meditations on first philosophy-第12章

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oreal　objects；　I　do　not　recognise　in　them　anything　so　great　or　so　excellent　that　they　might　not　have　possibly　proceeded　from　myself；　for　if　I　consider　them　more　closely；　and　examine　them　individually；　as　I　yesterday　examined　the　idea　of　wax；　I　find　that　there　is　very　little　in　them　which　I　perceive　clearly　and　distinctly。　Magnitude　or　extension　in　length；　breadth；　or　depth；　I　do　so　perceive；　also　figure　which　results　from　a　termination　of　this　extension；　the　situation　which　bodies　of　different　figure　preserve　in　relation　to　one　another；　and　movement　or　change　of　situation；　to　which　we　may　also　add　substance；　duration　and　number。　　As　to　other　things　such　as　light；　colours；　sounds；　scents；　tastes；　heat；　cold　and　the　other　tactile　qualities；　they　are　thought　by　me　with　so　much　obscurity　and　confusion　that　I　do　not　even　know　if　they　are　true　or　false；　i。e。　whether　the　ideas　which　I　form　of　these　qualities　are　actually　the　ideas　of　real　objects　or　not　＇or　whether　they　only　represent　chimeras　which　cannot　exist　in　fact＇。　　For　although　I　have　before　remarked　that　it　is　only　in　judgments　that　falsity；　properly　speaking；　or　formal　falsity；　can　be　met　with；　a　certain　material　falsity　may　nevertheless　be　found　in　ideas；　i。e。　when　these　ideas　represent　what　is　nothing　as　though　it　were　something。　　For　example；　the　ideas　which　I　have　of　cold　and　heat　are　so　far　from　clear　and　distinct　that　by　their　means　I　cannot　tell　whether　cold　is　merely　a　privation　of　heat；　or　heat　a　privation　of　cold；　or　whether　both　are　real　qualities；　or　are　not　such。　　And　inasmuch　as　＇since　ideas　resemble　images＇　there　cannot　be　any　ideas　which　do　not　appear　to　represent　some　things；　if　it　is　correct　to　say　that　cold　is　merely　a　privation　of　heat；　the　idea　which　represents　it　to　me　as　something　real　and　positive　will　not　be　improperly　termed　false；　and　the　same　holds　good　of　other　similar　ideas。　　　　　　To　these　it　is　certainly　not　necessary　that　I　should　attribute　any　author　other　than　myself。　　For　if　they　are　false；　i。e。　if　they　represent　things　which　do　not　exist；　the　light　of　nature　shows　me　that　they　issue　from　nought；　that　is　to　say；　that　they　are　only　in　me　so　far　as　something　is　lacking　to　the　perfection　of　my　nature。　　But　if　they　are　true；　nevertheless　because　they　exhibit　so　little　reality　to　me　that　I　cannot　even　clearly　distinguish　the　thing　represented　from　non…being；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　they　should　not　be　produced　by　myself。　　　　　　As　to　the　clear　and　distinct　idea　which　I　have　of　corporeal　things；　some　of　them　seem　as　though　I　might　have　derived　them　from　the　idea　which　I　possess　of　myself；　as　those　which　I　have　of　substance；　duration；　number；　and　such　like。　For　＇even＇　when　I　think　that　a　stone　is　a　substance；　or　at　least　a　thing　capable　of　existing　of　itself；　and　that　I　am　a　substance　also；　although　I　conceive　that　I　am　a　thing　that　thinks　and　not　one　that　is　extended；　and　that　the　stone　on　the　other　hand　is　an　extended　thing　which　does　not　think；　and　that　thus　there　is　a　notable　difference　between　the　two　conceptions￥they　seem；　nevertheless；　to　agree　in　this；　that　both　represent　substances。　　In　the　same　way；　when　I　perceive　that　I　now　exist　and　further　recollect　that　I　have　in　former　times　existed；　and　when　I　remember　that　I　have　various　thoughts　of　which　I　can　recognise　the　number；　I　acquire　ideas　of　duration　and　number　which　I　can　afterwards　transfer　to　any　object　that　I　please。　　