meditations on first philosophy-第6章

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efer　to　deny　the　existence　of　a　God　so　powerful；　rather　than　believe　that　all　other　things　are　uncertain。　　But　let　us　not　oppose　them　for　the　present；　and　grant　that　all　that　is　here　said　of　a　God　is　a　fable；　nevertheless　in　whatever　way　they　suppose　that　I　have　arrived　at　the　state　of　being　that　I　have　reached￥whether　they　attribute　it　to　fate　or　to　accident；　or　make　out　that　it　is　by　a　continual　succession　of　antecedents；　or　by　some　other　method￥since　to　err　and　deceive　oneself　is　a　defect；　it　is　clear　that　the　greater　will　be　the　probability　of　my　being　so　imperfect　as　to　deceive　myself　ever；　as　is　the　Author　to　whom　they　assign　my　origin　the　less　powerful。　　To　these　reasons　I　have　certainly　nothing　to　reply；　but　at　the　end　I　feel　constrained　to　confess　that　there　is　nothing　in　all　that　I　formerly　believed　to　be　true；　of　which　I　cannot　in　some　measure　doubt；　and　that　not　merely　through　want　of　thought　or　through　levity；　but　for　reasons　which　are　very　powerful　and　maturely　considered；　so　that　henceforth　I　ought　not　the　less　carefully　to　refrain　from　giving　credence　to　these　opinions　than　to　that　which　is　manifestly　false；　if　I　desire　to　arrive　at　any　certainty　＇in　the　sciences＇。　　　　　　But　it　is　not　sufficient　to　have　made　these　remarks；　we　must　also　be　careful　to　keep　them　in　mind。　　For　these　ancient　and　commonly　held　opinions　still　revert　frequently　to　my　mind；　long　and　familiar　custom　having　given　them　the　right　to　occupy　my　mind　against　my　inclination　and　rendered　them　almost　masters　of　my　belief；　nor　will　I　ever　lose　the　habit　of　deferring　to　them　or　of　placing　my　confidence　in　them；　so　long　as　I　consider　them　as　they　really　are；　i。e。　opinions　in　some　measure　doubtful；　as　I　have　just　shown；　and　at　the　same　time　highly　probable；　so　that　there　is　much　more　reason　to　believe　in　than　to　deny　them。　　That　is　why　I　consider　that　I　shall　not　be　acting　amiss；　if；　taking　of　set　purpose　a　contrary　belief；　I　allow　myself　to　be　deceived；　and　for　a　certain　time　pretend　that　all　these　opinions　are　entirely　false　and　imaginary；　until　at　last；　having　thus　balanced　my　former　prejudices　with　my　latter　＇so　that　they　cannot　divert　my　opinions　more　to　one　side　than　to　the　other＇；　my　judgment　will　no　longer　be　dominated　by　bad　usage　or　turned　away　from　the　right　knowledge　of　the　truth。　　For　I　am　assured　that　there　can　be　neither　peril　nor　error　in　this　course；　and　that　I　cannot　at　present　yield　too　much　to　distrust；　since　I　am　not　considering　the　question　of　action；　but　only　of　knowledge。　　　　　　I　shall　then　suppose；　not　that　God　who　is　supremely　good　and　the　fountain　of　truth；　but　some　evil　genius　not　less　powerful　than　deceitful；　has　employed　his　whole　energies　in　deceiving　me；　I　shall　consider　that　the　heavens；　the　earth；　colours；　figures；　sound；　and　all　other　external　things　are　nought　but　the　illusions　and　dreams　of　which　this　genius　has　availed　himself　in　order　to　lay　traps　for　my　credulity；　I　shall　consider　myself　as　having　no　hands；　no　eyes；　no　flesh；　no　blood；　nor　any　senses；　yet　falsely　believing　myself　to　possess　all　these　things；　I　shall　remain　obstinately　attached　to　this　idea；　and　if　by　this　means　it　is　not　in　my　power　to　arrive　at　the　knowledge　of　any　truth；　I　may　at　least　do　what　is　in　my　power　＇i。e。　suspend　my　judgment＇；　and　with　firm　purpose　avoid　giving　credence　to　any　false　thing；　or　being　imposed　upon　by　this　arch　deceiver；　however　powerful　and　deceptive　he　may　be。　　But　this　task　is　a　laborious　one；　and　insensibly　a　certain　lassitude　leads　me　into　the　course　of　my　ordinary　life。　　