meditations on first philosophy-第7章

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ion　that　this　proposition：　　I　am；　I　exist；　is　necessarily　true　each　time　that　I　pronounce　it；　or　that　I　mentally　conceive　it。　　　　　　But　I　do　not　yet　know　clearly　enough　what　I　am；　I　who　am　certain　that　I　am；　and　hence　I　must　be　careful　to　see　that　I　do　not　imprudently　take　some　other　object　in　place　of　myself；　and　thus　that　I　do　not　go　astray　in　respect　of　this　knowledge　that　I　hold　to　be　the　most　certain　and　most　evident　of　all　that　I　have　formerly　learned。　　That　is　why　I　shall　now　consider　anew　what　I　believed　myself　to　be　before　I　embarked　upon　these　last　reflections；　and　of　my　former　opinions　I　shall　withdraw　all　that　might　even　in　a　small　degree　be　invalidated　by　the　reasons　which　I　have　just　brought　forward；　in　order　that　there　may　be　nothing　at　all　left　beyond　what　is　absolutely　certain　and　indubitable。　　　　　　What　then　did　I　formerly　believe　myself　to　be？　Undoubtedly　I　believed　myself　to　be　a　man。　　But　what　is　a　man？　Shall　I　say　a　reasonable　animal？　　Certainly　not；　for　then　I　should　have　to　inquire　what　an　animal　is；　and　what　is　reasonable；　and　thus　from　a　single　question　I　should　insensibly　fall　into　an　infinitude　of　others　more　difficult；　and　I　should　not　wish　to　waste　the　little　time　and　leisure　remaining　to　me　in　trying　to　unravel　subtleties　like　these。　But　I　shall　rather　stop　here　to　consider　the　thoughts　which　of　themselves　spring　up　in　my　mind；　and　which　were　not　inspired　by　anything　beyond　my　own　nature　alone　when　I　applied　myself　to　the　consideration　of　my　being。　　In　the　first　place；　the；　I　considered　myself　as　having　a　face；　hands；　arms；　and　all　that　system　of　members　composed　on　bones　and　flesh　as　seen　in　a　corpse　which　I　designated　by　the　name　of　body。　　In　addition　to　this　I　considered　that　I　was　nourished；　that　I　walked；　that　I　felt；　and　that　I　thought；　and　I　referred　all　these　actions　to　the　soul：　　but　I　did　not　stop　to　consider　what　the　soul　was；　or　if　I　did　stop；　I　imagined　that　it　was　something　extremely　rare　and　subtle　like　a　wind；　a　flame；　or　an　ether；　which　was　spread　throughout　my　grosser　parts。　　As　to　body　I　had　no　manner　of　doubt　about　its　nature；　but　thought　I　had　a　very　clear　knowledge　of　it；　and　if　I　had　desired　to　explain　it　according　to　the　notions　that　I　had　then　formed　of　it；　I　should　have　described　it　thus：　　By　the　body　I　understand　all　that　which　can　be　defined　by　a　certain　figure：　　something　which　can　be　confined　in　a　certain　place；　and　which　can　fill　a　given　space　in　such　a　way　that　every　other　body　will　be　excluded　from　it；　which　can　be　perceived　either　by　tough；　or　by　sight；　or　by　hearing；　or　by　taste；　or　by　smell：　　which　can　be　moved　in　many　ways　not；　in　truth；　by　itself；　but　by　something　which　is　foreign　to　it；　by　which　it　is　touched　＇and　from　which　it　receives　impressions＇：　　for　to　have　the　power　of　self…movement；　as　also　of　feeling　or　of　thinking；　I　did　not　consider　to　appertain　to　the　nature　of　body：　　on　the　contrary；　I　was　rather　astonished　to　find　that　faculties　similar　to　them　existed　in　some　bodies。　　　　　　But　what　am　I；　now　that　I　suppose　that　there　is　a　certain　genius　which　is　extremely　powerful；　and；　if　I　may　say　so；　malicious；　who　employs　all　his　powers　in　deceiving　me？　　Can　I　affirm　that　I　possess　the　least　of　all　those　things　which　I　have　just　said　pertain　to　the　nature　of　body？　　I　pause　to　consider；　I　revolve　all　these　things　in　my　mind；　and　I　find　none　of　which　I　can　say　that　it　pertains　to　me。　　It　would　be　tedious　to　stop　to　enumerate　them。　　Let　us　pass　to　the　attributes　of　soul　and　see　if　there　is　any　one　which　is　in　me？　What　of　nutrition　or　walking　＇the　first　mentioned＇？　　