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act of choice； and also the mere act of wish； in so far as reason
may determine the faculty of desire in its activity。 The act of choice
that can be determined by pure reason constitutes the act of
free…will。 That act which is determinable only by inclination as a
sensuous impulse or stimulus would be irrational brute choice
（arbitrium brutum）。 The human act of choice； however； as human； is
in fact affected by such impulses or stimuli； but is not determined by
them； and it is； therefore； not pure in itself when taken apart from
the acquired habit of determination by reason。 But it may be
determined to action by the pure will。 The freedom of the act of
volitional choice is its independence of being determined by
sensuous impulses or stimuli。 This forms the negative conception of
the free…will。 The positive conception of freedom is given by the fact
that the will is the capability of pure reason to be practical of
itself。 But this is not possible otherwise than by the maxim of
every action being subjected to the condition of being practicable
as a universal law。 Applied as pure reason to the act of choice； and
considered apart from its objects； it may be regarded as the faculty
of principles； and； in this connection； it is the source of
practical principles。 Hence it is to be viewed as a law…giving
faculty。 But as the material upon which to construct a law is not
furnished to it； it can only make the form of the form of the maxim of
the act of will； in so far as it is available as a universal law；
the supreme law and determining principle of the will。 And as the
maxims； or rules of human action derived from subjective causes； do
not of themselves necessarily agree with those that are objective
and universal； reason can only prescribe this supreme law as an
absolute imperative of prohibition or command。
The laws of freedom； as distinguished from the laws of nature； are
moral laws。 So far as they refer only to external actions and their
lawfulness； they are called juridical； but if they also require
that； as laws； they shall themselves be the determining principles
of our actions； they are ethical。 The agreement of an action with
juridical laws is its legality； the agreement of an action with
ethical laws is its morality。 The freedom to which the former laws
refer； can only be freedom in external practice； but the freedom to
which the latter laws refer is freedom in the internal as well as
the external exercise of the activity of the will in so far as it is
determined by laws of reason。 So； in theoretical philosophy； it is
said that only the objects of the external senses are in space； but
all the objects both of internal and external sense are in time；
because the representations of both； as being representations； so
far belong all to the internal sense。 In like manner； whether
freedom is viewed in reference to the external or the internal
action of the will； its laws； as pure practical laws of reason for the
free activity of the will generally； must at the same time be inner
principles for its determination； although they may not always be
considered in this relation。
II。 THE IDEA AND NECESSITY OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS。
It has been shown in The Metaphysical Principles of the Science of
Nature that there must be principles a priori for the natural
science that has to deal with the objects of the external senses。
And it was further shown that it is possible； and even necessary； to
formulate a system of these principles under the name of a
〃metaphysical science of nature；〃 as a preliminary to experimental
physics regarded as natural science applied to particular objects of
experience。 But this latter science； if care be taken to keep its
generalizations free from error； may accept many propositions as
universal on the evidence of experience； although if the term
〃universal〃 be taken in its strict sense； these would necessarily have
to be deduced by the metaphysical science from principles a priori。
Thus Newton accepted the principle of the equality of action and
reaction as established by experience； and yet he extended it as a
universal law over the whole of material nature。 The chemists go
even farther； grounding their most general laws regarding the
combination and decomposition of the materials of bodies wholly upon
experience； and yet they trust so completely to the universality and
necessity of those laws that they have no anxiety as to any error
being found in propositions founded upon experiments conducted in
accordance with them。
But it is otherwise with moral laws。 These； in contradistinction
to natural laws； are only valid as laws； in so far as they can be
rationally established a priori and comprehended as necessary。 In
fact； conceptions and judgements regarding ourselves and our conduct
have no moral significance； if they contain only what may be learned
from experience； and when any one is； so to speak； misled into
making a moral principle out of anything derived from this latter
source； he is already in danger of falling into the coarsest and
most fatal errors。
If the philosophy of morals were nothing more than a theory of
happiness （eudaemonism）； it would be absurd to search after principles
a priori as a foundation for it。 For however plausible it may sound to
say that reason； even prior to experience； can comprehend by what
means we may attain to a lasting enjoyment of the real pleasures of
life； yet all that is taught on this subject a priori is either
tautological； or is assumed wholly without foundation。 It is only
experience that can show what will bring us enjoyment。 The natural
impulses directed towards nourishment； the sexual instinct； or the
tendency to rest and motion； as well as the higher desires of
honour； the acquisition of knowledge； and such like； as developed with
our natural capacities； are alone capable of showing in what those
enjoyments are to be found。 And； further； the knowledge thus
acquired is available for each individual merely in his own way； and
it is only thus he can learn the means by which be has to seek those
enjoyments。 All specious rationalizing a priori； in this connection；
is nothing at bottom but carrying facts of experience up to
generalizations by induction （secundum principia generalia non
universalia）； and the generality thus attained is still so limited
that numberless exceptions must be allowed to every individual in
order that he may adapt the choice of his mode of life to his own
Particular inclinations and his capacity for pleasure。 And； after all；
the individual has really to acquire his prudence at the cost of his
own suffering or that of his neighbors the form
But it is quite otherwise with the principles of morality。 They
lay down commands for every one without regard to his particular
inclinations； and merely because and so far as he is free； and has a
practical reason。 Instruction in the laws of morality is not drawn
from