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n may be established between the crime and the suspect； or whether the relation is only accidental。 ‘‘Unfortunate coincidence'' ‘‘closely related connection of facts''‘‘extraordinary accumulation of reason for suspicion；''all these terms are really chance mistaken for causation。 On the knowledge of the difference between the one and the other depends the fate of most evidence and trials。 Whoever is fortunate enough in rightly perceiving what chance is； is fortunate in the conduct of his trial。
Is there really a theory of chance？ I believe that a direct treatment of the subject is impossible。 The problem of chance can be only approximately explained when all conceivable chance…happenings of a given discipline are brought together and their number reduced by careful search for definite laws。 Besides； the problem demands the knowledge of an extremely rich casuistry； by means of which； on the one hand； to bring together the manifoldness of chance events； and on the other to discover order。 Enough has been written about chance； but a systematic treatment of it must be entirely theoretical。 So Windelband's＇1＇ excellent and well…ordered book deals with relations （chance and cause； chance and law； chance and purpose； chance and concept） the greatest value of which is to indicate critically the various definitions of the concept of chance。 Even though there is no definition which presents the concept of chance in a completely satisfactory manner； the making of such definitions is still of value because one side of chance is explained and the other is thereby seen more closely。 Let us consider a few of these and other definitions。 Aristotle says that the accidental occurs； ； according to nature。 Epicurus； who sees the creation of the world as a pure accident； holds it to occur 。 Spinoza believes nothing to be contingent save only according to the limitations of knowledge； Kant says that conditioned existence as such； is called accidental； the unconditioned； necessary。 Humboldt： ‘‘Man sees those things as accident which he can not explain genetically。'' Schiel： ‘‘Whatever may not be reduced back to law is called accidental。'' Quetelet： ‘‘The word chance serves officiously to hide our ignorance。'' Buckle derives the idea of chance from the life of nomadic tribes； which contains nothing firm and regulated。 According to Trendelenburg chance is that which could not be otherwise。 Rosenkranz says： Chance is a reality which has only the value of possibility； while Fischer calls chance the individualized fact； and Lotze identifies it with everything that is not valid as a natural purpose。 For Windelband ‘‘chance consists； according to usage； in the merely factual but not necessary transition from a possibility to an actuality。 Chance is the negation of necessity。 It is a contradiction to say ‘This happened by accident；' for the word ‘by' expressed a cause。''
＇1＇ Windelband： Die Lehren vom Zufall。 Berlin 1870。
A。 Hfler＇1＇ says most intelligently； that the contradiction of the idea of chance by the causal law may be easily solved by indicating the especial relativity of the concept。 （Accidental with regard to _*one_； but otherwise appearing as a possible causal series）。
＇1＇ Cf。 S。 Freud： Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben。
The lesson of these definitions is obvious。 What we call chance plays a great rle in our legal work。 On our recognizing a combination of circumstances as accidental the result of the trial in most cases depends； and the distinction between accident and law depends upon the amount of knowledge concerning the events of the daily life especially。 Now the use of this knowledge in particular cases consists in seeking out the causal relation in a series of events which are adduced as proof； and in turning accident into order。 Or； in cases where the law which unites or separates the events can not be discovered； it may consist in the very cautious interpretation of the combination of events on the principle _simul cum hoc non est propter hoc_。
Section 30。 （h） Persuasion and Explanation。
How in the course of trial are people convinced？ The criminalist has as presiding officer not only to provide the truth which convinces； it is his business as state official to convince the defendant of the correctness of the arguments adduced； the witness of his duty to tell the truth。 But he again is often himself convinced by a witness or an accused personcorrectly or incorrectly。 Mittermaier＇2＇ calls conviction a condition in which our belief…it…is…true depends on full satisfactory grounds of which we are aware。 But this state of conviction is a goal to be reached and our work is not done until the convincing material has been provided。 Seeking the truth is not enough。 Karl Gerock assures us that no philosophical system offers us the full and finished truth； but there is a truth for the idealist； and to ask Pilate's blas of the first glance often takes the prize from scholarship。 All hasty； decisive judgment betrays； when it becomes habitual； superficiality of observation and impiety against the essential character of particular facts。 Children know as completely determined and certain a great deal which is doubtful to the mature man'' （V。 Volkmar）。
So； frequently； the simplest thing we are told gets its value from the manner of telling； or from the person of the narrator。 And inasmuch as we ourselves are much more experienced and skilful in arranging and grouping facts than are our witnesses and the accused； it often happens that we persuade these people and that is the matter which wants consideration。
Nobody will assert that it will occur to any judge to persuade a witness to anything which he does not thoroughly believe； but we know how