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ere never was a case； says Xenophon；＇4＇ when the common people petitioned for employments which could endanger either their security or their glory。
As most citizens have sufficient ability to choose； though unqualified to be chosen； so the people； though capable of calling others to an account for their administration； are incapable of conducting the administration themselves。
The public business must be carried on with a certain motion； neither too quick nor too slow。 But the motion of the people is always either too remiss or too violent。 Sometimes with a hundred thousand arms they overturn all before them； and sometimes with a hundred thousand feet they creep like insects。
In a popular state the inhabitants are divided into certain classes。 It is in the manner of making this division that great legislators have signalised themselves； and it is on this the duration and prosperity of democracy have ever depended。
Servius Tullius followed the spirit of aristocracy in the distribution of his classes。 We find in Livy＇5＇ and in Dionysius Halicarnassus；＇6＇ in what manner he lodged the right of suffrage in the hands of the principal citizens。 He had divided the people of Rome into 193 centuries； which formed six classes； and ranking the rich； who were in smaller numbers； in the first centuries； and those in middling circumstances； who were more numerous； in the next； he flung the indigent multitude into the last； and as each century had but one vote＇7＇ it was property rather than numbers that decided the election。
Solon divided the people of Athens into four classes。 In this he was directed by the spirit of democracy； his intention not being to fix those who were to choose； but such as were eligible： therefore； leaving to every citizen the right of election； he made＇8＇ the judges eligible from each of those four classes； but the magistrates he ordered to be chosen only out of the first three； consisting of persons of easy fortunes。＇9＇
As the division of those who have a right of suffrage is a fundamental law in republics； so the manner of giving this suffrage is another fundamental。
The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy； as that by choice is to aristocracy。＇10＇
The suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one； but animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country。
Yet as this method is in itself defective； it has been the endeavour of the most eminent legislators to regulate and amend it。
Solon made a law at Athens that military employments should be conferred by choice； but that senators and judges should be elected by lot。
The same legislator ordained that civil magistracies； attended with great expense； should be given by choice； and the others by lot。
In order； however； to amend the suffrage by lot； he made a rule that none but those who presented themselves should be elected； that the person elected should be examined by judges＇11＇ and that every one should have a right to accuse him if he were unworthy of the office：＇12＇ this participated at the same time of the suffrage by lot； and of that by choice。 When the time of their magistracy had expired； they were obliged to submit to another judgment in regard to their conduct。 Persons utterly unqualified must have been extremely backward in giving in their names to be drawn by lot。
The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage is likewise fundamental in a democracy。 It is a question of some importance whether the suffrages ought to be public or secret。 Cicero observes＇13＇ that the laws＇14＇ which rendered them secret towards the close of the republic were the cause of its decline。 But as this is differently practised in different republics； I shall offer here my thoughts concerning this subject。
The people's suffrages ought doubtless to be public＇15＇ and this should be considered as a fundamental law of democracy。 The lower class ought to be directed by those of higher rank； and restrained within bounds by the gravity of eminent personages。 Hence； by rendering the suffrages secret in the Roman republic； all was lost； it was no longer possible to direct a populace that sought its own destruction。 But when the body of the nobles are to vote in an aristocracy＇16＇ or in a democracy the senate＇17＇ as the business is then only to prevent intrigues； the suffrages cannot be too secret。
Intriguing in a senate is dangerous； it is dangerous also in a body of nobles； but not so among the people； whose nature is to act through passion。 In countries where they have no share in the government； we often see them as much inflamed on account of an actor as ever they could be for the welfare of the state。 The misfortune of a republic is when intrigues are at an end； which happens when the people are gained by bribery and corruption： in this case they grow indifferent to public affairs； and avarice becomes their predominant passion。 Unconcerned about the government and everything belonging to it； they quietly wait for their hire。
It is likewise a fundamental law in democracies； that the people should have the sole power to enact laws。 And yet there are a thousand occasions on which it is necessary the senate should have the power of decreeing； nay； it is frequently proper to make some trial of a law before it is established。 The constitutions of Rome and Athens were excellent。 The decrees of the senate＇18＇ had the force of laws for the space of a year； but did not become perpetual till they were ratified by the consent of the people。
3。 Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of Aristocracy。 In an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons。 These are invested both with the legislative and executive authority； and the rest of the people are； in respect to them； the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign。
They do not vote here by lot； for this would be productive of inconveniences only。 And indeed； in a government where the most mortifying distinctions are already established； though they were to be chosen by lot； still they would not cease to be odious； it is the nobleman they envy； and not the magistrate。
When the nobility are numerous； there must be a senate to regulate the affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding； and to prepare others for their decision。 In this case it may be said that the aristocracy is in some measure in the senate； the democracy in the body of the nobles； and the people are a cipher。
It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy if the people； in some measure； could be raised from their state of annihilation。 Thus at Genoa； the bank of St。 George being administered by the people＇19＇ gives them a certain influence in the government； whence their whole prosperity is derived。
The senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own members； for this would be the only way to perpetuate abuses。 At Rome； which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy； the senate did not fill up the vacant places in their own body； the new members were nominated by the censors。＇20＇
In a republic； the sudden rise of a private citizen to exorbitant power produces monarchy； or something more th