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his standard of judgment is his own liking； but an opinion on a
point of conduct； not supported by reasons； can only count as one
person's preference； and if the reasons； when given； are a mere appeal
to a similar preference felt by other people； it is still only many
people's liking instead of one。 To an ordinary man； however； his own
preference； thus supported； is not only a perfectly satisfactory
reason； but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of
morality； taste； or propriety； which are not expressly written in
his religious creed； and his chief guide in the interpretation even of
that。 Men's opinions； accordingly； on what is laudable or blamable；
are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their
wishes in regard to the conduct of others； and which are as numerous
as those which determine their wishes on any other subject。
Sometimes their reason… at other times their prejudices or
superstitions： often their social affections； not seldom their
antisocial ones； their envy or jealousy； their arrogance or
contemptuousness： but most commonly their desires or fears for
themselves… their legitimate or illegitimate self…interest。
Wherever there is an ascendant class； a large portion of the
morality of the country emanates from its class interests； and its
feelings of class superiority。 The morality between Spartans and
Helots； between planters and negroes； between princes and subjects；
between nobles and roturiers； between men and women； has been for
the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings：
and the sentiments thus generated react in turn upon the moral
feelings of the members of the ascendant class； in their relations
among themselves。 Where； on the other hand； a class； formerly
ascendant； has lost its ascendancy； or where its ascendancy is
unpopular； the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress
of an impatient dislike of superiority。 Another grand determining
principle of the rules of conduct； both in act and forbearance；
which have been enforced by law or opinion； has been the servility
of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their
temporal masters or of their gods。 This servility； though
essentially selfish； is not hypocrisy； it gives rise to perfectly
genuine sentiments of abhorrence； it made men burn magicians and
heretics。 Among so many baser influences； the general and obvious
interests of society have of course had a share； and a large one； in
the direction of the moral sentiments： less； however； as a matter of
reason； and on their own account； than as a consequence of the
sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them： and sympathies
and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests
of society； have made themselves felt in the establishment of
moralities with quite as great force。
The likings and dislikings of society； or of some powerful portion
of it； are thus the main thing which has practically determined the
rules laid down for general observance； under the penalties of law
or opinion。 And in general； those who have been in advance of
society in thought and feeling； have left this condition of things
unassailed in principle； however they may have come into conflict with
it in some of its details。 They have occupied themselves rather in
inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike； than in
questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to
individuals。 They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of
mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves
heretical； rather than make common cause in defence of freedom； with
heretics generally。 The only case in which the higher ground has
been taken on principle and maintained with consistency； by any but an
individual here and there； is that of religious belief： a case
instructive in many ways； and not least so as forming a most
striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral
sense： for the odium theologicum； in a sincere bigot； is one of the
most unequivocal cases of moral feeling。 Those who first broke the
yoke of what called itself the Universal Church； were in general as
little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that
church itself。 But when the heat of the conflict was over； without
giving a complete victory to any party； and each church or sect was
reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it
already occupied； minorities； seeing that they had no chance of
becoming majorities； were under the necessity of pleading to those
whom they could not convert； for permission to differ。 It is
accordingly on this battle field； almost solely； that the rights of
the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds
of principle； and the claim of society to exercise authority over
dissentients openly controverted。 The great writers to whom the
world owes what religious liberty it possesses； have mostly asserted
freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right； and denied
absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his
religious belief。 Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever
they really care about； that religious freedom has hardly anywhere
been practically realised； except where religious indifference；
which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels；
has added its weight to the scale。 In the minds of almost all
religious persons； even in the most tolerant countries； the duty of
toleration is admitted with tacit reserves。 One person will bear
with dissent in matters of church government； but not of dogma；
another can tolerate everybody； short of a Papist or a Unitarian；
another every one who believes in revealed religion； a few extend
their charity a little further； but stop at the belief in a God and in
a future state。 Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still
genuine and intense； it is found to have abated little of its claim to
be obeyed。
In England； from the peculiar circumstances of our political
history； though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier； that of law is
lighter； than in most other countries of Europe； and there is
considerable jealousy of direct interference； by the legislative or
the executive power； with private conduct； not so much from any just
regard for the independence of the individual； as from the still
subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an
opposite interest to the public。 The majority have not yet learnt to
feel the power of the government their power； or its opinions their
opinions。 When they do so； individual liberty will probably be as much
exposed to invasion from the government； as it already is from
public opinion。 But； as yet； there is a consi