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accordance with external laws is unjust （unjustum）。
A collision of duties or obligations （collisio officiorum s。
obligationum） would be the result of such a relation between them that
the one would annul the other； in whole or in part。 Duty and
obligation； however； are conceptions which express the objective
practical necessity of certain actions； and two opposite rules
cannot be objective and necessary at the same time； for if it is a
duty to act according to one of them； it is not only no duty to act
according to an opposite rule； but to do so would even be contrary
to duty。 Hence a collision of duties and obligations is entirely
inconceivable （obligationes non colliduntur）。 There may； however； be
two grounds of obligation （rationes obligandi）； connected with an
individual under a rule prescribed for himself； and yet neither the
one nor the other may be sufficient to constitute an actual obligation
（rationes obligandi non obligantes）； and in that case the one of
them is not a duty。 If two such grounds of obligation are actually
in collision with each other； practical philosophy does not say that
the stronger obligation is to keep the upper hand （fortior obligatio
vincit）； but that the stronger ground of obligation is to maintain its
place （fortior obligandi ratio vincit）。
Obligatory Laws for which an external legislation is possible are
called generally external laws。 Those external laws； the
obligatoriness of which can be recognised by reason a priori even
without an external legislation； are called natural laws。 Those
laws； again； which are not obligatory without actual external
legislation； are called positive laws。 An external legislation；
containing pure natural laws； is therefore conceivable； but in that
case a previous natural law must be presupposed to establish the
authority of the lawgiver by the right to subject others to obligation
through his own act of will。
The principle which makes a certain action a duty is a practical
law。 The rule of the agent or actor； which he forms as a principle for
himself on subjective grounds； is called his maxim。 Hence； even when
the law is one and invariable； the maxims of the agent may yet be very
different。
The categorical imperative only expresses generally what constitutes
obligation。 It may be rendered by the following formula： 〃Act
according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a
universal law。〃 Actions must therefore be considered； in the first
place； according to their subjective principle； but whether this
principle is also valid objectively can only be known by the criterion
of the categorical imperative。 For reason brings the principle or
maxim of any action to the test； by calling upon the agent to think of
himself in connection with it as at the same time laying down a
universal law； and to consider whether his action is so qualified as
to be fit for entering into such a universal legislation。
The simplicity of this law； in comparison with the great and
manifold consequences which may be drawn from it； as well as its
commanding authority and supremacy without the accompaniment of any
visible motive or sanction； must certainly at first appear very
surprising。 And we may well wonder at the power of our reason to
determine the activity of the will by the mere idea of the
qualification of a maxim for the universality of a practical law；
especially when we are taught thereby that this practical moral law
first reveals a property of the will which the speculative reason
would never have come upon either by principles a priori； or from
any experience whatever； and even if it had ascertained the fact； it
could never have theoretically established its possibility。 This
practical law； however； not only discovers the fact of that property
of the will； which is freedom； but irrefutably establishes it。 Hence
it will be less surprising to find that the moral laws are
undemonstrable； and yet apodeictic； like the mathematical
postulates； and that they； at the same time； open up before us a whole
field of practical knowledge； from which reason； on its theoretical
side； must find itself entirely excluded with its speculative idea
of freedom and all such ideas of the supersensible generally。
The conformity of an action to the law of duty constitutes its
legality； the conformity of the maxim of the action with the law
constitutes its morality。 A maxim is thus a subjective principle of
action； which the individual makes a rule for himself as to how in
fact he will act。
On the other hand； the principle of duty is what reason
absolutely； and therefore objectively and universally； lays down in
the form of a command to the individual； as to how he ought to act。
The supreme principle of the science of morals accordingly is
this： 〃Act according to a maxim which can likewise be valid as a
universal law。〃 Every maxim which is not qualified according to this
condition is contrary to Morality。
Laws arise from the will； viewed generally as practical reason；
maxims spring from the activity of the will in the process of
choice。 The latter in man is what constitutes free…will。 The will
which refers to nothing else than mere law can neither be called
free nor not free； because it does not relate to actions
immediately； but to the giving of a law for the maxim of actions； it
is therefore the practical reason itself。 Hence as a faculty； it is
absolutely necessary in itself； and is not subject to any external
necessitation。 It is； therefore； only the act of choice in the
voluntary process that can be called free。
The freedom of the act of will； however； is not to be defined as a
liberty of indifference （libertas indifferentae）； that； is； as a
capacity of choosing to act for or against the law。 The voluntary
process； indeed； viewed as a phenomenal appearance； gives many
examples of this choosing in experience； and some have accordingly
so defined the free…will。 For freedom； as it is first made knowable by
the moral law； is known only as a negative property in us； as
constituted by the fact of not being necessitated to act by sensible
principles of determination。 Regarded as a noumenal reality；
however； in reference to man as a pure rational intelligence； the
act of the will cannot be at all theoretically exhibited； nor can it
therefore be explained how this power can act necessitatingly in
relation to the sensible activity in the process of choice； or
consequently in what the positive quality of freedom consists。 Only
thus much we can see into and comprehend； that although man； as a
being belonging to the world of sense； exhibits… as experience
shows… a capacity of choosing not only conformably to the law but also
contrary to it； his freedom as a rational being belonging to the world
of intelligence cannot be defined by reference merely to sensible
appearances。 For sensible phenomena cannot make a super…sensible
object… such as free…will is… intelligible； n