will naturally slight the orders sent them by a body of men whom they look upon as cowards； and therefore unworthy to command them。 So that as soon as the troops depend entirely on the legislative body； it becomes a military government； and if the contrary has ever happened； it has been owing to some extraordinary circumstances。 It is because the army was always kept divided； it is because it was composed of several bodies that depended each on a particular province； it is because the capital towns were strong places； defended by their natural situation； and not garrisoned with regular troops。 Holland； for instance； is still safer than Venice； she might drown or starve the revolted troops； for as they are not quartered in towns capable of furnishing them with necessary subsistence； this subsistence is of course precarious。
In perusing the admirable treatise of Tacitus On the Manners of the Germans；＇13＇ we find it is from that nation the English have borrowed the idea of their political government。 This beautiful system was invented first in the woods。
As all human things have an end； the state we are speaking of will lose its liberty； will perish。 Have not Rome； Sparta； and Carthage perished？ It will perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupt than the executive。
It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty or not。 Sufficient it is for my purpose to observe that it is established by their laws； and I inquire no further。
Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other governments； nor to say that this extreme political liberty ought to give uneasiness to those who have only a moderate share of it。 How should I have any such design； I who think that even the highest refinement of reason is not always desirable； and that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in extremes？
Harrington； in his Oceana； has also inquired into the utmost degree of liberty to which the constitution of a state may be carried。 But of him indeed it may be said that for want of knowing the nature of real liberty he busied himself in pursuit of an imaginary one； and that he built a Chalcedon； though he had a Byzantium before his eyes。
7。 Of the Monarchies we are acquainted with。 The monarchies we are acquainted with have not； like that we have been speaking of； liberty for their direct view： the only aim is the glory of the subject； of the state； and of the sovereign。 But hence there results a spirit of liberty； which in those states is capable of achieving as great things； and of contributing as much perhaps to happiness as liberty itself。
Here the three powers are not distributed and founded on the model of the constitution above…mentioned； they have each a particular distribution； according to which they border more or less on political liberty； and if they did not border upon it； monarchy would degenerate into despotic government。
8。 Why the Ancients had not a clea