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External perception involves three principal functions： apprehension； differentiation； and combination。 Perception in the narrower sense of the term is the simple sensory conscious apprehension of some present object stimulating our eyes。 We discover by means of it what the object is； its relation to ourselves and other things； its distance from us； its name； etc。
What succeeds this apprehension is the most important thing for us lawyers； i。 e。 _*recognition_。 Recognition indicates only that an object has sufficiently impressed a mind to keep it known and identifiable。 It is indifferent what the nature of the recognized object is。 According to Hume the object may be an enduring thing （‘‘non… interrupted and non…dependent on mind''）； or it may be identical with perception itself。 In the latter case the perception is considered as a logical judgment like the judgment： ‘‘It is raining；'' or the feeling that ‘‘it is raining；'' and there recognition is only the recognition of a perception。 Now judgments of this sort are what we get from witnesses； and what we have to examine and evaluate。 This must be done from two points of view。 First； from the point of view of the observer and collector of instances who is seeking to discover the principle which governs them。 If this is not done the deductions that we make are at least unreliable； and in most cases； false。 As Mach says； ‘‘If once observation has determined all the facts of any natural science； a new period begins for that science； the period of deduction。'' But how often do we lawyers distinguish these two periods in our own work。＇1＇
＇1＇ A sentence is here omitted。
The second point of importance is the presence of mistakes in the observations。 The essential mistakes are classified by Schiel under two headings。 Mistakes in observation are positive or negative； wrong observation or oversight。 The latter occurs largely through preconceived opinions。 The opponents of Copernicus concluded that the earth did not move because otherwise a stone dropped from the top of a tower would reach the ground a little to the west。 If the adherents of Copernicus had made the experiment they would have discovered that the stone does fall as the theory requires。 Similar oversights occur in the lawyer's work hundreds of times。 We are impressed with exceptions that are made by others or by ourselves； and give up some already tried approach without actually testing the truth of the exception which challenges it。 I have frequently； while at work； thought of the story of some one of the Georges； who did not like scholars and set the following problem to a number of philosophers and physicists： ‘‘When I put a ten pound stone into a hundred pound barrel of water the whole weighs a hundred and ten pounds； but when I put a live fish of ten pounds into the barrel the whole still weighs only a hundred pounds？'' Each one of the scholars had his own convincing explanation； until finally the king asked one of the foot…men； who said that he would like to see the experiment tried before he made up his mind。 I remember a case in which a peasant was accused of having committed arson for the sake of the insurance。 He asserted that he had gone into a room with a candle and that a long spider's web which was hanging down had caught fire from it accidentally and had inflamed the straw which hung from the roof。 So the catastrophe had occurred。 Only in the second examination did it occur to anybody to ask whether spider's web can burn at all； and the first experiment showed that that was impossible。
Most experiences of this kind indicate that in recognizing events we must proceed slowly； without leaping； and that we may construct our notions only on the basis of knowledge we already possess。 Saint Thomas says； ‘‘Omnes cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente。'' If this bit of wisdom were kept in mind in the examination of witnesses it would be an easier and simpler task than usual。 Only when the unknown is connected with the known is it possible to understand the former。 If it is not done the witness will hardly be able to answer。 He nowhere finds support； or he seeks one of his own； and naturally finds the wrong one。 So the information that an ordinary traveler brings home is mainly identical with what he carries away； for he has ears and eyes only for what he expects to see。 For how long a time did the negro believe that disease pales the coral that he wears？ Yet if he had only watched it he would have seen how foolish the notion was。 How long； since Adam Smith； did people believe that extravagance helps industry； and how much longer have people called Copernicus a fool because they actually saw the sun rise and set。 So J。 S。 Mill puts his opinions on this matter。 Benneke＇1＇ adds； ‘‘If anybody describes to me an animal； a region； a work of art； or narrates an event； etc。； I get no notion through the words I hear of the appearance of the subject。 I merely have a problem set me by means of the words and signs； in the conception of the subject； and hence it depends for truth mainly upon the completeness of earlier conceptions of similar things or events； and upon the material I have imaginatively at hand。 These are my perceptual capital and my power of representation。''
＇1＇ E。 Benneke： Pragmatische Psychologie。
It naturally is not necessary to ask whether a narrator has ever seen the things he speaks of； nor to convince oneself in examination that the person in question knows accurately what he is talking about。 At the same time； the examiner ought to be clear on the matter and know what attitude to take if he is going to deal intelligibly with the other。 I might say that all of us； educated and uneducated； have apprehended and remember definite and distinct images of all things we have seen； heard； or learned from descriptions。 When we get new information we simply attach the new image to the old； or extinguish a part of the old and put the new in its place； or we retain only a more or less vigorous breath of the old with the new。 Such images go far back； even animals possess them。 One day my small son came with his exciting information that his guinea pig； well known as a stupid beast； could count。 He tried to prove this by removing the six young from their mother and hiding them so that she could not see what happened to them。 Then he took one of the six； hid it； and brought the remaining five back to the old lady。 She smelled them one after the other and then showed a good deal of excitement； as if she missed something。 Then she was again removed and the sixth pig brought back； when she was restored to her brood； she sniffed all six and showed a great deal of satisfaction。 ‘‘She could count at least six。'' Naturally the beast had only a fixed collective image of her brood； and as one was missing the image was disturbed and incorrect。 At the same time； the image was such as is created by the combination of events or circumstances。 It is not far from the images of low…browed humanity and differs only in degree from those of civilized people。
The fact that a good deal of what is said is incorrect and yet not consciously untrue； depends upon the existence