meditations on first philosophy-第21章

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experiences　little　by　little　destroyed　all　the　faith　which　I　had　rested　in　my　senses；　for　I　from　time　to　time　observed　that　those　towers　which　from　afar　appeared　to　me　to　be　round；　more　closely　observed　seemed　square；　and　that　colossal　statues　raised　on　the　summit　of　these　towers；　appeared　as　quite　tiny　statues　when　viewed　from　the　bottom；　and　so　in　an　infinitude　of　other　cases　I　found　error　in　judgments　founded　on　the　external　senses。　　And　not　only　in　those　founded　on　the　external　senses；　but　even　in　those　founded　on　the　internal　as　well；　for　is　there　anything　more　intimate　or　more　internal　than　pain？　　And　yet　I　have　learned　from　some　persons　whose　arms　or　legs　have　been　cut　off；　that　they　sometimes　seemed　to　feel　pain　in　the　part　which　had　been　amputated；　which　made　me　think　that　I　could　not　be　quite　certain　that　it　was　a　certain　member　which　pained　me；　even　although　I　felt　pain　in　it。　　And　to　those　grounds　of　doubt　I　have　lately　added　two　others；　which　are　very　general；　the　first　is　that　I　never　have　believed　myself　to　feel　anything　in　waking　moments　which　I　cannot　also　sometimes　believe　myself　to　feel　when　I　sleep；　and　as　I　do　not　think　that　these　things　which　I　seem　to　feel　in　sleep；　proceed　from　objects　outside　of　me；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　I　should　have　this　belief　regarding　objects　which　I　seem　to　perceive　while　awake。　　The　other　was　that　being　still　ignorant；　or　rather　supposing　myself　to　be　ignorant；　of　the　author　of　my　being；　I　saw　nothing　to　prevent　me　from　having　been　so　constituted　by　nature　that　I　might　be　deceived　even　in　matters　which　seemed　to　me　to　be　most　certain。　　And　as　to　the　grounds　on　which　I　was　formerly　persuaded　of　the　truth　of　sensible　objects；　I　had　not　much　trouble　in　replying　to　them。　　For　since　nature　seemed　to　cause　me　to　lean　towards　many　things　from　which　reason　repelled　me；　I　did　not　believe　that　I　should　trust　much　to　the　teachings　of　nature。　　And　although　the　ideas　which　I　receive　by　the　senses　do　not　depend　on　my　will；　I　did　not　think　that　one　should　for　that　reason　conclude　that　they　proceeded　from　things　different　from　myself；　since　possibly　some　faculty　might　be　discovered　in　me￥though　hitherto　unknown　to　me￥which　produced　them。　　　　　　But　now　that　I　begin　to　know　myself　better；　and　to　discover　more　clearly　the　author　of　my　being；　I　do　not　in　truth　think　that　I　should　rashly　admit　all　the　matters　which　the　senses　seem　to　teach　us；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　I　do　not　think　that　I　should　doubt　them　all　universally。　　　　　　And　first　of　all；　because　I　know　that　all　things　which　I　apprehend　clearly　and　distinctly　can　be　created　by　God　as　I　apprehend　them；　it　suffices　that　I　am　able　to　apprehend　one　thing　apart　from　another　clearly　and　distinctly　in　order　to　be　certain　that　the　one　is　different　from　the　other；　since　they　may　be　made　to　exist　in　separation　at　least　by　the　omnipotence　of　God；　and　it　does　not　signify　by　what　power　this　separation　is　made　in　order　to　compel　me　to　judge　them　to　be　different：　and；　therefore；　just　because　I　know　certainly　that　I　exist；　and　that　meanwhile　I　do　not　remark　that　any　other　thing　necessarily　pertains　to　my　nature　or　essence；　excepting　that　I　am　a　thinking　thing；　I　rightly　conclude　that　my　essence　consists　solely　in　the　fact　that　I　am　a　thinking　thin　＇or　a　substance　whose　whole　essence　or　nature　is　to　think＇。　　