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The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate； it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people＇7＇ at certain times of the year； and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law； in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires。
By this method the judicial power； so terrible to mankind； not being annexed to any particular state or profession； becomes； as it were； invisible。 People have not then the judges continually present to their view； they fear the office； but not the magistrate。
In accusations of a deep and criminal nature； it is proper the person accused should have the privilege of choosing； in some measure； his judges； in concurrence with the law； or at least he should have a right to except against so great a number that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice。
The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies； because they are not exercised on any private subject； one being no more than the general will of the state； and the other the execution of that general will。
But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed； the judgments ought； and to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law。 Were they to be the private opinion of the judge； people would then live in society； without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations。
The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused； or； in other words； his peers； to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of persons inclined to treat him with rigour。
If the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good behaviour； there is an end of liberty； unless they are taken up； in order to answer without delay to a capital crime； in which case they are really free； being subject only to the power of the law。
But should the legislature think itself in danger by some secret conspiracy against the state； or by a correspondence with a foreign enemy； it might authorise the executive power； for a short and limited time； to imprison suspected persons； who in that case would lose their liberty only for a while； to preserve it for ever。
And this is the only reasonable method that can be substituted to the tyrannical magistracy of the Ephori； and to the state inquisitors of Venice； who are also despotic。
As in a country of liberty； every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own governor； the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people。 But since this is impossible in large states； and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences； it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves。
The inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests than with those of other places； and are better judges of the capacity of their neighbours than of that of the rest of their countrymen。 The members； therefore； of the legislature should not be chosen from the general body of the nation； but it is proper that in every considerable place a representative should be elected by the inhabitants。＇8＇
The great advantage of representatives is； their capacity of discussing public affairs。 For this the people collectively are extremely unfit； which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy。
It is not at all necessary that the representatives who have received a general instruction from their constituents should wait to be directed on each particular affair； as is practised in the diets of Germany。 True it is that by this way of proceeding the speeches of the deputies might with greater propriety be called the voice of the nation； but； on the other hand； this would occasion infinite delays； would give each deputy a power of controlling the assembly； and； on the most urgent and pressing occasions； the wheels of government might be stopped by the caprice of a single person。
When the deputies； as Mr。 Sidney well observes； represent a body of people； as in Holland； they ought to be accountable to their constituents； but it is a different thing in England； where they are deputed by boroughs。
All the inhabitants of the several districts ought to have a right of voting at the election of a representative； except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own。
One great fault there was in most of the ancient republics； that the people had a right to active resolutions； such as require some execution； a thing of which they are absolutely incapable。 They ought to have no share in the government but for the choosing of representatives； which is within their reach。 For though few can tell the exact degree of men's capacities； yet there are none but are capable of knowing in general whether the person they choose is better qualified than most of his neighbours。
Neither ought the representative body to be chosen for the executive part of government； for which it is not so fit； but for the enacting of laws； or to see whether the laws in being are duly executed； a thing suited to their abilities； and which none indeed but themselves can properly perform。
In such a state there are always persons distinguished by their birth； riches； or honours： but were they to be confounded with the common people； and to have only the weight of a single vote like the rest； the common liberty would be their slavery； and they would have no interest in supporting it； as most of the popular resolutions would be against them。 The share they have； therefore； in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other advantages in the state； which happens only when they form a body that has a right to check the licentiousness of the people； as the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of theirs。
The legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the nobles； and to that which represents the people； each having their assemblies and deliberations apart； each their separate views and interests。
Of the three powers above mentioned； the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing： there remain； therefore； only two； and as these have need of a regulating power to moderate them； the part of the legislative body composed of the nobility is extremely proper for this purpose。
The body of the nobility ought to be hereditary。 In the first place it is so in its own nature； and in the next there must be a considerable interest to preserve its privileges privileges that in themselves are obnoxious to popular envy； and of course in a free state are always in danger。
But as a hereditary power might be tempted to pursue its own particular interests； and forget those of the people； it is proper that where a singular advantage may be gained by corrupting the nobility； as in the laws relating to the supplies； they should have no other share in the legislation than the power of rejecting； and not that of resolving。
By the power of resolving I mean the right of ordaining by their own authority； or of amending what has been ordained by others。 By the power of rejecting I would be understood to mean the