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being considered unmannerly or presuming。 We have a right； also； in
various ways； to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one； not
to the oppression of his individuality； but in the exercise of ours。
We are not bound； for example； to seek his society； we have a right to
avoid it （though not to parade the avoidance）； for we have a right
to choose the society most acceptable to us。 We have a right； and it
may be our duty； to caution others against him； if we think his
example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those
with whom he associates。 We may give others a preference over him in
optional good offices； except those which tend to his improvement。
In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at
the hands of others for faults which directly concern only himself；
but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the
natural and； as it were； the spontaneous consequences of the faults
themselves； not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the
sake of punishment。 A person who shows rashness； obstinacy；
self…conceit… who cannot live within moderate means… who cannot
restrain himself from hurtful indulgences… who pursues animal
pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect… must
expect to be lowered in the opinion of others； and to have a less
share of their favourable sentiments； but of this he has no right to
complain； unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in
his social relations； and has thus established a title to their good
offices； which is not affected by his demerits towards himself。
What I contend for is； that the inconveniences which are strictly
inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others； are the only
ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of
his conduct and character which concerns his own good； but which
does not affect the interest of others in their relations with him。
Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment。
Encroachment on their rights； infliction on them of any loss or damage
not justified by his own rights； falsehood or duplicity in dealing
with them； unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them； even
selfish abstinence from defending them against injury… these are fit
objects of moral reprobation； and； in grave cases； of moral
retribution and punishment。 And not only these acts； but the
dispositions which lead to them； are properly immoral； and fit
subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence。 Cruelty of
disposition； malice and ill…nature； that most anti…social and odious
of all passions； envy； dissimulation and insincerity； irascibility
on insufficient cause； and resentment disproportioned to the
provocation； the love of domineering over others； the desire to
engross more than one's share of advantages （the pleonexia of the
Greeks）； the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of
others； the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more
important than everything else； and decides all doubtful questions
in its own favour；… these are moral vices； and constitute a bad and
odious moral character： unlike the self…regarding faults previously
mentioned； which are not properly immoralities； and to whatever
pitch they may be carried； do not constitute wickedness。 They may be
proofs of any amount of folly； or want of personal dignity and
self…respect； but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when
they involve a breach of duty to others； for whose sake the individual
is bound to have care for himself。 What are called duties to ourselves
are not socially obligatory； unless circumstances render them at the
same time duties to others。 The term duty to oneself； when it means
anything more than prudence； means self…respect or self…development；
and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow
creatures； because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that
he be held accountable to them。
The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may
rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity； and the
reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of
others； is not a merely nominal distinction。 It makes a vast
difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him whether
he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to
control him； or in things in which we know that we have not。 If he
displeases us； we may express our distaste； and we may stand aloof
from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us； but we shall
not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable。 We
shall reflect that he already bears； or will bear； the whole penalty
of his error； if he spoils his life by mismanagement； we shall not；
for that reason； desire to spoil it still further： instead of
wishing to punish him； we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his
punishment； by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his
conduct tends to bring upon him。 He may be to us an object of pity；
perhaps of dislike； but not of anger or resentment； we shall not treat
him like an enemy of society： the worst we shall think ourselves
justified in doing is leaving him to himself； if we do not interfere
benevolently by showing interest or concern for him。 It is far
otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection
of his fellow creatures； individually or collectively。 The evil
consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself； but on others；
and society； as the protector of all its members； must retaliate on
him； must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment；
and must take care that it be sufficiently severe。 In the one case； he
is an offender at our bar； and we are called on not only to sit in
judgment on him； but； in one shape or another； to execute our own
sentence： in the other case； it is not our part to inflict any
suffering on him； except what may incidentally follow from our using
the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs； which we
allow to him in his。
The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life
which concerns only himself； and that which concerns others； many
persons will refuse to admit。 How （it may be asked） can any part of
the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to
the other members？ No person is an entirely isolated being； it is
impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently
hurtful to himself； without mischief reaching at least to his near
connections； and often far beyond them。 If he injures his property； he
does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it；
and usually diminishes； by a greater or less amount； the general
resource； of the com