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23。 See in Strabo； xiv。； in what manner the Rhodians behaved in this respect。
24。 Amelot de la Houssaye； Of the Government of Venice； part III。 The Claudian law forbade the senators to have any ship at sea that held above forty bushels。 Livy； xxi。 63。
25。 The informers throw their scrolls into it。
26。 See Livy； xlix。 A censor could not be troubled even by a censor； each made his remark without taking the opinion of his colleague； and when it otherwise happened； the censorship was in a manner abolished。
27。 At Athens the Logist？； who made all the magistrates accountable for their conduct； gave no account themselves。
28。 It is so practised at Venice。 Amelot de la Houssaye； pp。 30； 31。
29。 The main design of some aristocracies seems to be less the support of the state than of their nobility。
30。 It is tolerated only in the common people。 See Leg。 3； Cod。 de comm。 et mercatoribus； which is full of good sense。
31。 Testament polit。
32。 Barbaris cunctatio servilis； statim exequi regium videtur。 Tacitus； Annals。； v。 32。
33。 Memoirs of Cardinal de Retz； and other histories。
34。 Testament polit。
35。 Edifying Letters； coll。 ii； p。 315。
36。 Continuation of Pufendorf； Introduction to the History of Europe； in the article on Sweden； 10。
37。 According to Sir John Chardin； there is no council of state in Persia。
38。 See Ricaut； State of the Ottoman Empire； p。 196。
39。 See concerning the inheritances of the Turks； Ancient and Modern Sparta。 See also Ricaut on the Ottoman empire。
40。 Collection of Voyages that Contributed to the Establishment of the East India Company； i。 The law of Pegu is less cruel； if there happen to be children； the king succeeds only to two…thirds。 Ibid。； iii； p。 1。
41。 See the different constitutions； especially that of 1722。
42。 See Justin。
43。 See the book of laws as relative to the nature of the climate。 Book xiv； below。
44。 Laquilletiere； Ancient and Modern Sparta； p。 463。
45。 The same may be said of compositions in regard to fair bankrupts。
46。 There was no such establishment made till the Julian law； De Cessione bonorum； which preserved them from prison and from an ignominious division of their goods。 Cod。； ii。 tit。 12。
47 They seem to have been too fond of confiscations in the republic of Athens。
48。 Authentica bona damnatorum。 Cod。 de bon。 proscript。 seu damn。
49。 De la Republique； v。 3。
50。 Ut esse Phoebi dulcius lumen solet Jamjam cadentis Seneca； Troas； V。 i。 1。
51。 Collection of Voyages that Contributed to the Establishment of the East India Company； i； p。 80。
52。 Laws； xii。
53。 Leg。 6； § 2； Dig。 ad leg。 Jul。 repet。
54。 Munuscula。
55。 Plato； in his Republic； viii； ranks these refusals among the marks of the corruption of a republic。 In his Laws； vi； he orders them to be punished by a fine； at Venice they are punished with banishment。
56。 Victor Amadeus。
57。 Some centurions having appealed to the people for the employments which they had before enjoyed； 〃It is just； my comrades；〃 said a centurion； 〃that you should look upon every post as honourable in which you have an opportunity of defending the republic。〃 Livy； dec。 5； xlii； 34。
58。 Ne imperium ad optimos nobilium transferretur； Senatum militia vetuit Gallienus； etiam adire exercitum。 Aurelius Victor； De C？saribus。
59。 Augustus deprived the senators； proconsuls； and governors of the privilege of wearing arms。 Dio； xxxiii。
60。 Constantine。 See Zozimus； ii。
61。 Ammianus Marcellinus； xxvi； Et Civilia； more veterum； et bella recturo。
62。 Republic； viii。
63。 We see the laziness of Spain； where all public employments are given away。
Book VI。 Consequences of the Principles of Different Governments with Respect to the Simplicity of Civil and Criminal Laws； the Form of Judgments； and the Inflicting of Punishments
1。 Of the Simplicity of Civil Laws in different Governments。 Monarchies do not permit of so great a simplicity of laws as despotic governments。 For in monarchies there must be courts of judicature； these must give their decisions； the decisions must be preserved and learned； that we may judge in the same manner to…day as yesterday； and that the lives and property of the citizens may be as certain and fixed as the very constitution of the state。
In monarchies； the administration of justice； which decides not only in whatever belongs to life and property； but likewise to honour； demands very scrupulous inquiries。 The delicacy of the judge increases in proportion to the increase of his trust； and of the importance of the interests on which he determines。
We must not； therefore； be surprised to find so many rules； restrictions； and extensions in the laws of those countries rules that multiply the particular cases； and seem to make of reason itself an art。
The difference of rank； birth； and condition established in monarchical governments is frequently attended with distinctions in the nature of property； and the laws relating to the constitution of this government may augment the number of these distinctions。 Hence； among us goods are divided into real estates； purchases； dowries； paraphernalia； paternal and maternal inheritances； movables of different kinds； estates held in fee…simple； or in tail； acquired by descent or conveyance； allodial； or held by soccage； ground rents； or annuities。 Each sort of goods is subject to particular rules； which must be complied with in the disposal of them。 These things must needs diminish the simplicity of the laws。
In our governments the fiefs have become hereditary。 It was necessary that the nobility should have a fixed property； that is； the fief should have a certain consistency； to the end that the proprietor might be always in a capacity of serving the prince。 This must have been productive of great varieties； for instance； there are countries where fiefs could not be divided among the brothers； in others； the younger brothers may be allowed a more generous subsistence。
The monarch who knows each of his provinces may establish different laws； or tolerate different customs。 But as the despotic prince knows nothing； and can attend to nothing； he must take general measures； and govern by a rigid and inflexible will； which throughout his whole dominions produces the same effect； in short； everything bends under his feet。
In proportion as the decisions of the courts of judicature are multiplied in monarchies； the law is loaded with decrees that sometimes contradict one another； either because succeeding judges are of a different way of thinking； or because the same causes are sometimes well； and at other times ill； defended； or； in fine； by reason of an infinite number of abuses； to which all human regulations are liable。 This is a necessary evil； which the legislator redresses from time to time； as contrary even to the spirit of moderate governments。 For when people are obliged to have recourse to courts of judicature； this should come from the nature of the constitution； and not from the contradiction or uncertainty of the law。
In governments where there are necessary distinctions of persons； there must likewise be privileges。 This also diminishes the simplicity；