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ordained by others。 By the power of rejecting I would be understood to mean the right of annulling a resolution taken by another； which was the power of the tribunes at Rome。 And though the person possessed of the privilege of rejecting may likewise have the right of approving； yet this approbation passes for no more than a declaration that he intends to make no use of his privilege of rejecting； and is derived from that very privilege。
The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch； because this branch of government； having need of despatch； is better administered by one than by many： on the other hand； whatever depends on the legislative power is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person。
But if there were no monarch； and the executive power should be committed to a certain number of persons selected from the legislative body； there would be an end then of liberty； by reason the two powers would be united； as the same persons would sometimes possess； and would be always able to possess； a share in both。
Were the legislative body to be a considerable time without meeting； this would likewise put an end to liberty。 For of two things one would naturally follow： either that there would be no longer any legislative resolutions； and then the state would fall into anarchy； or that these resolutions would be taken by the executive power； which would render it absolute。
It would be needless for the legislative body to continue always assembled。 This would be troublesome to the representatives； and； moreover； would cut out too much work for the executive power； so as to take off its attention to its office； and oblige it to think only of defending its own prerogatives； and the right it has to execute。
Again； were the legislative body to be always assembled； it might happen to be kept up only by filling the places of the deceased members with new representatives； and in that case； if the legislative body were once corrupted； the evil would be past all remedy。 When different legislative bodies succeed one another； the people who have a bad opinion of that which is actually sitting may reasonably entertain some hopes of the next： but were it to be always the same body； the people upon seeing it once corrupted would no longer expect any good from its laws； and of course they would either become desperate or fall into a state of indolence。
The legislative body should not meet of itself。 For a body is supposed to have no will but when it is met； and besides； were it not to meet unanimously； it would be impossible to determine which was really the legislative body； the part assembled； or the other。 And if it had a right to prorogue itself； it might happen never to be prorogued； which would be extremely dangerous； in case it should ever attempt to encroach on the executive power。 Besides； there are seasons； some more proper than others； for assembling the legislative body： it is fit； therefore； that the executive power should regulate the time of meeting； as well as the duration of those assemblies； according to the circumstances and exigencies of a state known to itself。
Were the executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body； the latter would become despotic； for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased； it would soon destroy all the other powers。
But it is not proper； on the other hand； that the legislative power should have a right to stay the executive。 For as the execution has its natural limits； it is useless to confine it； besides； the executive power is generally employed in momentary operations。 The power； therefore； of the Roman tribunes was faulty； as it put a stop not only to the legislation； but likewise to the executive part of government； which was attended with infinite mischief。
But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive； it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed； an advantage which this government has over that of Crete and Sparta； where the Cosmi＇9＇ and the Ephori＇10＇ gave no account of their administration。
But whatever may be the issue of that examination； the legislative body ought not to have a power of arraigning the person； nor； of course； the conduct； of him who is entrusted with the executive power。 His person should be sacred； because as it is necessary for the good of the state to prevent the legislative body from rendering themselves arbitrary； the moment he is accused or tried there is an end of liberty。
In this case the state would be no longer a monarchy； but a kind of republic； though not a free government。 But as the person entrusted with the executive power cannot abuse it without bad counsellors； and such as have the laws as ministers； though the laws protect them as subjects； these men may be examined and punished an advantage which this government has over that of Gnidus； where the law allowed of no such thing as calling the Amymones＇11＇ to an account； even after their administration；＇12＇ and therefore the people could never obtain any satisfaction for the injuries done them。
Though； in general； the judiciary power ought not to be united with any part of the legislative； yet this is liable to three exceptions； founded on the particular interest of the party accused。
The great are always obnoxious to popular envy； and were they to be judged by the people； they might be in danger from their judges； and would； moreover； be deprived of the privilege which the meanest subject is possessed of in a free state； of being tried by his peers。 The nobility； for this reason； ought not to be cited before the ordinary courts of judicature； but before that part of the legislature which is composed of their own body。
It is possible that the law； which is clearsighted in one sense； and blind in another； might； in some cases； be too severe。 But as we have already observed； the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law； mere passive beings； incapable of moderating either its force or rigour。 That part； therefore； of the legislative body； which we have just now observed to be a necessary tribunal on another occasion； is also a necessary tribunal in this； it belongs to its supreme authority to moderate the law in favour of the law itself； by mitigating the sentence。
It might also happen that a subject entrusted with the administration of public affairs may infringe the rights of the people； and be guilty of crimes which the ordinary magistrates either could not or would not punish。 But； in general； the legislative power cannot try causes： and much less can it try this particular case； where it represents the party aggrieved； which is the people。 It can only； therefore； impeach。 But before what court shall it bring its impeachment？ Must it go and demean itself before the ordinary tribunals； which are its inferiors； and； being composed； moreover； of men who are chosen from the people as well as itself； will naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser？ No： in order to preserve the dignity of the people； and the security of the subject； the legislati