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practical reason。 Instruction in the laws of morality is not drawn
from observation of oneself or of our animal nature； nor from
perception of the course of the world in regard to what happens； or
how men act。* But reason commands how we ought to act； even although
no example of such action were to be found； nor does reason give any
regard to the advantage which may accrue to us by so acting； and which
experience could alone actually show。 For； although reason allows us
to seek what is for our advantage in every possible way； and although；
founding upon the evidence of experience； it may further promise
that greater advantages will probably follow on the average from the
observance of her commands than from their transgression； especially
if prudence guides the conduct； yet the authority of her precepts as
commands does not rest on such considerations。 They are used by reason
only as counsels； and by way of a counterpoise against seductions to
an opposite course； when adjusting beforehand the equilibrium of a
partial balance in the sphere of practical judgement； in order thereby
to secure the decision of this judgement； according to the due
weight of the a priori principles of a pure practical reason。
*This holds notwithstanding the fact that the term morals；〃 in Latin
mores； and in German sitten； signifies originally only manners or mode
of life。
Metaphysics designates any system of knowledge a priori that
consists of pure conceptions。 Accordingly； a practical philosophy
not having nature； but the freedom of the will for its object； will
presuppose and require a metaphysic of morals。 It is even a duty to
have such a metaphysic； and every man does； indeed； possess it in
himself； although commonly but in an obscure way。 For how could any
one believe that he has a source of universal law in himself；
without principles a priori？ And just as in a metaphysics of nature
there must be principles regulating the application of the universal
supreme principles of nature to objects of experience； so there cannot
but be such principles in the metaphysic of morals； and we will
often have to deal objectively with the particular nature of man as
known only by experience； in order to show in it the consequences of
these universal moral principles。 But this mode of dealing with
these principles in their particular applications will in no way
detract from their rational purity； or throw doubt on their a priori
origin。 In other words； this amounts to saying that a metaphysic of
morals cannot be founded on anthropology as the empirical science of
man； but may be applied to it。
The counterpart of a metaphysic of morals； and the other member of
the division of practical philosophy； would be a moral anthropology；
as the empirical science of the moral nature of man。 This science
would contain only the subjective conditions that hinder or favor
the realization in practice of the universal moral laws in human
nature； with the means of propagating； spreading； and strengthening
the moral principles… as by the education of the young and the
instruction of the people… and all other such doctrines and precepts
founded upon experience and indispensable in themselves； although they
must neither precede the metaphysical investigation of the
principles of reason； nor be mixed up with it。 For； by doing so； there
would be a great danger of laying down false； or at least very
flexible moral laws； which would hold forth as unattainable what is
not attached only because the law has not been comprehended and
presented in its purity； in which also its strength consists。 Or；
otherwise； spurious and mixed motives might be adopted instead of what
is dutiful and good in itself； and these would furnish no certain
moral principles either for the guidance of the judgement or for the
discipline of the heart in the practice of duty。 It is only by pure
reason； therefore； that duty can and must be prescribed。
The higher division of philosophy； under which the division just
mentioned stands； is into theoretical philosophy and practical
philosophy。 Practical philosophy is just moral philosophy in its
widest sense； as has been explained elsewhere。* All that is
practicable and possible； according to natural laws； is the special
subject of the activity of art； and its precepts and rules entirely
depend on the theory of nature。 It is only what is practicable
according to laws of freedom that can have principles independent of
theory； for there is no theory in relation to what passes beyond the
determinations of nature。 Philosophy therefore cannot embrace under
its practical division a technical theory； but only a morally
practical doctrine。 But if the dexterity of the will in acting
according to laws of freedom； in contradistinction to nature； were
to be also called an art； it would necessarily indicate an art which
would make a system of freedom possible like the system of nature。
This would truly be a Divine art； if we were in a position by means of
it to realize completely what reason prescribes to us； and to put
the idea into practice。
*In the Critique of Judgement （1790）。
III。 THE DIVISION OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS。
All legislation； whether relating to internal or external action；
and whether prescribed a priori by mere reason or laid down by the
will of another； involves two elements： First； a law which
represents the action that ought to happen as necessary objectively；
thus making the action a duty； second； a motive which connects the
principle determining the will to this action with the mental
representation of the law subjectively； so that the law makes duty the
motive of the action。 By the first element； the action is
represented as a duty； in accordance with the mere theoretical
knowledge of the possibility of determining the activity of the will
by practical rules。 By the second element； the obligation so to act is
connected in the subject with a determining principle of the will as
such。 All legislation； therefore； may be differentiated by reference
to its motive…principle。* The legislation which makes an action a
duty； and this duty at the same time a motive； is ethical。 That
legislation which does not include the motive…principle in the law；
and consequently admits another motive than the idea of duty itself；
is juridical。 In respect of the latter； it is evident that the motives
distinct from the idea of duty； to which it may refer； must be drawn
from the subjective （pathological） influences of inclination and of
aversion； determining the voluntary activity； and especially from
the latter； because it is a legislation which has to be compulsory；
and not merely a mode of attracting or persuading。 The agreement or
non…agreement of an action with the law； without reference to its
motive； is its legality； and that character of the action in which the
idea of duty arising from the law at the same time forms the motive of