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itors with the question： ‘‘Perhaps one of you gentlemen may _*by some chance_ have a quarter with you？'' He judges from his habit of not carrying money with him； that to carry it is to be presupposed as a ‘‘perhaps；'' and the appearance of a quarter in this crowded auditorium must be ‘‘by chance。''
The same thing is true with some of the most habitual processes of some of the most ordinary people。 If a man sees a directory in which his name must be mentioned； he looks it up and studies it。 If he sees a group photograph in which he also occurs he looks up his own picture； and when the most miserable cheater who is traveling under a false name picks that out； he will seek it out of his _*own_ relationships； will either alter his real name or slightly vary the maiden name of his mother； or deduce it from his place of birth； or simply make use of his christian name。 But he will not be likely to move far from his precious self。
That similar things are true for readers； Goethe told us when he showed us that everything that anybody reads interests him only when he finds himself or his activities therein。 So Goethe explains that business men and men of the world apprehend a scientific dissertation better than the really learned； ‘‘who habitually hear no more of it than what they have learned or taught and with which they meet their equals。''
It is properly indicated that every language has the largest number of terms for those things which are most important to those who speak it。 Thus we are told that the Arabians have as many as 6000 words for camel； 2000 for horse； and 50 for lion。 Richness of form and use always belong together； as is shown in the fact that the auxiliaries and those verbs most often used are everywhere the most irregular This fact may be very important in examinations； for definite inferences concerning the nature and affairs of the witness may be drawn from the manner and frequency with which he uses words； and whether he possesses an especially large number of forms in any particular direction。
The fact is that we make our conceptions in accordance with the things as _*we_ have seen them； and so completely persuade ourselves of the truth of one definite； partial definition； that sometimes we wonder at a phenomenon without judging that it might have been expected to be otherwise。 When I first became a student at Strassbourg； I wondered； subconsciously； when I heard the ragged gamins talk French fluently。 I knew； indeed； that it was their mother… tongue； but I was so accustomed to viewing all French as a sign of higher education that this knowledge in the gamins made me marvel。 When I was a child I once had to bid my grandfather adieu very early； while he was still in bed。 I still recall the vivid astonishment of my perception that grandfather awoke without his habitual spectacles upon his nose。 I must have known that spectacles are as superfluous as uncomfortable and dangerous when one is sleeping； and I should not even with most cursory thinking have supposed that he would have worn his spectacles during the night。 But as I was accustomed always to see my grandfather with spectacles； when he did not have them I wondered at it。
Such instances are of especial importance when the judge is himself making observations； i。 e。； examining the premises of the crime； studying corpora delicti； etc。； because we often suppose ourselves to see extraordinary and illegal things simply because we have been habituated to seeing things otherwise。 We even construct and name according to this habit。 Taine narrates the instructive story of a little girl who wore a medal around her throat； of which she was told； ‘‘C'est le bon Dieu。'' When the child once saw her uncle with a lorgnon around his neck she said； ‘‘C'est le bon Dieu de mon oncle。'' And since I heard the story； I have repeatedly had the opportunity to think； ‘‘C'est aussi le bon Dieu de cet homme。'' A single word which indicates how a man denotes a thing defines for us his nature； his character； and his circumstances。
For the same reason that everything interests us more according to the degree it involves us personally； we do not examine facts and completely overlook them though they are later shown to be unshakable； without our being able to explain their causal nexus。 If； however； we know causes and relationships； these facts become portions of our habitual mental equipment。 Any practitioner knows how true this is； and how especially visible during the examination of witnesses； who ignore facts which to us seem； in the nature of the case； important and definitive。 In such cases we must first of all not assume that these facts have not oc… curred because the witness has not explained them or has overlooked them； we must proceed as suggested in order to validate the relevant circumstances by means of the witnessi。 e。； we must teach him the conditions and relationships until they become portions of his habitual mental machinery。 I do not assert that this is easy on the contrary； I say that whoever is able to do this is the most effective of examiners； and shows again that the witness is no more than an instrument which is valueless in the hands of the bounder； but which can accomplish all sorts of things in the hands of the master。
One must beware； however； of too free use of the most comfortable means；that of examples。 When Newton said； ‘‘In addiscendis scientiis exempla plus prosunt； quam praecepta；'' he was not addressing criminalists； but he might have been。 As might； also； Kant； when he proved that thinking in examples is dangerous because it allows the use of real thinking； for which it is not a substitute； to lapse。 That this fact is one reason for the danger of examples is certain； but the chief reason； at least for the lawyer； is the fact that an example requires not equality； but mere similarity。 The degree of similarity is not expressed and the auditor has no standard for the degree of similarity in the mind of the speaker。 ‘‘Omnis analogia claudicat'' is correct； and it may happen that the example might be falsely conceived； that similarity may be mistaken for equality； or at least； that there should be ignorance of the inequality。 Examples； therefore； are to be used only in the most extreme cases； and only in such wise； that the nature of the example is made very clearly obvious and its incorrectness warned against。
There are several special conditions； not to be overlooked。 One of these is the influence of expectation。 Whoever expects anything； sees； hears； and constructs； only in the suspense of this expectation； and neglects all competing events most astoundingly。 Whoever keenly expects any person is sensible only of the creaking of the garden door； he is interested in all sounds which resemble it； and which he can immediately distinguish with quite abnormal acuteness； everything else so disappears that even powerful sounds； at any event more powerful than that of the creaking gate； are overlooked。 This may afford some explanation for the very different statements we often receive from numerous observers of the same event； each one had expected a different thing； and hence； had perceived and had ignored different things。