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First： the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority
may possibly be true。 Those who desire to suppress it； of course
deny its truth； but they are not infallible。 They have no authority to
decide the question for all mankind； and exclude every other person
from the means of judging。 To refuse a hearing to an opinion；
because they are sure that it is false； is to assume that their
certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty。 All silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility。 Its condemnation may
be allowed to rest on this common argument； not the worse for being
common。
Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind； the fact of their
fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical
judgment which is always allowed to it in theory； for while every
one well knows himself to be fallible； few think it necessary to
take any precautions against their own fallibility； or admit the
supposition that any opinion； of which they feel very certain； may
be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge
themselves to be liable。 Absolute princes； or others who are
accustomed to unlimited deference； usually feel this complete
confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects。 People more
happily situated； who sometimes hear their opinions disputed； and
are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong； place the
same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared
by all who surround them； or to whom they habitually defer； for in
proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment；
does he usually repose； with implicit trust； on the infallibility of
〃the world〃 in general。 And the world； to each individual； means the
part of it with which he comes in contact； his party； his sect； his
church； his class of society； the man may be called； by comparison；
almost liberal and large…minded to whom it means anything so
comprehensive as his own country or his own age。 Nor is his faith in
this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that
other ages； countries； sects； churches； classes； and parties have
thought； and even now think； the exact reverse。 He devolves upon his
own world the responsibility of being in the right against the
dissentient worlds of other people； and it never troubles him that
mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object
of his reliance； and that the same causes which make him a Churchman
in London； would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin。 Yet
it is as evident in itself； as any amount of argument can make it；
that ages are no more infallible than individuals； every age having
held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false
but absurd； and it is as certain that many opinions now general will
be rejected by future ages； as it is that many； once general； are
rejected by the present。
The objection likely to be made to this argument would probably take
some such form as the following。 There is no greater assumption of
infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error； than in any
other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment
and responsibility。 Judgment is given to men that they may use it。
Because it may be used erroneously； are men to be told that they ought
not to use it at all？ To prohibit what they think pernicious； is not
claiming exemption from error； but fulfilling the duty incumbent on
them； although fallible； of acting on their conscientious
conviction。 If we were never to act on our opinions； because those
opinions may be wrong； we should leave all our interests uncared
for； and all our duties unperformed。 An objection which applies to all
conduct can be no valid objection to any conduct in particular。 It
is the duty of governments； and of individuals； to form the truest
opinions they can； to form them carefully； and never impose them
upon others unless they are quite sure of being right。 But when they
are sure （such reasoners may say）； it is not conscientiousness but
cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions； and allow doctrines
which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind；
either in this life or in another； to be scattered abroad without
restraint； because other people； in less enlightened times； have
persecuted opinions now believed to be true。 Let us take care； it
may be said； not to make the same mistake： but governments and nations
have made mistakes in other things； which are not denied to be fit
subjects for the exercise of authority： they have laid on bad taxes；
made unjust wars。 Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes； and； under
whatever provocation； make no wars？ Men； and governments； must act
to the best of their ability。 There is no such thing as absolute
certainty； but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human
life。 We may； and must； assume our opinion to be true for the guidance
of our own conduct： and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad
men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we
regard as false and pernicious。
I answer； that it is assuming very much more。 There is the
greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true；
because； with every opportunity for contesting it； it has not been
refuted； and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting
its refutation。 Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our
opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth
for purposes of action； and on no other terms can a being with human
faculties have any rational assurance of being right。
When we consider either the history of opinion； or the ordinary
conduct of human life； to what is it to be ascribed that the one and
the other are no worse than they are？ Not certainly to the inherent
force of the human understanding； for； on any matter not self…evident；
there are ninety…nine persons totally incapable of judging of it for
one who is capable； and the capacity of the hundredth person is only
comparative； for the majority of the eminent men of every past
generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous； and did or
approved numerous things which no one will now justify。 Why is it；
then； that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of
rational opinions and rational conduct？ If there really is this
preponderance… which there must be unless human affairs are； and have
always been； in an almost desperate state… it is owing to a quality
of the human mind； the source of everything respectable in man
either as an intellectual or as a moral being； namely； that his errors
are corrigible。 He is capable of rectifying his mistakes； by
discussion and experience。 Not by experience alone。 There must be
discussion；