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nd the whole work has gone for nothing。 Such occurrences convince one that no judge would have been guilty of them if the few difficulties concerning the fact in question were not； because treated in the light of the effort required by the logical work； quite neglected。 Nor does this occur unconsciously； or as a consequence of a sort of lapse of memory concerning the meaning or the importance of an empirical problem； it also happens at least half consciously by way of a characteristic psychic process which everybody may identify in his own experience： i。 e。； the idea occurs； in some degree subconsciously； that the overgreatness of the work done in one direction ought to be corrected by the inadequacy of the work done in the other direction。 And this happens in lawyer's work often； and being frequently justifiable； becomes habitual。 If I； for example； have examined ten unanimous witnesses concerning the same event and have completely demonstrated the status of the case； I ought； in examining the last two witnesses； who are perhaps no longer needed but have been summoned and appear； certainly to proceed in a rapid manner。 This justifiable neglect is then half unconsciously transferred to other procedures where there is possible no equalization of the hypertrophy of work in one direction with the dwarfing of it in another； and where the mistake causes the result to be wrong。 However I may have been bothered by the multiplication of ten groups of factors and whatever accuracy I may have applied to a task can not permit me to relax my attention in the addition of the individual results。 If I do I am likely to commit an error and the error renders all the previous labor worthless。
Indeed； it may be asserted that all logic is futile where the premises or a single premise may be wrong。 I expect； in truth； that the procedures here described will be doubted to be even possible； but doubters are recommended to examine a few cases for the presence of this sort of thing。
Section 27。 （e） Analogy。
Analogy is the least negligible of all methods of induction because it rests at bottom on the postulate that one thing which has a number of qualities in common with another will agree with that other in one or more _*additional_ qualities。 In cases of analogy； identity is never asserted； indeed； it is excluded； while a certain parallelism and agreement in specific points are assumed； i。 e。； introduced tacitly as a mutatis mutandis。 Consider Lipps's examples。 He calls analogy the transfer of judgment or the transition from similar to similar； and he adds that the value of such a process is very variable。 If I have perceived x times that flowers of a certain color have perfume； I am inclined to expect perfume from flowers of the same color in x＋1 cases。 If I have observed x times that clouds of a certain structure are followed by rain I shall expect rain in the x＋1st case。 The first analogy is worthless because there is no relation between color and perfume； the second is of great value because such a relation does exist between rain and clouds。
Simply stated； the difference between these two examples does not consist in the existence of a relationship in the one case and the absence of a relationship in the other； it consists in the fact that in the case of the flowers the relationship occurs now and then but is not permanently knowable。 It is possible that there is a natural law controlling the relation between color and odor； and if that law were known there would be no question of accident or of analogy； but of law。 Our ignorance of such a law； in spite of the multiplicity of instances； lies in the fact that we are concerned only with the converse relationships and not with the common cause of perfume and color。 Suppose I see on the street a large number of people with winter over…coats and a large number of people with skates in their hands； I would hardly ask whether the coats are conditioned or brought out by the skates or the skates by the coats。 If I do not conclude that the cold weather is the condition both of the need of over…coats and the utility of skates； I will suppose that there is some unintelligible reflexive relation between over…coats and skates。 If I observe that on a certain day every week there regularly appear many well…dressed people and no workingmen on the street； if I am ignorant of the fact that Sunday is the cause of the appearance of the one and the disappearance of the other； I shall try in vain to find out how it happens that the working people are crowded out by the well…dressed ones or conversely。
The danger of analogy lies in the fact that we prefer naturally to depend on something already known； and that the preference is the greater in proportion to our feeling of the strangeness and ominousness of the particular intellectual or natural regions in which we find ourselves。 I have already once demonstrated＇1＇ how disquieting it is to notice； during the examination of the jury； that the jurymen who ask questions try to find some relation to their own trades even though this requires great effort； and seek to bring the case they are asking about under the light of their particular profession。 So； however irrelevant the statement of a witness may be； the merchant juryman will use it to explain Saldo…Conti； the carpenter juryman to explain carpentry； the agriculturist to notice the farming of cattle； and then having set the problem in his own field construct the most daring analogies； for use in determining the guilt of the accused。 And we lawyers are no better。 The more difficult and newer a case is the more are we inclined to seek analogies。 We want supports； for we do not find firm natural laws； and in our fear we reach out after analogies； not of course in law； because that is not permitted； but certainly in matters of fact。 Witness X has given difficult testimony in a certain case。 We seek an analogy in witness Y of an older case； and we observe the present issue thus analogically； without the least justification。 We have never yet seen drops of blood on colored carpets； yet we believe in applying our experience of blood stains on clothes and boots analogically。 We have before us a perfectly novel deed rising from perverted sexual impulseand we presuppose that the accused is to be treated altogether analogously to another in a different case； although indeed the whole event was different。
＇1＇ Manual for Examining Justices。
Moreover the procedure； where the analogy is justified； is complex。 ‘‘With insight；'' says Trendelenburg； ‘‘did the ancients regard analogy as important。 The power of analogy lies in the construction and induction of a general term which binds the subconcept with regard to which a conclusion is desired； together with the individual object which is compared with the first； and which is to appear as a mediating concept but can not。 This new general term is not； however； the highest concept among the three termini of the conclusion； it is the middle one and is nothing else than the terminus medius of the first figure。'' This clear statement shows not only how circumstantial every conclusion from analogy is； but also how little it achieves。 There is h