And　although　possibly　（or　rather　certainly；　as　I　shall　say　in　a　moment）　I　possess　a　body　with　which　I　am　very　intimately　conjoined；　yet　because；　on　the　one　side；　I　have　a　clear　and　distinct　idea　of　myself　inasmuch　as　I　am　only　a　thinking　and　unextended　thing；　and　as；　on　the　other；　I　possess　a　distinct　idea　of　body；　inasmuch　as　it　is　only　an　extended　and　unthinking　thing；　it　is　certain　that　this　I　＇that　is　to　say；　my　soul　by　which　I　am　what　I　am＇；　is　entirely　and　absolutely　distinct　from　my　body；　and　can　exist　without　it。　　　　　　I　further　find　in　myself　faculties　imploying　modes　of　thinking　peculiar　to　themselves；　to　wit；　the　faculties　of　imagination　and　feeling；　without　which　I　can　easily　conceive　myself　clearly　and　distinctly　as　a　complete　being；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　they　cannot　be　so　conceived　apart　from　me；　that　is　without　an　intelligent　substance　in　which　they　reside；　for　＇in　the　notion　we　have　of　these　faculties；　or；　to　use　the　language　of　the　Schools＇　in　their　formal　concept；　some　kind　of　intellection　is　comprised；　from　which　I　infer　that　they　are　distinct　from　me　as　its　modes　are　from　a　thing。　　I　observe　also　in　me　some　other　faculties　such　as　that　of　change　of　position；　the　assumption　of　different　figures　and　such　like；　which　cannot　be　conceived；　any　more　than　can　the　preceding；　apart　from　some　substance　to　which　they　are　attached；　and　consequently　cannot　exist　without　it；　but　it　is　very　clear　that　these　faculties；　if　it　be　true　that　they　exist；　must　be　attached　to　some　corporeal　or　extended　substance；　and　not　to　an　intelligent　substance；　since　in　the　clear　and　distinct　conception　of　these　there　is　some　sort　of　extension　found　to　be　present；　but　no　intellection　at　all。　　There　is　certainly　further　in　me　a　certain　passive　faculty　of　perception；　that　is；　of　receiving　and　recognising　the　ideas　of　sensible　things；　but　this　would　be　useless　to　me　＇and　I　could　in　no　way　avail　myself　of　it＇；　if　there　were　not　either　in　me　or　in　some　other　thing　another　active　faculty　capable　of　forming　and　producing　these　ideas。　　But　this　active　faculty　cannot　exist　in　me　＇inasmuch　as　I　am　a　thing　that　thinks＇　seeing　that　it　does　not　presuppose　thought；　and　also　that　those　ideas　are　often　produced　in　me　without　my　contributing　in　any　way　to　the　same；　and　often　even　against　my　will；　it　is　thus　necessarily　the　case　that　the　faculty　resides　in　some　substance　different　from　me　in　which　all　the　reality　which　is　objectively　in　the　ideas　that　are　produced　by　this　faculty　is　formally　or　eminently　contained；　as　I　remarked　before。　　And　this　substance　is　either　a　body；　that　is；　a　corporeal　nature　in　which　there　is　contained　formally　＇and　really＇　all　that　which　is　objectively　＇and　by　representation＇　in　those　ideas；　or　it　is　God　Himself；　or　some　other　creature　more　noble　than　body　in　which　that　same　is　contained　eminently。　　But；　since　God　is　no　deceiver；　it　is　very　manifest　that　He　does　not　communicate　to　me　these　ideas　immediately　and　by　Himself；　nor　yet　by　the　intervention　of　some　creature　in　which　their　reality　is　not　formally；　but　only　eminently；　contained。　　For　since　He　has　given　me　no　faculty　to　recognise　that　this　is　the　case；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　a　very　great　inclination　to　believe　＇that　they　are　sent　to　me　or＇　that　they　are　conveyed　to　me　by　corporeal　objects；　I　do　not　see　how　He　could　be　defended　from　the　accusation　of　deceit　if　these　ideas　were　produced　by　causes　other　than　corporeal　objects。　　Hence　we　must　allow　that　corporeal　things　exist。　However；　they　are　perhaps　not　exactly　what　we　perceive　by　the　senses；　since　this　comprehension　by　the　senses　is　in　many　instances　very　obscure　and　confused；　but　we　must　at　least　admit　that　all　things　which　I　conceive　in　them　clearly　and　distinctly；　that　is　to　say；　all　things　which；　speaking　generally；　are　comprehended　in　the　object　of　pure　mathematics；　are　truly　to　be　recognised　as　external　objects。　　　　　　As　to　other　things；　how