meditations on first philosophy-第2章

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ay　that　these　proofs　are　such　that　I　do　not　think　that　there　is　any　way　open　to　the　human　mind　by　which　it　can　ever　succeed　in　discovering　better。　　For　the　importance　of　the　subject；　and　the　glory　of　God　to　which　all　this　relates；　constrain　me　to　speak　here　somewhat　more　freely　of　myself　than　is　my　habit。　　Nevertheless；　whatever　certainty　and　evidence　I　find　in　my　reasons；　I　cannot　persuade　myself　that　all　the　world　is　capable　of　understanding　them。　　Still；　just　as　in　Geometry　there　are　many　demonstrations　that　have　been　left　to　us　by　Archimedes；　by　Apollonius；　by　Pappus；　and　others；　which　are　accepted　by　everyone　as　perfectly　certain　and　evident　（because　they　clearly　contain　nothing　which；　considered　by　itself；　is　not　very　easy　to　understand；　and　as　all　through　that　which　follows　has　an　exact　connection　with；　and　dependence　on　that　which　precedes）；　nevertheless；　because　they　are　somewhat　lengthy；　and　demand　a　mind　wholly　devoted　to　their　consideration；　they　are　only　taken　in　and　understood　by　a　very　limited　number　of　persons。　　Similarly；　although　I　judge　that　those　of　which　I　here　make　use　are　equal　to；　or　even　surpass　in　certainty　and　evidence；　the　demonstrations　of　Geometry；　I　yet　apprehend　that　they　cannot　be　adequately　understood　by　many；　both　because　they　are　also　a　little　lengthy　and　dependent　the　one　on　the　other；　and　principally　because　they　demand　a　mind　wholly　free　of　prejudices；　and　one　which　can　be　easily　detached　from　the　affairs　of　the　senses。　And；　truth　to　say；　there　are　not　so　many　in　the　world　who　are　fitted　for　metaphysical　speculations　as　there　are　for　those　of　Geometry。　　And　more　than　that；　there　is　still　this　difference；　that　in　Geometry；　since　each　one　is　persuaded　that　nothing　must　be　advanced　of　which　there　is　not　a　certain　demonstration；　those　who　are　not　entirely　adepts　more　frequently　err　in　approving　what　is　false；　in　order　to　give　the　impression　that　they　understand　it；　than　in　refuting　the　true。　　But　the　case　is　different　in　philosophy　where　everyone　believes　that　all　is　problematical；　and　few　give　themselves　to　the　search　after　truth；　and　the　greater　number；　in　their　desire　to　acquire　a　reputation　for　boldness　of　thought；　arrogantly　combat　the　most　important　of　truths3。　　　　　　　That　is　why；　whatever　force　there　may　be　in　my　reasonings；　seeing　they　belong　to　philosophy；　I　cannot　hope　that　they　will　have　much　effect　on　the　minds　of　men；　unless　you　extend　to　them　your　protection。　　But　the　estimation　in　which　you　Company　is　universally　held　is　so　great；　and　the　name　of　SORBONNE　carries　with　it　so　much　authority；　that；　next　to　the　Sacred　Councils；　never　has　such　deference　been　paid　to　the　judgment　of　any　Body；　not　only　in　what　concerns　the　faith；　but　also　in　what　regards　human　philosophy　as　well：　　everyone　indeed　believes　that　it　is　not　possible　to　discover　elsewhere　more　perspicacity　and　solidity；　or　more　integrity　and　wisdom　in　pronouncing　judgment。　　For　this　reason　I　have　no　doubt　that　if　you　deign　to　take　the　trouble　in　the　first　place　of　correcting　this　work　（for　being　conscious　not　only　of　my　infirmity；　but　also　of　my　ignorance；　I　should　not　dare　to　state　that　it　was　free　from　errors）；　and　then；　after　adding　to　it　these　things　that　are　lacking　to　it；　completing　those　which　are　imperfect；　and　yourselves　taking　the　trouble　to　give　a　more　ample　explanation　of　those　things　which　have　need　of　it；　or　at　least　making　me　aware　of　the　defects　so　that　I　may　apply　myself　to　remedy　them　when　this　is　done　and　when　finally　the　reasonings　by　which　I　prove　that　there　is　a　God；　and　that　the　human　soul　differs　from　the　body；　shall　be　carried　to　that　point　of　perspicuity　to　which　I　am　sure　they　can　be　carried　in　order　that　they　may　be　esteemed　as　perfectly　exact　demonstrations；　if　you　deign　to　authorize　your　approbation　and　to　render　public　testimony　to　their　truth　and　certainty；　I　do　not　doubt；　I　say；　that　henceforward　all　the　errors　and　false　opinions　which　have　ever　existed　regarding　these　two　questions　will　soon　be　effaced　from　the　minds　of　men。　　