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being。
It is to be observed； first； that with desire or aversion there is
always connected pleasure or pain； the susceptibility for which is
called feeling。 But the converse does not always hold； for there may
be a pleasure connected； not with the desire of an object； but with
a mere mental representation； it being indifferent whether an object
corresponding to the representation exist or not。 And second； the
pleasure or pain connected with the object of desire does not always
precede the activity of desire； nor can it be regarded in every case
as the cause； but it may as well be the effect of that activity。 The
capacity of experiencing pleasure or pain on the occasion of a
mental representation is called 〃feeling；〃 because pleasure and pain
contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental
activity。 They do not involve any relation to an object that could
possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such； they cannot even give us a
knowledge of our own mental state。 For even sensations；* considered
apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the
modifications of the subject… as； for instance； in reference to red；
sweet； and such like… are referred as constituent elements of
knowledge to objects； whereas pleasure or pain felt in connection with
what is red or sweet express absolutely nothing that is in the object；
but merely a relation to the subject。 And for the reason just
stated； pleasure and pain considered in themselves cannot be more
precisely defined。 All that can be further done with regard to them is
merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain
relations； in order to make the knowledge of them available
practically。
*The sensibility as the faculty of sense may be defined by reference
to the subjective nature of our representations generally。 It is the
understanding that fir refers the subjective representations to an
object； it alone thinks anything by means of these representations。
Now； the subjective nature of our representations might be of such a
kind that they could be related to objects so as to furnish
knowledge of them； either in regard to their form or matter… in the
former relation by pure perception； in the latter by sensation proper。
In this case； the sense…faculty； as the capacity for receiving
objective representations； would be properly called sense
perception。 But mere mental representation from its subjective
nature cannot； in fact； become a constituent of objective knowledge；
because it contains merely the relation of the representations to
the subject； and includes nothing that can be used for attaining a
knowledge of the object。 In this case； then； this receptivity of the
mind for subjective representations is called feeling。 It includes the
effect of the representations； whether sensible or intellectual；
upon the subject； and it belongs to the sensibility； although the
representation itself may belong to the understanding or the reason。
The pleasure which is necessarily connected with the activity of
desire； when the representation of the object desired affects the
capacity of feeling； may be called practical pleasure。 And this
designation is applicable whether the pleasure is the cause or the
effect of the desire。 On the other hand； that pleasure which is not
necessarily connected with the desire of an object； and which；
therefore； is not a pleasure in the existence of the object； but is
merely attached to a mental representation alone； may be called
inactive complacency； or mere contemplative pleasure。 The feeling of
this latter kind of pleasure is what is called taste。 Hence； in a
system of practical philosophy； the contemplative pleasure of taste
will not be discussed as an essential constituent conception； but need
only be referred to incidentally or episodically。 But as regards
practical pleasure； it is otherwise。 For the determination of the
activity of the faculty of desire or appetency； which is necessarily
preceded by this pleasure as its cause； is what properly constitutes
desire in the strict sense of the term。 Habitual desire； again；
constitutes inclination； and the connection of pleasure with the
activity of desire； in so far as this connection is judged by the
understanding to be valid according to a general rule holding good
at least for the individual； is what is called interest。 Hence； in
such a case； the practical pleasure is an interest of the
inclination of the individual。 On the other hand； if the pleasure
can only follow a preceding determination of the faculty of desire； it
is an intellectual pleasure； and the interest in the object must be
called a rational interest； for were the interest sensuous； and not
based only upon pure principles of reason； sensation would necessarily
be conjoined with the pleasure； and would thus determine the
activity of the desire。 Where an entirely pure interest of reason must
be assumed； it is not legitimate to introduce into it an interest of
inclination surreptitiously。 However； in order to conform so far
with the common phraseology； we may allow the application of the
term 〃inclination〃 even to that which can only be the object of an
〃intellectual〃 pleasure in the sense of a habitual desire arising from
a pure interest of reason。 But such inclination would have to be
viewed； not as the cause； but as the effect of the rational
interest； and we might call it the non…sensuous or rational
inclination （propensio intellectualis）。 Further； concupiscence is to
be distinguished from the activity of desire itself； as a stimulus
or incitement to its determination。 It is always a sensuous state of
the mind； which does not itself attain to the definiteness of an act
of the power of desire。
The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with
conceptions； and in so far as the principle thus determining it to
action is found in the mind； and not in its object it constitutes a
power acting or not acting according to liking。 In so far as the
activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of the
action to produce the object； it forms an act of choice； if this
consciousness is not conjoined with it； the activity is called a wish。
The faculty of desire； in so far as its inner principle of
determination as the ground of its liking or predilection lies in
the reason of the subject； constitutes the will。 The will is therefore
the faculty of active desire or appetency； viewed not so much in
relation to the action… which is the relation of the act of choice… as
rather in relation to the principle that determines the power of
choice to the action。 It has； in itself； properly no special principle
of determination； but in so far as it may determine the voluntary
act of choice； it is the practical reason itself。
Under the will； taken generally； may be included the volitional
act of choice； and also the mere act of wish； in so far as reason
may determine the faculty of desi