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e several subsidies。 This last case is very rare； an aristocracy so instituted would be the most intolerable of all governments。
While Rome inclined towards aristocracy； she avoided all these inconveniences。 The magistrates never received any emoluments from their office。 The chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest； nay； more heavily； and sometimes the taxes fell upon them alone。 In fine； far from sharing among themselves the revenues of the state； all they could draw from the public treasure； and all the wealth that fortune flung into their laps； they bestowed freely on the people； to be excused from accepting public honours。＇23＇
It is a fundamental maxim that largesses are pernicious to the people in a democracy； but salutary in an aristocratic government。 The former make them forget they are citizens； the latter bring them to a sense of it。 If the revenues of the state are not distributed among the people； they must be convinced at least of their being well administered： to feast their eyes with the public treasure is with them the same thing almost as enjoying it。 The golden chain displayed at Venice； the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs； the treasures preserved in the temple of Saturn； were in reality the wealth of the people。
It is a very essential point in an aristocracy that the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes。 The first order of the state in Rome never concerned themselves with it； the levying of the taxes was committed to the second； and even this in process of time was attended with great inconveniences。 In an aristocracy of this kind； where the nobles levied the taxes； the private people would be all at the discretion of persons in public employments； and there would be no such thing as a superior tribunal to check their power。 The members appointed to remove the abuses would rather enjoy them。 The nobles would be like the princes of despotic governments； who confiscate whatever estates they please。
Soon would the profits hence arising be considered as a patrimony； which avarice would enlarge at pleasure。 The farms would be lowered； and the public revenues reduced to nothing。 This is the reason that some governments； without having ever received any remarkable shock； have dwindled away to such a degree as not only their neighbours； but even their own subjects； have been surprised at it。
The laws should likewise forbid the nobles all kinds of commerce： merchants of such unbounded credit would monopolise all to themselves。 Commerce is a profession of people who are upon an equality； hence among despotic states the most miserable are those in which the prince applies himself to trade。
The laws of Venice debar＇24＇ the nobles from commerce； by which they might even innocently acquire exorbitant wealth。
The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the nobles do justice to the people。 If they have not established a tribune； they ought to be a tribune themselves。
Every sort of asylum in opposition to the execution of the laws destroys aristocracy； and is soon succeeded by tyranny。 They ought always to mortify the lust of dominion。 There should be either a temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the nobles in awe； as the Ephori at Sparta and the State Inquisitors at Venice magistrates subject to no formalities。 This sort of government stands in need of the strongest springs： thus a mouth of stone＇25＇ is open to every informer at Venice a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of tyranny。
These arbitrary magistrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to the censorship in democracies； which of its own nature is equally independent。 And； indeed； the censors ought to be subject to no inquiry in relation to their conduct during their office； they should meet with a thorough confidence； and never be discouraged。 In this respect the practice of the Romans deserved admiration； magistrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration；＇26＇ except the censors。＇27＇
There are two very pernicious things in an aristocracy excess either of poverty； or of wealth in the nobility。 To prevent their poverty； it is necessary； above all things； to oblige them to pay their debts in time。 To moderate the excess of wealth； prudent and gradual regulations should be made； but no confiscations； no agrarian laws； no expunging of debts； these are productive of infinite mischief。
The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles＇28＇ to the end that by a continual division of the inheritances their fortunes may be always upon a level。
There should be no substitutions； no powers of redemption； no rights of Majorasgo； or adoption。 The contrivances for perpetuating the grandeur of families in monarchical governments ought never to be employed in aristocracies。＇29＇
When the laws have compassed the equality of families； the next thing is to preserve a proper harmony and union among them。 The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly decided； otherwise the contests of individuals become those of families。 Arbiters may terminate； or even prevent； the rise ot disputes。
In fine； the laws must not favour the distinctions raised by vanity among families； under pretence that they are more noble or ancient than others。 Pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weaknesses of private persons。
We have only to cast an eye upon Sparta； there we may see how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings； as well as those of the nobility and common people。
9。 In what Manner the Laws are in relation to their Principle in Monarchies。 As honour is the principle of a monarchical government； the laws ought to be in relation to this principle。
They should endeavour to support the nobility； in respect to whom honour may be； in some measure； deemed both child and parent。
They should render the nobility hereditary； not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people； but as the link which connects them both。
In this government； substitutions which preserve the estates of families undivided are extremely useful； though in others not so proper。
Here the power of redemption is of service； as it restores to noble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent。
The land of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their persons。 The monarch's dignity is inseparable from that of his kingdom； and…the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief。
All these privileges must be peculiar to the nobility； and incommunicable to the people； unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government； and to diminish the power of the nobles together with that of the people。
Substitutions are a restraint to commerce； the power of redemption produces an infinite number of processes； every estate in land that is sold throughout the kingdom is in some measure without an owner for the space of a year。 Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power very burdensome to those governments which tolerate them。 These are the inconveniences of nobility inconveniences； however； that vanish when confronted with its general utility： but when these privileges