But　if　it　is　so　that　I　have　no　body　it　is　also　true　that　I　can　neither　walk　nor　take　nourishment。　　Another　attribute　is　sensation。　But　one　cannot　feel　without　body；　and　besides　I　have　thought　I　perceived　many　things　during　sleep　that　I　recognised　in　my　waking　moments　as　not　having　been　experienced　at　all。　　What　of　thinking？　　I　find　here　that　thought　is　an　attribute　that　belongs　to　me；　it　alone　cannot　be　separated　from　me。　　I　am；　I　exist；　that　is　certain。　　But　how　often？　　Just　when　I　think；　for　it　might　possibly　be　the　case　if　I　ceased　entirely　to　think；　that　I　should　likewise　cease　altogether　to　exist。　　I　do　not　now　admit　anything　which　is　not　necessarily　true：　　to　speak　accurately　I　am　not　more　than　a　thing　which　thinks；　that　is　to　say　a　mind　or　a　soul；　or　an　understanding；　or　a　reason；　which　are　terms　whose　significance　was　formerly　unknown　to　me。　I　am；　however；　a　real　thing　and　really　exist；　but　what　thing？　I　have　answered：　　a　thing　which　thinks。　　　　　　And　what　more？　　I　shall　exercise　my　imagination　＇in　order　to　see　if　I　am　not　something　more＇。　　I　am　not　a　collection　of　members　which　we　call　the　human　body：　　I　am　not　a　subtle　air　distributed　through　these　members；　I　am　not　a　wind；　a　fire；　a　vapour；　a　breath；　nor　anything　at　all　which　I　can　imagine　or　conceive；　because　I　have　assumed　that　all　these　were　nothing。　Without　changing　that　supposition　I　find　that　I　only　leave　myself　certain　of　the　fact　that　I　am　somewhat。　　But　perhaps　it　is　true　that　these　same　things　which　I　supposed　were　non…　existent　because　they　are　unknown　to　me；　are　really　not　different　from　the　self　which　I　know。　　I　am　not　sure　about　this；　I　shall　not　dispute　about　it　now；　I　can　only　give　judgment　on　things　that　are　known　to　me。　　I　know　that　I　exist；　and　I　inquire　what　I　am；　I　whom　I　know　to　exist。　　But　it　is　very　certain　that　the　knowledge　of　my　existence　taken　in　its　precise　significance　does　not　depend　on　things　whose　existence　is　not　yet　known　to　me；　consequently　it　does　not　depend　on　those　which　I　can　feign　in　imagination。　　And　indeed　the　very　term　feign　in　imagination10　proves　to　me　my　error；　for　I　really　do　this　if　I　image　myself　a　something；　since　to　imagine　is　nothing　else　than　to　contemplate　the　figure　or　image　of　a　corporeal　thing。　　But　I　already　know　for　certain　that　I　am；　and　that　it　may　be　that　all　these　images；　and；　speaking　generally；　all　things　that　relate　to　the　nature　of　body　are　nothing　but　dreams　＇and　chimeras＇。　　For　this　reason　I　see　clearly　that　I　have　as　little　reason　to　say；　〃I　shall　stimulate　my　imagination　in　order　to　know　more　distinctly　what　I　am；〃　than　if　I　were　to　say；　〃I　am　now　awake；　and　I　perceive　somewhat　that　is　real　and　true：　　but　because　I　do　not　yet　perceive　it　distinctly　enough；　I　shall　go　to　sleep　of　express　purpose；　so　that　my　dreams　may　represent　the　perception　with　greatest　truth　and　evidence。〃　　And；　thus；　I　know　for　certain　that　nothing　of　all　that　I　can　understand　by　means　of　my　imagination　belongs　to　this　knowledge　which　I　have　of　myself；　and　that　it　is　necessary　to　recall　the　mind　from　this　mode　of　thought　with　the　utmost　diligence　in　order　that　it　may　be　able　to　know　its　own　nature　with　perfect　distinctness。　　　　　　But　what　then　am　I？　　A　thing　which　thinks。　　What　is　a　thing　which　thinks？　　It　is　a　thing　which　doubts；　understands；　＇conceives＇；　affirms；　denies；　wills；　refuses；　which　also　imagines　and　feels。　　　　　　Certainly　it　is　no　small　matter　if　all　these　things　pertain　to　my　nature。　　But　why　should　they　not　so　pertain？　　Am　I　not　that　being　who　now　doubts　nearly　everything；　who　nevertheless　understands　certain　things；　who　affirms　that　one　only　is　true；　who　denies　all　the　others；　who　desires　t