And　just　as　a　captive　who　in　sleep　enjoys　an　imaginary　liberty；　when　he　begins　to　suspect　that　his　liberty　is　but　a　dream；　fears　to　awaken；　and　conspires　with　these　agreeable　illusions　that　the　deception　may　be　prolonged；　so　insensibly　of　my　own　accord　I　fall　back　into　my　former　opinions；　and　I　dread　awakening　from　this　slumber；　lest　the　laborious　wakefulness　which　would　follow　the　tranquillity　of　this　repose　should　have　to　be　spent　not　in　daylight；　but　in　the　excessive　darkness　of　the　difficulties　which　have　just　been　discussed。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　II　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Nature　of　the　Human　Mind；　and　that　it　is　more　easily　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　known　than　the　Body。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Meditation　of　yesterday　filled　my　mind　with　so　many　doubts　that　it　is　no　longer　in　my　power　to　forget　them。　　And　yet　I　do　not　see　in　what　manner　I　can　resolve　them；　and；　just　as　if　I　had　all　of　a　sudden　fallen　into　very　deep　water；　I　am　so　disconcerted　that　I　can　neither　make　certain　of　setting　my　feet　on　the　bottom；　nor　can　I　swim　and　so　support　myself　on　the　surface。　　I　shall　nevertheless　make　an　effort　and　follow　anew　the　same　path　as　that　on　which　I　yesterday　entered；　i。e。　I　shall　proceed　by　setting　aside　all　that　in　which　the　least　doubt　could　be　supposed　to　exist；　just　as　if　I　had　discovered　that　it　was　absolutely　false；　and　I　shall　ever　follow　in　this　road　until　I　have　met　with　something　which　is　certain；　or　at　least；　if　I　can　do　nothing　else；　until　I　have　learned　for　certain　that　there　is　nothing　in　the　world　that　is　certain。　Archimedes；　in　order　that　he　might　draw　the　terrestrial　globe　out　of　its　place；　and　transport　it　elsewhere；　demanded　only　that　one　point　should　be　fixed　and　immoveable；　in　the　same　way　I　shall　have　the　right　to　conceive　high　hopes　if　I　am　happy　enough　to　discover　one　thing　only　which　is　certain　and　indubitable。　　　　　　I　suppose；　then；　that　all　the　things　that　I　see　are　false；　I　persuade　myself　that　nothing　has　ever　existed　of　all　that　my　fallacious　memory　represents　to　me。　　I　consider　that　I　possess　no　senses；　I　imagine　that　body；　figure；　extension；　movement　and　place　are　but　the　fictions　of　my　mind。　　What；　then；　can　be　esteemed　as　true？　　Perhaps　nothing　at　all；　unless　that　there　is　nothing　in　the　world　that　is　certain。　　　　　　But　how　can　I　know　there　is　not　something　different　from　those　things　that　I　have　just　considered；　of　which　one　cannot　have　the　slightest　doubt？　　Is　there　not　some　God；　or　some　other　being　by　whatever　name　we　call　it；　who　puts　these　reflections　into　my　mind？　　That　is　not　necessary；　for　is　it　not　possible　that　I　am　capable　of　producing　them　myself？　　I　myself；　am　I　not　at　least　something？　　But　I　have　already　denied　that　I　had　senses　and　body。　　Yet　I　hesitate；　for　what　follows　from　that？　　Am　I　so　dependent　on　body　and　senses　that　I　cannot　exist　without　these？　　But　I　was　persuaded　that　there　was　nothing　in　all　the　world；　that　there　was　no　heaven；　no　earth；　that　there　were　no　minds；　nor　any　bodies：　　was　I　not　then　likewise　persuaded　that　I　did　not　exist？　　Not　at　all；　of　a　surety　I　myself　did　exist　since　I　persuaded　myself　of　something　＇or　merely　because　I　thought　of　something＇。　　But　there　is　some　deceiver　or　other；　very　powerful　and　very　cunning；　who　ever　employs　his　ingenuity　in　deceiving　me。　　Then　without　doubt　I　exist　also　if　he　deceives　me；　and　let　him　deceive　me　as　much　as　he　will；　he　can　never　cause　me　to　be　nothing　so　long　as　I　think　that　I　am　something。　　So　that　after　having　reflected　well　and　carefully　examined　all　things；　we　must　come　to　the　definite　conclusion　that　this　proposition：　　I　am；　I　exist；　is　necessarily　true　each　time　that　I　pronounce　it；　or　tha