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The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of all their wills。 〃The conjunction of those wills；〃 as Gravina again very justly observes； 〃is what we call the civil state。〃
Law in general is human reason； inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth： the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied。
They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another。
They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government； whether they form it； as may be said of politic laws； or whether they support it； as in the case of civil institutions。
They should be in relation to the climate of each country； to the quality of its soil； to its situation and extent； to the principal occupation of the natives； whether husbandmen； huntsmen； or shepherds： they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear； to the religion of the inhabitants； to their inclinations； riches； numbers； commerce； manners； and customs。 In fine； they have relations to each other； as also to their origin； to the intent of the legislator； and to the order of things on which they are established； in all of which different lights they ought to be considered。
This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work。 These relations I shall examine； since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws。
I have not separated the political from the civil institutions； as I do not pretend to treat of laws； but of their spirit； and as this spirit consists in the various relations which the laws may bear to different objects； it is not so much my business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these relations and objects。
I shall first examine the relations which laws bear to the nature and principle of each government； and as this principle has a strong influence on laws； I shall make it my study to understand it thoroughly： and if I can but once establish it； the laws will soon appear to flow thence as from their source。 I shall proceed afterwards to other and more particular relations。
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1。 〃Law；〃 says Plutarch； 〃is the king of mortal and immortal beings。〃 See his treatise； A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince。
2。 Witness the savage found in the forests of Hanover； who was carried over to England during the reign of George I。
3。 In pref。； De cive。
4。 Italian poet and jurist； 1664…1718。
Book II。 Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government
1。 Of the Nature of the three different Governments。 There are three species of government： republican； monarchical； and despotic。 In order to discover their nature； it is sufficient to recollect the common notion； which supposes three definitions； or rather three facts： that a republican government is that in which the body； or only a part of the people； is possessed of the supreme power； monarchy； that in which a single person governs by fixed and established laws； a despotic government； that in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice。
This is what I call the nature of each government； we must now inquire into those laws which directly conform to this nature； and consequently are the fundamental institutions。
2。 Of the Republican Government； and the Laws in relation to Democracy。＇1＇ When the body of the people is possessed of the supreme power； it is called a democracy。 When the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a part of the people； it is then an aristocracy。
In a democracy the people are in some respects the sovereign； and in others the subject。
There can be no exercise of sovereignty but by their suffrages； which are their own will； now the sovereign's will is the sovereign himself。 The laws therefore which establish the right of suffrage are fundamental to this government。 And indeed it is as important to regulate in a republic； in what manner； by whom； to whom； and concerning what； suffrages are to be given； as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince； and after what manner he ought to govern。
Libanius＇2＇ says that at Athens a stranger who intermeddled in the assemblies of the people was punished with death。 This is because such a man usurped the rights of sovereignty。
It is an essential point to fix the number of citizens who are to form the public assemblies； otherwise it would be uncertain whether the whole； or only a part of the people； had given their votes。 At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand。 But Rome； designed by Providence to rise from the weakest beginnings to the highest pitch of grandeur； Rome； doomed to experience all the vicissitudes of fortune； Rome； who had sometimes all her inhabitants without her walls； and sometimes all Italy and a considerable part of the world within them； Rome； I say； never fixed the number＇3＇ and this was one of the principal causes of her ruin。
The people； in whom the supreme power resides； ought to have the management of everything within their reach： that which exceeds their abilities must be conducted by their ministers。
But they cannot properly be said to have their ministers； without the power of nominating them： it is； therefore； a fundamental maxim in this government； that the people should choose their ministers that is； their magistrates。
They have occasion； as well as monarchs； and even more so； to be directed by a council or senate。 But to have a proper confidence in these； they should have the choosing of the members； whether the election be made by themselves； as at Athens； or by some magistrate deputed for that purpose； as on certain occasions was customary at Rome。
The people are extremely well qualified for choosing those whom they are to entrust with part of their authority。 They have only to be determined by things to which they cannot be strangers； and by facts that are obvious to sense。 They can tell when a person has fought many battles； and been crowned with success； they are； therefore； capable of electing a general。 They can tell when a judge is assiduous in his office； gives general satisfaction； and has never been charged with bribery： this is sufficient for choosing a pr？tor。 They are struck with the magnificence or riches of a fellow…citizen； no more is requisite for electing an edile。 These are facts of which they can have better information in a public forum than a monarch in his palace。 But are they capable of conducting an intricate affair； of seizing and improving the opportunity and critical moment of action？ No； this surpasses their abilities。
Should we doubt the people's natural capacity； in respect to the discernment of merit； we need only cast an eye on the series of surprising elections made by the Athenians and Romans； which no one surely will attribute to hazard。
We know that though the people of Rome assumed the right of raising plebeians to public offices； yet they never would exert this power； and though at Athens the magistrates were allowed； by the law of Aristides； to be elected from all the different classes of inhabitants； there never was a