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is fact assume that the act does contain an image。 According to St。 Augustine the image serves as the knowledge of the object； according to Erdmann the object is the image objectified。
Of great importance is the substitutional adequacy of images。 E。 g。； I imagine my absent dog； Bismarck's dog； whom I know only pictorially； and finally； the dog of Alcibiades； whose appearance is known only by the fact that he was pretty and that his master had cut off his tail。 In this case； the representative value of these images will be definite； for everybody knows that I can imagine my own dog very correctly； that the image of Bismarck's beast will also be comparatively good inasmuch as this animal has been fre… quently pictured and described； while the image of Alcibiades' dog will want much in the way of reliabilityalthough I have imagined this historic animal quite vividly since boyhood。 When； therefore； I speak of any one of these three animals everybody will be able properly to value the correctness of my images because he knows their conditions。 When we speak with a witness； however； we rarely know the conditions under which he has obtained his images； and we learn them only from him。 Now it happens that the description offered by the witness adds another image； i。 e。； our own image of the matter； and this； and that of the witness； have to be placed in specific relation to each other。 Out of the individual images of all concerned an image should be provided which implies the image of the represented event。 Images can be compared only with images； or images are only pictures of images。＇1＇
＇1＇ Cf。 Windelband： ‘‘Prludien。''
The difficulty of this transmutation lies fundamentally in the nature of representation。 Representation can never be identical with its object。 Helmholtz has made this most clear： ‘‘Our visions and representations are effects； objects seen and represented have worked on our nervous system and on our consciousness。 The nature of each effect depends necessarily upon the nature of its cause； and the nature of the individual upon whom the cause was at work。 To demand an image which should absolutely reproduce its object and therefore be absolutely true； would be to demand an effect which should be absolutely independent of the nature of that object on which the effect is caused。 And this is an obvious contradiction。''
What the difference between image and object consists of； whether it is merely formal or material； how much it matters； has not yet been scientifically proved and may never be so。 We have to assume only that the validity of this distinction is universally known； and that everybody possesses an innate corrective with which he assigns proper place to image and object； i。 e。； he knows approximately the distinction between them。 The difficulty lies in the fact that not all people possess an identical standard； and that upon the creation of the latter practically all human qualities exert an influence。 This variety in standards； again； is double…edged。 On the one side it depends on the essence of image and of object； on the other it depends on the alteration which the image undergoes even during perception as well as during all the ensuing time。 Everybody knows this distinction。 Whoever has seen anything under certain circumstances； or during a certain period of his life； may frequently produce an image of it varying in individual characteristics； but in its general character constant。 If he sees it later under different conditions； at a different age； when memory and imaginative disposition have exercised their alterative influence； image and object fail to correspond in various directions。 The matter is still worse with regard to images of things and events that have never been seen。 I can imagine the siege of Troy； a dragon； the polar night and Alexander the Great； but how different will the image be from the object！
This is especially obvious when we have perceived something which did not appear to us altogether correct。 We improve the thing； i。 e。； we study how it might have been better； and we remember it as improved； then the more frequently this object as imagined recurs； the more fixed its form becomes； but not its actual form； only its altered form。 We see this with especial clearness in the case of drawings that in some way displease us。 Suppose I do not like the red dress of a woman in some picture and I prefer brown。 If later I recall the picture the image will become progressively browner and browner； and finally I see the picture as brown； and when I meet the real object I wonder about the red dress。＇1＇
＇1＇ H。 Gross： Korregierte Vorstellungen。 In H。 Gross's Archiv X； 109。
We get this situation in miniature each time we hear of a crime； however barren the news may be；no more than a telegraphic word。 The event must naturally have some degree of importance； because； if I hear merely that a silver watch has been stolen； I do not try to imagine that situation。 If； however； I hear that near a hostelry in X； a peasant was robbed by two traveling apprentices I immediately get an image which contains not only the unknown region； but also the event of the robbery； and even perhaps the faces of those concerned。 It does not much matter that this image is completely false in practically every detail； because in the greater number of cases it is corrected。 The real danger lies in the fact that this correction is frequently so bad and often fails altogether and that； in consequence； the first image again breaks through and remains the most vigorous。＇2＇ The vigor is the greater because we always attach such imagination to something actual or approximately real； and inasmuch as the latter thing is either really seen； or at least energetically imagined； the first image acquires renewed power of coming up。 According to Lipps； ‘‘Reproductive images presuppose dispositions。 Dispositions ensue upon perceptions that they imply； still there are reproductive images and imagined wholes which imply no preceding perceptions。 This contradiction is solved when dispositions are contained in other things at the same time。 A finite number of dispositions may in this way be also infinite。。。。 Dispositions are transformed power itself； power transformed in such a way as to be able to respond actively to inner stimulations。''
＇2＇ C。 de Lagrave： L'Autosuggestion Naturelle。 Rev。 d'Hypnot。 1889； XIV； 257。
The process is similar in the reproduction of images during speech。 The fact that this reproduction is not direct but depends on the sequence of images； leads to the garrulity of children； old men； and uneducated people； who try to present the whole complex of relations belonging to any given image。 But such total recall drives the judge to despair； not only because he loses time； but because of the danger of having the attention turned from important to unimportant things。 The same thing is perceived in judicial documents which often reveal the fact that the dictator permitted himself to be led astray by unskilful witnesses； or that he had himself been responsible for abstruse； indirect memories。 The real thinker will almost always be chary of words； because he retains； fr