But　as　to　all　the　other　qualities　of　which　the　ideas　of　corporeal　things　are　composed；　to　wit；　extension；　figure；　situation　and　motion；　it　is　true　that　they　are　not　formally　in　me；　since　I　am　only　a　thing　that　thinks；　but　because　they　are　merely　certain　modes　of　substance　＇and　so　to　speak　the　vestments　under　which　corporeal　substance　appears　to　us＇　and　because　I　myself　am　also　a　substance；　it　would　seem　that　they　might　be　contained　in　me　eminently。　　　　　　Hence　there　remains　only　the　idea　of　God；　concerning　which　we　must　consider　whether　it　is　something　which　cannot　have　proceeded　from　me　myself。　　By　the　name　God　I　understand　a　substance　that　is　infinite　＇eternal；　immutable＇；　independent；　all…knowing；　all…powerful；　and　by　which　I　myself　and　everything　else；　if　anything　else　does　exist；　have　been　created。　　Now　all　these　characteristics　are　such　that　the　more　diligently　I　attend　to　them；　the　less　do　they　appear　capable　of　proceeding　from　me　alone；　hence；　from　what　has　been　already　said；　we　must　conclude　that　God　necessarily　exists。　　　　　　For　although　the　idea　of　substance　is　within　me　owing　to　the　fact　that　I　am　substance；　nevertheless　I　should　not　have　the　idea　of　an　infinite　substance￥since　I　am　finite￥if　it　had　not　proceeded　from　some　substance　which　was　veritably　infinite。　　　　　　Nor　should　I　imagine　that　I　do　not　perceive　the　infinite　by　a　true　idea；　but　only　by　the　negation　of　the　finite；　just　as　I　perceive　repose　and　darkness　by　the　negation　of　movement　and　of　light；　for；　on　the　contrary；　I　see　that　there　is　manifestly　more　reality　in　infinite　substance　than　in　finite；　and　therefore　that　in　some　way　I　have　in　me　the　notion　of　the　infinite　earlier　then　the　finite￥to　wit；　the　notion　of　God　before　that　of　myself。　　For　how　would　it　be　possible　that　I　should　know　that　I　doubt　and　desire；　that　is　to　say；　that　something　is　lacking　to　me；　and　that　I　am　not　quite　perfect；　unless　I　had　within　me　some　idea　of　a　Being　more　perfect　than　myself；　in　comparison　with　which　I　should　recognise　the　deficiencies　of　my　nature？　　　　　　And　we　cannot　say　that　this　idea　of　God　is　perhaps　materially　false　and　that　consequently　I　can　derive　it　from　nought　＇i。e。　that　possibly　it　exists　in　me　because　I　am　imperfect＇；　as　I　have　just　said　is　the　case　with　ideas　of　heat；　cold　and　other　such　things；　for；　on　the　contrary；　as　this　idea　is　very　clear　and　distinct　and　contains　within　it　more　objective　reality　than　any　other；　there　can　be　none　which　is　of　itself　more　true；　nor　any　in　which　there　can　be　less　suspicion　of　falsehood。　　The　idea；　I　say；　of　this　Being　who　is　absolutely　perfect　and　infinite；　is　entirely　true；　for　although；　perhaps；　we　can　imagine　that　such　a　Being　does　not　exist；　we　cannot　nevertheless　imagine　that　His　idea　represents　nothing　real　to　me；　as　I　have　said　of　the　idea　of　cold。　　This　idea　is　also　very　clear　and　distinct；　since　all　that　I　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　of　the　real　and　the　true；　and　of　what　conveys　some　perfection；　is　in　its　entirety　contained　in　this　idea。　　And　this　does　not　cease　to　be　true　although　I　do　not　comprehend　the　infinite；　or　though　in　God　there　is　an　infinitude　of　things　which　I　cannot　comprehend；　nor　possibly　even　reach　in　any　way　by　thought；　for　it　is　of　the　nature　of　the　infinite　that　my　nature；　which　is　finite　and　limited；　should　not　comprehend　it；　and　it　is　sufficient　that　I　should　understand　this；　and　that　I　should　judge　that　all　things　which　I　clearly　perceive　and　in　which　I　know　that　there　is　some　perfection；　and　possibly　likewise　an　infinitude　of　properties　of　which　I　am　ignorant；　are　in　God　formally　or　eminently；　so　that　the　idea　which　I　have　of　Him　may　become　the　most　true；　most　clear；　and　most　distinct　of　all　the　ideas　that　are　in　my　mind。　　　　　　But　possibly　I　am　something　more　than　I　suppose　myself　to　be；　and　perhaps　all　those　perfections　which　I