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exposed to invasion from the government； as it already is from
public opinion。 But； as yet； there is a considerable amount of feeling
ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control
individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been
accustomed to be controlled by it； and this with very little
discrimination as to whether the matter is； or is not； within the
legitimate sphere of legal control； insomuch that the feeling；
highly salutary on the whole； is perhaps quite as often misplaced as
well grounded in the particular instances of its application。 There
is； in fact； no recognised principle by which the propriety or
impropriety of government interference is customarily tested。 People
decide according to their personal preferences。 Some； whenever they
see any good to be done； or evil to be remedied； would willingly
instigate the government to undertake the business； while others
prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil； rather than add one
to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental
control。 And men range themselves on one or the other side in any
particular case； according to this general direction of their
sentiments； or according to the degree of interest which they feel
in the particular thing which it is proposed that the government
should do； or according to the belief they entertain that the
government would； or would not； do it in the manner they prefer； but
very rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently
adhere； as to what things are fit to be done by a government。 And it
seems to me that in consequence of this absence of rule or
principle； one side is at present as of wrong as the other； the
interference of government is； with about equal frequency；
improperly invoked and improperly condemned。
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle；
as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and control； whether the means
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties； or the moral
coercion of public opinion。 That principle is； that the sole end for
which mankind are warranted； individually or collectively； in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number； is
self…protection。 That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community； against
his will； is to prevent harm to others。 His own good； either
physical or moral； is not a sufficient warrant。 He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so； because it will make him happier； because； in the opinions of
others； to do so would be wise； or even right。 These are good
reasons for remonstrating with him； or reasoning with him； or
persuading him； or entreating him； but not for compelling him； or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise。 To justify that；
the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated
to produce evil to some one else。 The only part of the conduct of
any one； for which he is amenable to society； is that which concerns
others。 In the part which merely concerns himself； his independence
is； of right； absolute。 Over himself； over his own body and mind；
the individual is sovereign。
It is； perhaps； hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is
meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties。 We are not speaking of children； or of young persons
below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood。
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others； must be protected against their own actions as well as against
external injury。 For the same reason； we may leave out of
consideration those backward states of society in which the race
itself may be considered as in its nonage。 The early difficulties in
the way of spontaneous progress are so great； that there is seldom any
choice of means for overcoming them； and a ruler full of the spirit of
improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain
an end； perhaps otherwise unattainable。 Despotism is a legitimate mode
of government in dealing with barbarians； provided the end be their
improvement； and the means justified by actually effecting that end。
Liberty； as a principle； has no application to any state of things
anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being
improved by free and equal discussion。 Until then； there is nothing
for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne； if
they are so fortunate as to find one。 But as soon as mankind have
attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by
conviction or persuasion （a period long since reached in all nations
with whom we need here concern ourselves）； compulsion； either in the
direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non…compliance； is
no longer admissible as a means to their own good； and justifiable
only for the security of others。
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be
derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right； as a thing
independent of utility。 I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all
ethical questions； but it must be utility in the largest sense；
grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being。
Those interests； I contend； authorise the subjection of individual
spontaneity to external control； only in respect to those actions of
each； which concern the interest of other people。 If any one does an
act hurtful to others； there is a prima facie case for punishing
him； by law； or； where legal penalties are not safely applicable； by
general disapprobation。 There are also many positive acts for the
benefit of others； which he may rightfully be compelled to perform；
such as to give evidence in a court of justice； to bear his fair share
in the common defence； or in any other joint work necessary to the
interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection； and to
perform certain acts of individual beneficence； such as saving a
fellow creature's life； or interposing to protect the defenceless
against ill…usage； things which whenever it is obviously a man's
duty to do； he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not
doing。 A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but
by his inaction； and in either case he is justly accountable to them
for the injury。 The latter case； it is true； requires a much more
cautious exercise of compulsion than the former。 To make any one
answerable for doing evil to others is the rule； to make him
answerable for not preventing evil is； comparatively speaking； the
exception。 Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to
just