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closing as may be requisite for public surveillance； and to withdraw
the licence if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the
connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house； or if it
becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the
law。 Any further restriction I do not conceive to be； in principle；
justifiable。 The limitation in number； for instance； of beer and
spirit houses； for the express purpose of rendering them more
difficult of access； and diminishing the occasions of temptation；
not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by
whom the facility would be abused； but is suited only to a state of
society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as
children or savages； and placed under an education of restraint； to
fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom。 This is
not the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly
governed in any free country； and no person who sets due value on
freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed； unless
after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom
and govern them as freemen； and it has been definitively proved that
they can only be governed as children。 The bare statement of the
alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have
been made in any case which needs be considered here。 It is only
because the institutions of this country are a mass of
inconsistencies； that things find admittance into our practice which
belong to the system of despotic； or what is called paternal；
government； while the general freedom of our institutions precludes
the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the
restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education。
It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay； that the
liberty of the individual； in things wherein the individual is alone
concerned； implies a corresponding liberty in any number of
individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them
jointly； and regard no persons but themselves。 This question
presents no difficulty； so long as the will of all the persons
implicated remains unaltered； but since that will may change； it is
often necessary； even in things in which they alone are concerned；
that they should enter into engagements with one another； and when
they do； it is fit； as a general rule； that those engagements should
be kept。 Yet； in the laws； probably； of every country； this general
rule has some exceptions。 Not only persons are not held to engagements
which violate the rights of third parties； but it is sometimes
considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an
engagement； that it is injurious to themselves。 In this and most other
civilised countries； for example； an engagement by which a person
should sell himself； or allow himself to be sold； as a slave； would be
null and void； neither enforced by law nor by opinion。 The ground
for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in
life； is apparent； and is very clearly seen in this extreme case。
The reason for not interfering； unless for the sake of others； with
a person's voluntary acts； is consideration for his liberty。 His
voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable；
or at least endurable； to him； and his good is on the whole best
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it。 But
by selling himself for a slave； be abdicates his liberty； he
foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act。 He therefore
defeats； in his own case； the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself。 He is no longer
free； but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the
presumption in its favour； that would be afforded by his voluntarily
remaining in it。 The principle of freedom cannot require that he
should be free not to be free。 It is not freedom to be allowed to
alienate his freedom。 These reasons； the force of which is so
conspicuous in this peculiar case； are evidently of far wider
application； yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the
necessities of life； which continually require； not indeed that we
should resign our freedom； but that we should consent to this and
the other limitation of it。 The principle； however； which demands
uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents
themselves； requires that those who have become bound to one
another； in things which concern no third party； should be able to
release one another from the engagement： and even without such
voluntary release there are perhaps no contracts or engagements；
except those that relate to money or money's worth； of which one can
venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of
retractation。
Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt； in the excellent essay from which I have
already quoted； states it as his conviction； that engagements which
involve personal relations or services should never be legally binding
beyond a limited duration of time； and that the most important of
these engagements； marriage； having the peculiarity that its objects
are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in
harmony with it； should require nothing more than the declared will of
either party to dissolve it。 This subject is too important； and too
complicated； to be discussed in a parenthesis； and I touch on it
only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration。 If the
conciseness and generality of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not
obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his
conclusion without discussing the premises； he would doubtless have
recognised that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as
those to which he confines himself。 When a person； either by express
promise or by conduct； has encouraged another to rely upon his
continuing to act in a certain way… to build expectations and
calculations； and stake any part of his plan of life upon that
supposition… a new series of moral obligations arises on his part
towards that person； which may possibly be overruled； but cannot be
ignored。 And again； if the relation between two contracting parties
has been followed by consequences to others； if it has placed third
parties in any peculiar position； or； as in the case of marriage；
has even called third parties into existence； obligations arise on the
part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons；
the fulfilment of which； or at all events the mode of fulfilment； must
be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation
between the original parties to the contract。 It does not follow；
nor can I admit； that these obligations extend to requiring the
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