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veniences； however； that vanish when confronted with its general utility： but when these privileges are communicated to the people； every principle of government is wantonly violated。
In monarchies a person may leave the bulk of his estate to one of his children a permission improper in any other government。
The laws ought to favour all kinds of commerce＇30＇ consistent with the constitution； to the end that the subjects may； without ruining themselves； be able to satisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his court。
They should establish some regulation that the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more burdensome than the taxes themselves。
The weight of duties produces labour； labour weariness； and weariness the spirit of indolence。
10。 Of the Expedition peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies。 Great is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic： as the state is conducted by a single person； the executive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition。 But as this expedition may degenerate into rapidity； the laws should use some contrivance to slacken it。 They ought not only to favour the nature of each constitution； but likewise to remedy the abuses that might result from this very nature。
Cardinal Richelieu＇31＇ advises monarchs to permit no such things as societies or communities that raise difficulties upon every trifle。 If this man's heart had not been bewitched with the love of despotic power； still these arbitrary notions would have filled his head。
The bodies entrusted with the deposition of the laws are never more obedient than when they proceed slowly； and use that reflection in the prince's affairs which can scarcely be expected from the ignorance of a court； or from the precipitation of its councils。＇32＇
What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world if the magistrates； by their delays； their complaints； and entreaties； had not checked the rapidity even of their princes' virtues； when these monarchs； consulting only the generous impulse of their minds； would fain have given a boundless reward to services performed with an unlimited courage and fidelity？
11。 Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government。 Monarchy has a great advantage over a despotic government。 As it naturally requires there should be several orders or ranks of subjects； the state is more permanent； the constitution more steady； and the person of him who governs more secure。
Cicero is of opinion that the establishing of the tribunes preserved the republic。 〃And indeed；〃 says he； 〃the violence of a headless people is more terrible。 A chief or head is sensible that the affair depends upon himself； and therefore he thinks； but the people in their impetuosity are ignorant of the danger into which they hurry themselves。〃 This reflection may be applied to a despotic government； which is a people without tribunes； and to a monarchy； where the people have some sort of tribunes。
Accordingly it is observable that in the commotions of a despotic government； the people； hurried away by their passions； are apt to push things as far as they can go。 The disorders they commit are all extreme； whereas in monarchies matters are seldom carried to excess。 The chiefs are apprehensive on their own account； they are afraid of being abandoned； and the intermediate dependent powers do not choose that the populace should have too much the upper hand。 It rarely happens that the states of the kingdom are entirely corrupted： the prince adheres to these； and the seditious； who have neither will nor hopes to subvert the government； have neither power nor will to dethrone the prince。
In these circumstances men of prudence and authority interfere； moderate measures are first proposed； then complied with； and things at length are redressed； the laws resume their vigour； and command submission。
Thus all our histories are full of civil wars without revolutions； while the histories of despotic governments abound with revolutions without civil wars。
The writers of the history of the civil wars of some countries； even those who fomented them； sufficiently demonstrate the little foundation princes have to suspect the authority with which they invest particular bodies of men； since； even under the unhappy circumstance of their errors； they sighed only after the laws and their duty； and restrained； more than they were capable of inflaming； the impetuosity of the revolted。＇33＇ Cardinal Richelieu； reflecting perhaps that he had too much reduced the states of the kingdom； has recourse to the virtues of the prince and of his ministers for the support＇34＇ of government： but he requires so many things； that indeed there is none but an angel capable of such attention； such resolution and knowledge； and scarcely can we flatter ourselves that we shall ever see such a prince and ministers while monarchy subsists。
As people who live under a good government are happier than those who without rule or leaders wander about the forests； so monarchs who live under the fundamental laws of their country are far happier than despotic princes who have nothing to regulate； neither their own passions nor those of their subjects。
12。 The same Subject continued。 Let us not look for magnanimity in despotic governments； the prince cannot impart a greatness which he has not himself； with him there is no such thing as glory。
It is in monarchies that we behold the subjects encircling the throne； and cheered by the irradiancy of the sovereign； there it is that each person filling； as it were； a larger space； is capable of exercising those virtues which adorn the soul； not with independence； but with true dignity and greatness。
13。 An Idea of Despotic Power。 When the savages of Louisiana are desirous of fruit； they cut the tree to the root； and gather the fruit。＇35＇ This is an emblem of despotic government。
14。 In what Manner the Laws are in relation to the Principles of Despotic Government。 The principle of despotic government is fear； but a timid； ignorant； and faint…spirited people have no occasion for a great number of laws。
Everything ought to depend here on two or three ideas； hence there is no necessity that any new notions should be added。 When we want to break a horse； we take care not to let him change his master； his lesson； or his pace。 Thus an impression is made on his brain by two or three motions； and no more。
If a prince is shut up in a seraglio； he cannot leave his voluptuous abode without alarming those who keep him confined。 Thev will not bear that his person and power should pass into other hands。 He seldom therefore wages war in person； and hardly ventures to entrust the command to his generals。
A prince of this stamp； unaccustomed to resistance in his palace； is enraged to see his will opposed by armed force； hence he is generally governed by wrath or vengeance。 Besides； he can have no notion of true glory。 War therefore is carried on under such a government in its full natural fury； and less extent is given to the law of nations than in other states。
Such a prince has so many imperfections that they are afraid to expose his natural stupidity to public view。 He is concealed i