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publican taste applied it to this species of polity； those who liked a monarchical state gave it to monarchy。＇3＇ Thus they have all applied the name of liberty to the government most suitable to their own customs and inclinations： and as in republics the people have not so constant and so present a view of the causes of their misery； and as the magistrates seem to act only in conformity to the laws； hence liberty is generally said to reside in republics； and to be banished from monarchies。 In fine； as in democracies the people seem to act almost as they please； this sort of government has been deemed the most free； and the power of the people has been confounded with their liberty。
3。 In what Liberty consists。 It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please； but political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom。 In governments； that is； in societies directed by laws； liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will； and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will。
We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty。 Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit； and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty； because all his fellow…citizens would have the same power。
4。 The same Subject continued。 Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free。 Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments； and even in these it is not always found。 It is there only when there is no abuse of power。 But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it； and to carry his authority as far as it will go。 Is it not strange； though true； to say that virtue itself has need of limits？
To prevent this abuse； it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power。 A government may be so constituted； as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him； nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits。
5。 Of the End or View of different Governments。 Though all governments have the same general end； which is that of preservation； yet each has another particular object。 Increase of dominion was the object of Rome； war； that of Sparta； religion； that of the Jewish laws； commerce； that of Marseilles； public tranquillity； that of the laws of China：＇4＇ navigation； that of the laws of Rhodes； natural liberty； that of the policy of the Savages； in general； the pleasures of the prince； that of despotic states； that of monarchies； the prince's and the kingdom's glory； the independence of individuals is the end aimed at by the laws of Poland； thence results the oppression of the whole。＇5＇
One nation there is also in the world that has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty。 We shall presently examine the principles on which this liberty is founded； if they are sound； liberty will appear in its highest perfection。
To discover political liberty in a constitution； no great labour is requisite。 If we are capable of seeing it where it exists； it is soon found； and we need not go far in search of it。
6。 Of the Constitution of England。 In every government there are three sorts of power： the legislative； the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations； and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law。
By virtue of the first； the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws； and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted。 By the second； he makes peace or war； sends or receives embassies； establishes the public security； and provides against invasions。 By the third； he punishes criminals； or determines the disputes that arise between individuals。 The latter we shall call the judiciary power； and the other simply the executive power of the state。
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety。 In order to have this liberty； it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another。
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person； or in the same body of magistrates； there can be no liberty； because apprehensions may arise； lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws； to execute them in a tyrannical manner。
Again； there is no liberty； if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive。 Were it joined with the legislative； the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control； for the judge would be then the legislator。 Were it joined to the executive power； the judge might behave with violence and oppression。
There would be an end of everything； were the same man or the same body； whether of the nobles or of the people； to exercise those three powers； that of enacting laws； that of executing the public resolutions； and of trying the causes of individuals。
Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government because the prince who is invested with the two first powers leaves the third to his subjects。 In Turkey； where these three powers are united in the Sultan's person； the subjects groan under the most dreadful oppression。
In the republics of Italy； where these three powers are united； there is less liberty than in our monarchies。 Hence their government is obliged to have recourse to as violent methods for its support as even that of the Turks； witness the state inquisitors；＇6＇ and the lion's mouth into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accusations。
In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics！ The same body of magistrates are possessed； as executors of the laws； of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators。 They may plunder the state by their general determinations； and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands； every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions。
The whole power is here united in one body； and though there is no external pomp that indicates a despotic sway； yet the people feel the effects of it every moment。
Hence it is that many of the princes of Europe； whose aim has been levelled at arbitrary power； have constantly set out with uniting in their own persons all the branches of magistracy； and all the great offices of state。
I allow indeed that the mere hereditary aristocracy of the Italian republics does not exactly answer to the despotic power of the Eastern princes。 The number of magistrates sometimes moderates the power of the magistracy； the whole body of the nobles do not always concur in the same design； and different tribunals are erected； that temper each other。 Thus at Venice tlie legislative power is in the council； the executive in the pregadi； and the judiciary in the quarantia。 But the mischief is； that these different tribunals are composed of magistrates all belonging to the same body； which constitutes almost one and the same power。
The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate； it should be exercised by persons taken from the body o