For　the　truth　itself　will　easily　cause　all　men　of　mind　and　learning　to　subscribe　to　your　judgment；　and　your　authority　will　cause　the　atheists；　who　are　usually　more　arrogant　than　learned　or　judicious；　to　rid　themselves　of　their　spirit　of　contradiction　or　lead　them　possibly　themselves　to　defend　the　reasonings　which　they　find　being　received　as　demonstrations　by　all　persons　of　consideration；　lest　they　appear　not　to　understand　them。　　And；　finally；　all　others　will　easily　yield　to　such　a　mass　of　evidence；　and　there　will　be　none　who　dares　to　doubt　the　existence　of　God　and　the　real　and　true　distinction　between　the　human　soul　and　the　body。　　It　is　for　you　now　in　your　singular　wisdom　to　judge　of　the　importance　of　the　establishment　of　such　beliefs　＇you　who　see　the　disorders　produced　by　the　doubt　of　them＇5　。　　But　it　would　not　become　me　to　say　more　in　consideration　of　the　cause　of　God　and　religion　to　those　who　have　always　been　the　most　worthy　supports　of　the　Catholic　Church。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Preface　to　the　Reader　　　　　　　　　　　　I　have　already　slightly　touched　on　these　two　questions　of　God　and　the　human　soul　in　the　Discourse　on　the　Method　of　rightly　conducting　the　Reason　and　seeking　truth　in　the　Sciences；　published　in　French　in　the　year　1637。　　Not　that　I　had　the　design　of　treating　these　with　any　thoroughness；　but　only　so　to　speak　in　passing；　and　in　order　to　ascertain　by　the　judgment　of　the　readers　how　I　should　treat　them　later　on。　　For　these　questions　have　always　appeared　to　me　to　be　of　such　importance　that　I　judged　it　suitable　to　speak　of　them　more　than　once；　and　the　road　which　I　follow　in　the　explanation　of　them　is　so　little　trodden；　and　so　far　removed　from　the　ordinary　path；　that　I　did　not　judge　it　to　be　expedient　to　set　it　forth　at　length　in　French　and　in　a　Discourse　which　might　be　read　by　everyone；　in　case　the　feebler　minds　should　believe　that　it　was　permitted　to　them　to　attempt　to　follow　the　same　path。　　　　　　But；　having　in　this　Discourse　on　Method　begged　all　those　who　have　found　in　my　writings　somewhat　deserving　of　censure　to　do　me　the　favour　of　acquainting　me　with　the　grounds　of　it；　nothing　worthy　of　remark　has　been　objected　to　in　them　beyond　two　matters：　　to　these　two　I　wish　here　to　reply　in　a　few　words　before　undertaking　their　more　detailed　discussion。　　　　　　The　first　objection　is　that　it　does　not　follow　from　the　fact　that　the　human　mind　reflecting　on　itself　does　not　perceive　itself　to　be　other　than　a　thing　that　thinks；　that　its　nature　or　its　essence　consists　only　in　its　being　a　thing　that　thinks；　in　the　sense　that　this　word　only　excludes　all　other　things　which　might　also　be　supposed　to　pertain　to　the　nature　of　the　soul。　　To　this　objection　I　reply　that　it　was　not　my　intention　in　that　place　to　exclude　these　in　accordance　with　the　order　that　looks　to　the　truth　of　the　matter　（as　to　which　I　was　not　then　dealing）；　but　only　in　accordance　with　the　order　of　my　thought　＇perception＇；　thus　my　meaning　was　that　so　far　as　I　was　aware；　I　knew　nothing　clearly　as　belonging　to　my　essence；　excepting　that　I　was　a　thing　that　thinks；　or　a　thing　that　has　in　itself　the　faculty　of　thinking。　　But　I　shall　show　hereafter　how　from　the　fact　that　I　know　no　other　thing　which　pertains　to　my　essence；　it　follow