按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
evacuation cannot possibly be justified。'
The true policy was obvious。 A strong manSir Samuel Baker；
perhaps
must be sent to Khartoum； with a large contingent of Indian and
Turkish
troops and with two millions of money。 He would very soon
overpower the
Mahdi； whose forces would 'fall to pieces of themselves'。 For in
Gordon's opinion it was 'an entire mistake to regard the Mahdi as
in any sense a religious leader'； he would collapse as soon as he
was face to face with an English general。 Then the distant
regions of Darfur and Equatoria could once more be occupied；
their original Sultans could be reinstated； the whole country
would be placed under civilised rule； and the slave…trade would
be finally abolished。 These were the views which Gordon publicly
expressed on January 9th and on January 14th； and it certainly
seems strange that on January 10th and on January 14th； Lord
Granville should have proposed； without a word of consultation
with Gordon himself； to send him on a mission which involved； not
the reconquest； but the abandonment of the Sudan； Gordon； indeed；
when he was actually approached by Lord Wolseley； had apparently
agreed to become the agent of a policy which was exactly the
reverse of his own。 No doubt； too； it is possible for a
subordinate to suppress his private convictions and to carry out
loyally； in spite of them； the orders of his superiors。 But how
rare are the qualities of self…control and wisdom which such a
subordinate must possess！ And how little reason there was to
think that General Gordon possessed them！
In fact； the conduct of the Government wears so singular an
appearance that it has seemed necessary to account for it by some
ulterior explanation。 It has often been asserted that the true
cause of Gordon's appointment was the clamour in the Press。 It is
said among others； by Sir Evelyn Baring himself； who has given
something like an official sanction to this view of the case
that
the Government could not resist the pressure of the newspapers
and the feeling in the country which it indicated； that
Ministers； carried off their feet by a wave of 'Gordon cultus'；
were obliged to give way to the inevitable。 But this suggestion
is hardly supported by an examination of the facts。 Already；
early in December； and many weeks before Gordon's name had begun
to figure in the newspapers； Lord Granville had made his first
effort to induce Sir Evelyn Baring to accept Gordon's services。
The first newspaper demand for a Gordon mission appeared in the
〃Pall Mall Gazette〃 on the afternoon of January 9th； and the very
next morning； Lord Granville was making his second telegraphic
attack upon Sir Evelyn Baring。 The feeling in the Press did not
become general until the 11th； and on the 14th Lord Granville； in
his telegram to Mr。 Gladstone； for the third time proposed the
appointment of Gordon。 Clearly； on the part of Lord Granville at
any rate； there was no extreme desire to resist the wishes of the
Press。 Nor was the Government as a whole by any means incapable
of ignoring public opinion； a few months were to show that；
plainly enough。 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if
Ministers had been opposed to the appointment of Gordon； he would
never have been appointed。 As it was； the newspapers were in fact
forestalled； rather than followed； by the Government。
How； then； are we to explain the Government's action？ Are we to
suppose that its members； like the members of the public at
large； were themselves carried away by a sudden enthusiasm； a
sudden conviction that they had found their saviour； that General
Gordon was the manthey did not quite know why； but that was of
no consequencethe one man to get them out of the whole Sudan
difficultythey did not quite know how； but that was of no
consequence either if only he were sent to Khartoum？ Doubtless
even Cabinet Ministers are liable to such impulses； doubtless it
is possible that the Cabinet of that day allowed itself to drift；
out of mere lack of consideration； and judgment； and foresight；
along the rapid stream of popular feeling towards the inevitable
cataract。 That may be so； yet there are indications that a more
definite influence was at work。 There was a section of the
Government which had never become quite reconciled to the policy
of withdrawing from the Sudan。 To this sectionwe may call it
the imperialist sectionwhich was led； inside the Cabinet； by
Lord Hartington； and outside by Lord Wolseley； the policy which
really commended itself was the very policy which had been
outlined by General Gordon in his interview with Mr。 Stead and
his
letter to Sir Samuel Baker。 They saw that it might be necessary
to abandon some of the outlying parts of the Sudan to the Mahdi；
but the prospect of leaving the whole province in his hands was
highly distasteful to them； above all； they dreaded the loss of
Khartoum。 Now； supposing that General Gordon； in response to a
popular agitation in the Press； were sent to Khartoum； what would
follow？ Was it not at least possible that； once there； with his
views and his character； he would； for some reason or other；
refrain from carrying out a policy of pacific retreat？ Was it not
possible that in that case he might so involve the English
Government that it would find itself obliged； almost
imperceptibly perhaps； to substitute for its policy of withdrawal
a policy of advance？ Was it not possible that General Gordon
might get into difficulties； that he might be surrounded and cut
off from Egypt'？ If that were to happen； how could the English
Government avoid the necessity of sending an expedition to rescue
him？ And； if an English expedition went to the Sudan； was it
conceivable that it would leave the Mahdi as it found him？ In
short； would not the dispatch of General Gordon to Khartoum
involve； almost inevitably； the conquest of the Sudan by British
troops； followed by a British occupation？ And； behind all these
questions； a still larger question loomed。 The position of the
English in Egypt itself was still ambiguous； the future was
obscure； how long； in reality； would an English army remain in
Egypt？ Was not one thing； at least； obvious that if the English
were to conquer and occupy the Sudan； their evacuation of Egypt
would become impossible？
With our present information； it would be rash to affirm that
all； or any； of these considerations were present to the minds of
the imperialist section of the Government。 Yet it is difficult to
believe that a man such as Lord Wolseley； for instance； with his
knowledge of affairs and his knowledge of Gordon； could have
altogether overlooked them。 Lord Hartington； indeed； may well
have failed to realise at once the implications of General
Gordon's appointment for it took Lord Hartington some time t