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nly how circumstantial every conclusion from analogy is； but also how little it achieves。 There is hardly any doubt of the well…known fact that science has much to thank analogy for； since analogy is the simplest and easiest means for progress in thought。 If anything is established in any one direction but progress is desired in another； then the attempt is made to adapt what is known to the proximate unknown and to draw the possible inference by analogy。 Thousands upon thousands of analogies have been attempted and have failed； but no matter； one successful one became a hypothesis and finally an important natural law。 In our work； however； the case is altogether different； for we are not concerned with the construction of hypotheses； we are concerned with the discovering of truth； or with the recognition that it cannot be discovered。
The only place where our problems permit of the use of analogy is in the making of so…called constructions； i。 e。； when we aim to clarify or to begin the explanation of a case which is at present unintelligible； by making some assumption。 The construction then proceeds in analogy to some already well known earlier case。 We say： ‘‘Suppose the case to have been so and so；'' and then we begin to test the assumption by applying it to the material before us； eliminating and constructing progressively until we get a consistent result。 There is no doubt that success is frequently attained in this way and that it is often the only way in which a work may be begun。 At the same time； it must be recognized how dangerous this is； for in the eagerness of the work it is easy to forget that so far； one is working only according to analogy by means of an assumption still to be proved。 This assumption is in such cases suddenly considered as something already proved and is counted as such with the consequence that the result must be false。 If you add the variability in value of analogy； a variability not often immediately recognized； the case becomes still worse。 We have never been on the moon； have therefore apparently no right to judge the conditions thereand still we knowonly by way of analogy that if we jumped into the air there we should fall back to the ground。 But still further： we conclude again； by analogy； that there are intelligent beings on Mars； if； however； we were to say how these people might look； whether like us or like cubes or like threads； whether they are as large as bees or ten elephants； we should have to give up because we have not the slightest basis for analogy。
In the last analysis； analogy depends upon the recurrence of similar conditions。 Therefore we tacitly assume when we judge by analogy that the similarity of conditions contains an equivalence of ultimately valid circumstance。 The certainty of analogy is as great as the certainty of this postulate； and its right as great as the right of this postulate。
If； then； the postulate is little certain； we have gained nothing and reach out into the dark； if its certainty is great we no longer have an analogy； we have a natural law。 Hence； Whately uses the term analogy as an expression for the similarity of relation； and in this regard the use of analogy for our real work has no special significance。 Concerning so…called false analogies and their importance cf。 J。 Schiel's Die Methode der induktiven Forschung （Braunschweig 1868）。
Section 28。 （f） Probability。
Inasmuch as the work of the criminal judge depends upon the proof of evidence； it is conceivable that the thing for him most important is that which has evidential character or force。＇1＇ A sufficient definition of evidence or proof does not exist because no bounds have been set to the meaning of ‘‘Proved。'' All disciplines furnish examples of the fact that things for a long time had probable validity； later indubitable validity； that again some things were considered proved and were later shown to be incorrect； and that many things at one time wobbly are in various places； and even among particular persons； supposed to be at the limits of probability and proof。 Es… pecially remarkable is the fact that the concept of _*the proved_ is very various in various sciences； and it would be absorbing to establish the difference between what is called proved and what only probable in a number of given examples by the mathematician； the physicist； the chemist； the physician； the naturalist； the philologist； the historian； the philosopher； the lawyer； the theologian； etc。 But this is no task for us and nobody is called upon to determine who knows what ‘‘Proved'' means。 It is enough to observe that the differences are great and to understand why we criminalists have such various answers to the question： Is this proved or only probable？ The varieties may be easily divided into groups according to the mathematical； philosophic； historical or naturalistic inclinations of the answerer。 Indeed； if the individual is known； what he means by ‘‘proved'' can be determined beforehand。 Only those minds that have no especial information remain confused in this regard； both to others and to themselves。
＇1＇ B。 Petronievics： Der Satz vom Grunde。 Leipzig 1898。
Sharply to define the notion of ‘‘proved'' would require at least to establish its relation to usage and to say： What we desire leads us to an _*assumption_； what is possible gives us _*probability_； what appears certain； we call _*proved_。 In this regard the second is always； in some degree； the standard for the first （desires； e。 g。； cause us to act； one becomes predominant and is fixed as an assumption which later on becomes clothed with a certain amount of reliability by means of this fixation）。
The first two fixations； the assumption and the probability； have in contrast to their position among other sciences only a heuristic interest to us criminalists。 Even assumptions； when they become hypotheses； have in various disciplines a various value； and the greatest lucidity and the best work occur mainly in the quarrel about an acutely constructed hypothesis。
_*Probability_ has a similar position in the sciences。 The scholar who has discovered a new thought； a new order； explanation or solution； etc。； will find it indifferent whether he has made it only highly probable or certain。 He is concerned only with the idea； and a scholar who is dealing with the idea for its own sake will perhaps prefer to bring it to a great probability rather than to indubitable certainty； for where conclusive proof is presented there is no longer much interest in further research； while probability permits and requires further study。 But our aim is certainty and proof only； and even a high degree of probability is no better than untruth and can not count。 In passing judgment and for the purpose of judgment a high degree of probability can have only corroborative weight； and then it is probability only when taken in itself； and proof when taken with regard to the thing it corroborates。 If； for example； it is most probable that X was recognized at the place of a crime； and if at the same time his evidence of alibi has failed； his footmarks are corroborative； so are the stolen goods which have been seen in his possession； and someth